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I. INTRODUCTION
It is by now a commonplace that we are living in a period of radical
global transformation Particularly in the developing world, this
transformation has had two watchwords: markets and democracy.2 Indeed,
the reascendant teleology of free-market democracy has redefined the very
concept of underdevelopment-a term that has shed its exclusively Third
World trappings and today joins in a single embrace countries from Algeria
to Azerbaijan, from Pakistan to Poland.'
Marketization and democratization each have been the site of massive
Western legal intervention in the developing world. Legal work on
marketization ranges from structuring international project finance4 to
drafting market-oriented laws5 to developing legal regimes that facilitate the
transition from command to market economies.6 Work on democratization
includes not only writing constitutions7 but also grappling with formidable
1. See, e.g., GEORGE SOROS, UNDERWRITING DEMOCRACY at x (1990) (noting the "radical
transformation" of the international political landscape); Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World
Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 774 (1997) (decrying the indifference of American
constitutional thought to "world-historical transformation"); George E. Condon, Jr., Pope Urges
U.S. Not To Shut Door to Immigrants, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRIB., Oct. 5, 1995, at Al (quoting
Pope John Paul II describing the "profound transformation" of the international system); Jim
Hoagland, Bibi's Choice, WASH. POST, June 6, 1996, at A29 (referring to a "dizzying global
transformation").
2. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, WHITHER SOCIALISM? 1-3 (1995); LESTER C. THUROW,
THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM 1-5 (1996); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY
REALIZED (forthcoming Oct. 1998) (manuscript at 5, on file with The Yale Law Journal); THE
WORLD BANK GROUP, LEARNING FROM THE PAST, EMBRACING THE FUTURE 10-13 (1994);
Samuel P. Huntington, Challenges Facing Democracy: What Cost Freedom?, CURRENT, June
1993, at 22, 22.
3. See, e.g., STEPHAN HAGGARD & ROBERT R. KAUFMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS 3, 15-17 (1995); Claus Offe, Cultural Aspects of Consolidation: A
Note on the Peculiarities of Postcommunist Transformations, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Fall 1997, at
64, 64-65 (1997); cf. Michael Mann, Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying,
Developing, Not Dying, DAEDALUS, Summer 1993, at 115, 136 (describing the multitude of
"semieffective states" that are "coping with uneven modernity-unevenly developed or enclave
capitalisms [and] bulging state administrations sponsoring development and dispensing
corruption").
4. See, e.g., John E. Morris, Project Finance: New Telecom and Oil and Gas Deals, Plus
Newly Opened Economies in the Developing World, Brought a Surge of Project Financings, AM.
LAw., Apr. 1997, at 23, 24, 27; Jones Day Poaches Skadden Arps Project Finance Lawyer,
LAWYER, Feb. 11, 1997, at 5.
5. See, e.g., Linda Himelstein, Big Oil Plays a Big Role Shaping Russia's Energy Laws,
LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 13, 1992, at 1; Ken Myers, East-West Scholar Cooperation Becoming a
Booming Business, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 5, 1992, at 4; Tina Rosenberg, In Albania, Justice Is Now at
Least a Possibility: Building Law in the Nation That Defined Communist Lawlessness, LEGAL
TIMES, Jan. 2, 1995, at 1.
6. See, e.g., ABA CENT. & E. EUR. LAW INITIATIVE (CEELI), ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT
LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES IN NIZHNY NOVGOROD OBLAST (1996) [hereinafter
ANALYSIS OF NIzHNY NOVGOROD INVESTMENT LAW]; see also infra text accompanying notes
38-39.
7. See, e.g., RETT R. LUDWIKOWSKI, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN THE REGION OF FORMER
SOVIET DOMINANCE 1-3 (1996); Jon Elster, The Role ofInstitutional Interest in East European
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issues such as the transplantability of Western social and political
institutions' and postcommunist state building.9
But there is one constitutive element of developing societies that these
interventions repeatedly overlook. Entrenched ethnic divisions permeate
most developing countries," and these divisions bear a distinctive and
potentially subversive relationship to the project of marketization and
democratization. In First World countries, markets have tended to reinforce
the economic dominance of a perceived ethnic majority over those
countries' most salient ethnic minorities-hence the controversial calls for
(and backlash against) market-" correcting" affirmative action for blacks
and Hispanics in the United States." In the developing world, the
ethnoeconomic dynamic tends to be just the reverse: Markets often
reinforce the economic dominance of certain ethnic minorities. In the First
World, democracy poses no radical challenge to economically dominant
ethnic groups. 2 By contrast, in the developing world, democracy
characteristically pits a politically powerful but impoverished "indigenous"
majority" against an economically dominant ethnic minority.
Constitution-Making, E. EUR. CONST. REv., Winter 1996, at 63, 63; Stephen Kanter, Constitution
Making in Kazakhstan, 5 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 65 (1993).
8. See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Reducing Bribery in the Public Sector, in CORRUPTION
AND DEMOCRACY 21, 22 (Duc V. Trang ed., 1994) (noting that corruption, itself often a response
to a weak state, may in turn render more difficult "the move to a modem bureaucratic, democratic
state"); Stephen Holmes, Can Weak-State Liberalism Survive? 3-7 (Spring 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal) (discussing the problems hindering the
establishment of a liberal state in postcommunist Russia).
10. See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWrrz, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 3-4, 6 (1985);
ANTHONY D. SMITH, THE ETHNIC REvIvAL 8-12 (1981).
11. See, e.g., William Claibome, Affinnative Action Ban Is Upheld: California Proposition
Constitutionally Valid, U.S. Appeals Panel Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1997, at Al; Anne
Laurent, The Great Divide: Fear, Anger and Resentment in the Federal Diversity Crusade, NAT'L
J., Apr. 1996, at 12. There is obvious artificiality in referring to "whites" as an ethnic group in a
country such as the United States (note, for example, that Italian Americans are counted as
"whites" whereas Hispanic Americans are generally treated as a separate ethnic group). See
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CPH-2-1, 1990 CENSUS OF
POPULATION AND HOUSING: POPULATION AND HOUSING UNIT COUNTS, UNITED STATES app. E-
6 (1990) (requesting information regarding the respondent's "race" in question 4 and asking
whether the respondent is "of Spanish/Hispanic origin" in question 7); see also IAN F. HANEY
LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE at xiv (1996) (noting that"White"
refers to an "unstable category which gains its meaning only through social relations and that
encompasses a profoundly diverse set of persons"). Nonetheless, it remains the case that the core
ethnic problem in countries such as the United States is one that pits an economically and
politically dominant white majority against economically and politically weaker ethnic minorities.
12. See infra note 132. This might change in the future. For example, according to some
demographers (and opponents of immigration), whites could become a minority in the United
States as early as 2050 if percentages of Hispanic, Asian, and African Americans continue to rise.
See Tom Morganthau, The Face of the Future, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 27, 1997, at 58.
13. As explained below, claims of majority "indigenousness" are often extremely artificial.
See infra text accompanying notes 167-172.
1998]
The Yale Law Journal
From these simple premises, a number of profound implications follow.
First, far from having the civilizing effect that Montesquieu envisioned, 4
marketization in the developing world is often destabilizing, fomenting
ethnic envy and hatred among often chronically poor majorities. Second, in
most developing countries, democracy can proceed only in deep tension
with markets. Rather than reinforcing the market's efficiency and wealth-
producing effects, democratization ordinarily will lead to powerful
ethnonationalist, antimarket pressures. Third, ethnic division in the
developing world cannot be regarded as just another aspect of
underdevelopment curable by the universal prescription of free-market
democracy. On the contrary, the combined pursuit of marketization and
democratization in the developing world is likely to catalyze ethnic
tensions, with potentially catastrophic effects, including the subversion of
both markets and democracy.
Despite compelling historical and sociological evidence corroborating
these propositions, i" and despite the unprecedented influence currently
wielded by American lawyers in the developing world, 16  the
interrelationship among marketization, democratization, and ethnic conflict
has been almost entirely ignored." This Article will provide a framework
for analyzing and addressing the consequences likely to ensue when
markets and democracy collide with the particular ethnic structures that
characterize most developing societies.' Although there are other potential
axes of social division in developing societies, over the last several decades
14. See CHARLES L. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE IAWS 338 (Anne M. Cohler et al.
eds. & trans., 1989) (1748); see also Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 329, 352 (1996) (discussing 18th-century economic thinkers who saw commerce
as "softening and civilizing rough manners").
15. See, e.g., infra notes 178-200, 212-241, 252-272, 301-307 and accompanying text.
16. Seeinfranote5l.
17. There is a large theoretical and empirical literature on the correlation between ethnic
fragmentation and economic growth. See, e.g., William Easterly & Ross Levine, Africa's Growth
Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions, 112 QJ. ECON. 1203 (1997); Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples
Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System, 38 INT'L STUD. Q. 347
(1994). There is also a significant literature studying the link between markets and democracy.
See, e.g., CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY REVISITED (Larry Diamond & Marc F.
Plattner eds., 1993); HAGGARD & KAUFMAN, supra note 3; Jos6 Maria Maravall, The Myth of the
Authoritarian Advantage, J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 1994, at 17; Minxin Pei, The Puzzle of the East
Asian Exceptionalism, J. DEMOCRACY, Oct. 1994, at 90. In addition, a growing literature explores
the relationship between democracy and ethnic conflict. See sources cited infra note 208. To date,
however, no one has systematically analyzed the interrelationship among all three forces.
18. In an earlier article, I analyzed the relationship in Latin America and Southeast Asia
between markets and ethnicity. See Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The
Link Between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 223 (1995).
This Article expands my earlier inquiry by adding democratization to the picture and by
broadening my geographical focus. Under the model proposed in this Article, nationalization is
just one of several possible equilibria that may result when markets and democracy are pursued in
the face of entrenched ethnic divisions. See infra text accompanying notes 248-262.
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ethnicity "[a]s a political idea, as a mobilizing principle," 19 has spread
through the world with striking new intensity" and has been a far more
fertile source of mass conflict than, for example, class or religion.21
Part II describes the prevailing law and development paradigm and
argues that the ideology of free-market democracy forms the theoretical
core of today's international development literature, policy, and practice.
Part I highlights a fundamental and pervasive feature of developing
societies that lawyers and legal scholars involved in the developing world
almost uniformly have disregarded. Most developing countries have one or
more ethnic minorities who, for widely varying reasons, have economically
dominated the "indigenous" majorities around them. Under certain
conditions, the presence of an economically dominant minority will
introduce a fundamental tension between markets and democracy. This will
be the case whenever the economically dominant minority is also market-
dominant, meaning that it tends to be economically dominant under market
conditions.22 In developing countries with a market-dominant minority,
markets and democracy will tend to favor different ethnic groups. Markets
will (by definition) benefit the market-dominant minority, while democracy
will increase the power of the relatively impoverished majority. In these
circumstances, markets and democracy will not be mutually reinforcing.
Rather, the combined pursuit of markets and democracy will produce a very
charged and unstable situation.
Part IV proposes a model to explore the consequences of pursuing
markets and democracy under these conditions. The sobering thrust of the
model is that in many developing countries, the combined pursuit of
marketization and democratization will likely lead to one of three
nonexclusive outcomes: (1) an ethnically fueled antimarket backlash; (2)
actions directed at eliminating the market-dominant minority (for example,
atrocity or expulsion); or (3) a retreat from democracy.
Part V applies the model developed in Part IV to three countries
currently receiving extraordinary attention from the international business
and legal communities: South Africa (the "next Hong Kong?"'),
Kazakhstan (the next Kuwait?24), and Vietnam (the next "Asian Tiger?" 2).
19. Nathan Glazer & Daniel P. Moynihan, Introduction to ETHNICITY: THEORY AND
EXPERIENCE 20 (Nathan Glazer & Daniel P. Moynihan eds., 1975).
20. See id. at 5-6, 20, 25.
21. See ifra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
22. Whether any given ethnic minority is market-dominant is a complex question that I
discuss more fully below. See infra Section III.C.
23. James M. Pethokoukis, Investor's Corner: Will South Africa Be the Next Hong Kong?,
INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, May 27, 1994, at Al.
24. Cf. Helen Davidson, Kazalkhstan, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Apr. 16, 1995 (noting that
Kazakhstan's oil reserves rival those of Kuwait), available in LEXIS, News Library, NON-US
File.
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Without purporting to offer a how-to guide, Part V explores the question of
which reforms, legal and nonlegal, would lead to the long-term success of
markets and democracy in the developing world. If the model is correct, a
critical policy question is whether the potentially explosive ethnic dynamics
triggered by markets and democracy in developing countries can be kept in
check with conventional human rights and social welfare measures (for
example, judicial reform, international treaties, progressive taxation, social
security, and public works projects) or whether they require more radical
measures. Ultimately, the historical record of the developing world suggests
that, short-term efficiency costs notwithstanding, narrowly tailored,
ethnically conscious interventions into the market may prove the best way
of forestalling more drastic outcomes (for example, ethnically targeted
expropriations or ethnic eliminationism). Along with market adjustments,
there might also be room for ethnically conscious adjustments to the
democratic process.
In their systematic ahistoricism, Western lawyers involved in the
developing world have not focused enough on whether today's
sophisticated market initiatives fundamentally differ from the market
policies of the past when viewed from a distributional and
ethnodistributional perspective. Are today's international asset
securitizations and telecommunications privatizations structurally any more
advantageous to majorities in developing countries than yesterday's mining
concessions? Why have some groups repeatedly fared better than others
under market conditions? Proponents of marketization and democratization
must start confronting these questions, however awkward or unsettling. If
they do not, markets and democracy in the developing world will remain
mutually subversive.
II. LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: ThE CURRENT PARADIGM
Notwithstanding the operatic "death" of the law and development
movement twenty years ago, its central tenets remain the intellectual
backbone of international development policy and practice. Section A will
clarify my use of certain terminology in this Article. Section B will describe
the rise and fall of the early law and development movement. Section C will
describe the prevailing law and development orthodoxy, as manifested both
in the current literature and in practical international application. Finally,
Section D will highlight a fundamental problem in the current paradigm.
25. K.P. Waran, Vietnam Can Become an 'Asian Tiger,' Says PM, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Mar.
8, 1996, at 1.
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A. Terminology
In this Article, the term "marketization" refers to the whole spectrum
of efforts toward privatization and contractualization of economic activity
in developing and transitional economies, ranging from the replacement of
a command economy with market mechanisms to typical "economic
liberalization" measures (such as privatization, liberalization of investment
and trade restrictions, and elimination of price controls).26
"Democracy" is a contested term and can take numerous forms.2 7 In
this Article, I will adopt what Jon Elster describes as the basic definition of
democracy: "simple majority rule, based on the principle 'One person one
vote."'" s The term "democratization" will refer broadly to any political
26. Cf. LuDWuKOWSIu, supra note 7, at 163 (defining marketization as a "fundamental
structural economic change signified by massive privatization, price liberalization, the
introduction of internal exchange convertibility, a certain amount of competition, and elimination
of most governmental subsidies"). Although virtually all economic systems have both market and
nonmarket elements, the extent of government economic intervention in any given society will be
a matter of degree, ranging "from the all-encompassing role assumed in some centrally planned
socialist economies, to the very limited role that it [has heretofore undertaken] in Hong Kong."
STIGLrI , supra note 2, at 231. It is thus possible to speak of relatively more or less "marketized"
economies.
27. In Joseph Schumpeter's classic formulation, democracy is "that institutional arrangement
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a
competitive struggle for the people's vote." JOSEPH A. SCHuMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM,
AND DEMOCRACY 269 (3d ed. 1950). Many have found Schumpeter's "procedural" approach
problematic. See, e.g., Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl, What Democracy Is... and Is
Not, in TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES FROM SOUTHERN EUROPE,
LATIN AMERICA AND EASTERN EUROPE 3, 15 n.3 (Geoffrey Pridham ed., 1995) [hereinafter
TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY). For an important recent contribution building on (but also
critiquing in part) the Schumpeterian tradition, see ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS
CRrnCs 121-22, 220-22 (1989). See also CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTrrUnTON OF
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1996) (deliberative model); WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM
AGAINST POPULISM (1982) (rational choice approach); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT (1996) (communitarian perspective).
28. Jon Elster, hztroduction to CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 1 (Jon Elster & Rune
Slagstad eds., 1988). Samuel Huntington has summarized the issue nicely:
Mhe definition of democracy in terms of elections is a minimal definition. To some
people democracy has or should have much more sweeping and idealistic connotations.
To them, "true democracy" means liberti, igaliti, fraterniti, effective citizen control
over policy... and various other civic virtues .... [Defining] democracy in these
terms ... raises all the problems that come up with the definitions of democracy by
source or by purpose. Fuzzy norms do not yield useful analysis. Elections, open, free,
and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non.
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 9 (1991); cf Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 567, 570 (1993) (noting that while "[d]emocracies vary so much that no one conclusion
can cover all cases .... many practical insights can be obtained by thinking first about one of the
simplest democratic situations").
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reform introducing greater electoral competition or increased
majoritarianism in the political process."
Ethnicity is another controversial concept that has generated much
debate among social scientists.31 Following Horowitz and others, I adopt
"an inclusive conception of ethnicity, 32 which acknowledges the
importance of subjective perceptions of identity33 and encompasses
differences along racial lines (for example, blacks and whites in the United
States or South Africa), lines of geographic origin (for example, Malays,
Chinese, and Indians in Malaysia), and linguistic, religious, tribal, or other
cultural lines (for example, Protestants and Catholics in Ireland, and Hutus
and Tutsis in Rwanda). 4
I use terms such as "developing" and "underdeveloped" to refer to
countries with, relatively speaking, low per capita incomes, low rates of
labor productivity, and large segments of their populations engaged in
29. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 27, at 269.
30. See, e.g., Ann Seidman & Robert B. Seidman, Beyond Contested Elections: The
Processes of Bill Creation and the Fulfillment of Democracys Promises to the Third World, 34
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1997) (advocating a definition of democracy in terms of increased majority
input and decisionmaking rather than mere electoral competition).
31. A principal debate in this area has been between "primordialism" and
"instrumentalism." Primordialism holds that ethnic identity is "so deeply rooted" (perhaps even
biologically) "in historical experience that it should properly be treated as a given in human
relations." MILTON J. ESMAN, ETHNIC POLrrIcs 10 (1994). For scholarship inclining toward or
embracing primordialism, see HAROLD R. ISAACS, IDOLS OF THE TRIBE: GROUP IDENTITY AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 38-45 (1975); ANTHONY D. SMITH, THE ETHNIC ORIGINS OF NATIONS 11-
13,32 (1986); and PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, THE ETHNIC PHENOMENON 27-28,35-36 (1981).
By contrast, instrumentalists emphasize the importance of subjective factors and hold "that
ethnicity is not a historical given at all, but in fact a highly adaptive and malleable phenomenon."
ESMAN, supra, at 10. "Thus, according to many instrumentalists, ethnicity is either an ideology
that elites construct and deconstruct for opportunistic reasons or a set of myths calculated to
mobilize mass support." Id. at 11. For expressions of the instrumentalist position, see PAUL R.
BRASS, ETHNICrrY AND NATIONALISM: THEORY AND COMPARISON 19 (1991); Fredrik Barth,
Introduction to ETHNIC GROUPS AND BOUNDARIES 9-10, 13-15 (Fredrik Barth ed., 1969); and
sources cited infra note 177.
32. HOROwITZ, supra note 10, at 41.
33. See id. at 52-53; see also ESMAN, supra note 31, at 14 (stating that "[t]he polar extremes
of primordial givens and of instrumental opportunism seldom account for the real behavior of
ethnic communities"); Timothy M. Frye, Ethnicity, Sovereignty and Transitions from Non-
Democratic Rule, 45 J. INT'L AFF. 599, 602 (1992) (defining ethnicity as a "subjectively held
sense of shared identity based on objective cultural or regional criteria").
34. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, Introduction: Political Economics and Possibilism, in A
BIAS FOR HOPE: ESSAYS ON DEVELOPMENT AND LATIN AMERICA 1, 14 (1971); HOROWrrz,
supra note 10, at 41. Horowitz and others have suggested that ethnicity is best understood "as a
form of greatly extended kinship":
The whole matter has been put nicely by Joshua A. Fishman. Kinship, he says, "is the
basis of one's felt bond to one's own kind .... It is the basis of one's dependency,
sociability and intimacy with them as a matter of course." And, concludes Fishman,
"ethnicity may be the maximal case of societally organized intimacy and kinship
experience." The ethnic tie is simultaneously suffused with overtones of familial duty
and laden with depths of familial emotion.
HOROWITZ, supra note 10, at 59-60 (footnote omitted).
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agriculture. In short, these terms refer to countries that "have not yet
achieved, but generally aspire to, self-sustaining economic growth."3
B. The Early Law and Development Movement
The law and development movement was born in the mid-1960s at
leading American law schools such as Harvard, Stanford, Wisconsin, and
Yale.36 The movement adhered to the basic premise of modernization
theory "that development was an inevitable, evolutionary process of
increasing societal differentiation that would ultimately produce economic,
political, and social institutions similar to those in the West."
' 37
35. David M. Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and
Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1972); see MICHAEL P. TODARO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
THE THIRD WORLD 27 (4th ed. 1989). I am not suggesting that development will ultimately
produce institutions similar to those in the West. On the contrary, one of the major questions
addressed in this Article is whether Western institutions can be grafted without significant
adaptations onto the particular ethnic and nationalist structures of the developing world. Compare
ANN SEIDMAN & ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, STATE AND LAW IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 44-51
(1994) (describing the "almost universal failure" of developing countries' attempts to copy the
laws of seemingly successful developed countries), with Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur'an and the
Common Law: Islamic Law Reform and the Theory of Legal Change, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 233,
267-73, 574 (1994) (describing the successful incorporation of English law into Malaysian Islamic
law).
36. See Elliot M. Burg, Law and Development: A Review of the Literature and a Critique of
"Scholars in Self-Estrangement," 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 492, 495-97 (1977); John H. Merryman,
Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and
Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 457-58 n.4 (1977). The movement received
substantial support from institutions such as the Ford Foundation and the U.S. Agency for
International Development. See Merryman, supra, at 457. Others have chronicled the law and
development movement in much greater detail. See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL
IMPERIALISM: AIERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 6-12, 45-47, 231-35
(1980) (tracing the history of the law and development movement in American institutions);
David M. Trubek, Back to the Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement,
18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 4, 23-24 (1990) (same). For particularly incisive overviews and critiques
of the law and development movement, see Richard Bilder & Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of
Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 470 (1995) (reviewing LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT (Anthony Carty ed., 1992)); and LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD (Sammy
Adelman & Abdul Paliwala eds., 1993). A good partial list of law and development work from the
sixties can be found in Trubek, supra note 35, at 3-4 n.7.
37. Bilder & Tamanaha, supra note 36, at 471. According to modernization theory (which
arose in the wake of World War 11 principally through the efforts of American economists,
political scientists, and sociologists), political development required four elements: (1)
rationalization, involving "movement from particularism to universalism, from diffuseness to
specificity, from ascription to achievement, and from affectivity to affective neutrality"; (2)
national integration or "nation-building"; (3) democratization, emphasizing pluralism,
competitiveness, and equality; and (4) mobilization or participation, to be achieved through
"increases in literacy, urbanization, exposure to mass media, industrialization," and so on.
Samuel P. Huntington, Political Development and Decay, in POLITICAL SYSTEM AND CHANGE
95, 96-97 (Ikuo Kabashima & Lynn T. White III eds., 1986); see also DAVID E. APTER,
RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT: MODERNIZATION, DEPENDENCY, AND POST-MODERN POLITICS 16
(1987) (describing one goal of modernization theory as "the recapitulation in nonindustrial
settings of the functional roles, classes, and reciprocities that appeared first in the old
'metropoles"').
The Yale Law Journal
Emphasizing the importance of law in the development of a market
economy and democratic values," law and development scholars attempted
to assist developing countries in establishing Western-style legal
institutions.39 In so doing, the law and development movement self-
consciously sought to supplant Third World "localism," "irregularity, and
particularism" with the "unity, uniformity, and universality" of the modem
Western state.4" Ethnic identity and ethnic conflict were aspects of
traditionalism or "pre-modemity" that in the course of development "were
ultimately supposed to disappear."41 The ultimate goal of the development
process was to be the creation of a free-market system (which in turn would
bring economic growth), liberal democratic government institutions, and
the rule of law.42
By the mid-1970s, barely a decade after its inception, the law and
development movement had fallen into open crisis! 3 In a well-known piece
entitled Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in
Law and Development Studies in the United States,' Professors Trubek and
Galanter criticized the paradigm of "liberal legalism," which they had
38. Law was seen as essential to the creation and maintenance of markets. Because of its
"predictability as a set of universal rules uniformly applied.... modem law encourages men to
engage in new forms of economic activity and guarantees that the fruits of this activity will be
protected." Trubek, supra note 35, at 7. At the same time, by restraining arbitrary or oppressive
government action, law would foster political development and serve as the foundation of the
liberal democratic state. See Kenneth L. Karst, Law in Developing Countries, 60 L. LIBR. J. 13,
16-19 (1967); Trubek, supra note 35, at 8-9.
39. For example, American legal scholars urged and participated in the development of
capital market programs, which were supposed to foster the development of Western-style
regulatory regimes and systems of private rights. See Trubek, supra note 35, at 45-46. The hope
was that capital markets "would demand 'modem' substantive codes, a more stable and coherent
body of laws, a reduction in government ad hoc decisionmaking, judicial reform, rationality in
legal thought, and a restructuring of professional organization." Id. at 46. Educational reform was
another primary emphasis of the law and development movement. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 38,
at 19 (calling for a "radical re-ordering of legal education" in the developing world); Trubek,
supra note 36, at 23 ("We devised grand programs to re-educate Third World lawyers .... By
exporting the educational techniques of the American law school-socratic method, social
science, and all-we would strengthen legal institutions just as AID agricultural technicians were
transforming small, yellow eggs into large, white ones.").
40. Marc Galanter, Modernization of Law, in MODERNIZATION: THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH
153, 154-55, 157 (Myron Weiner ed., 1966); see Trubek, supra note 35, at 9.
41. Bjim Hettne, Ethnicity and Development: An Elusive Relationship, in ETHNICITY AND
DEVELOPMENT: GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 15, 15 (Denis Dwyer & David Drakakis-Smith
eds., 1996) (discussing modernization theory).
42. See Trubek, supra note 35, at 6-9; Bilder & Tamanaha, supra note 36, at 471; see also
Trubek, supra note 36, at 23 (describing retrospectively the mission of the early law and
development movement as "exporting democratic capitalism" to countries seen as "too poor or
benighted to grasp the possibilities of this superior form of civilization").
43. This onset of crisis roughly coincided with the civil rights movement and anti-Vietnam
War protests, which were calling into question the American system and ideals. See Bilder &
Tamanaha, supra note 36, at 472.
44. David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on
the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062.
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previously championed, as being "ethnocentric and naive."" Liberal
legalism, they argued, ignored the severe "social stratification and class
cleavage" in developing societies and failed to recognize that "in much of
the Third World the grip of tribe, clan, and local community is far stronger
than that of the nation-state."'4 6 More radically, Trubek and Galanter
challenged the institution of law itself, suggesting that even in countries
such as the United States the legal system reinforces "domination by elite
groups" and legitimates "arbitrary actions by government." 47
Not long after the publication of Scholars in Self-Estrangement, "the
law and development movement in the United States all but expired. Money
stopped flowing from foundations. Various institutes and programs
dedicated to the subject were scaled back or terminated. The scholars
involved moved on to other pursuits." 48 Since that time, numerous scholars
have pondered the "death" of the law and development field.49 A few have
even written "memoirs." 50 As I will suggest, however, the epitaph remains
to be written.
C. Law and Development Today
Despite the demise of the early law and development movement,
American lawyers and legal scholars today are helping to shape the
fundamental economic and political institutions of the developing world to
an extent unprecedented since decolonization. 1 Much has changed about
the law and development field. Today, many of the lawyers most centrally
involved in the developing world are law and economics luminaries,
constitutional designers, and Wall Street practitioners. With some
exceptions, legal work on development is more sophisticated than ever.
45. Id. at 1070, 1080.
46. ld. at 1080 (citation omitted). In addition, liberal legalism assumed the existence of an
independent judiciary, whereas developing countries' courts were typically weak and captured by
"political, tribal, religious, or class interests." Id. at 1080-81. Moreover, legal rules in the Third
World principally served the interests of the elite and rarely were internalized by the vast majority
of the population. See id.
47. Id. at 1083.
48. Bilder & Tamanaha, supra note 36, at 474.
49. See, e.g., Introduction to LAW AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 36, at xi ("[L]aw and
development has been so marked by controversy.., it can be said to be almost stillborn .... ");
Merryman, supra note 36, at 460 ("Are we witnessing the death of a field, the realization that one
was never born... or what?").
50. See, e.g., Trubek, supra note 36, at 5 (offering "more than a memoir [but] less than a
history" of the movement).
51. See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, Democracy in Divided Societies, 4 J. DEMOCRACY 18, 35
(1993); Lisa Brennan, Firms Thrive on Asia Woes, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 23, 1998, at Al; Virginia
Citrano, Shrinking Governments Fatten City Firms, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Jan. 11, 1993, at 11;
Wendy Cooper & Harvey D. Shapiro, Privatization of Privatization, INSTITrruONAL INVESTOR,
Oct. 1991, at 87, 89.
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Moreover, the disintegration of the former Communist bloc has raised a
host of challenging legal issues of first impression.
Nevertheless, the thrust of international development policy today
remains essentially what it was in the sixties and seventies: to export
markets, democracy, and the rule of law to the developing world. In this
Section, I will first survey the current literature relating to law in the
developing world. This literature is highly interdisciplinary, including
political scientists and economists among its leading contributors. I will
limit my discussion here to work directed at the legal community or relating
specifically to legal institutions. I will then discuss international
development policy and practice.
1. The Current Literature
Today's law and development literature can be divided into two broad
categories. First, a relatively small number of scholars who consciously
identify themselves with law and development have generally picked up
where the movement of the 1960s and 1970s left off. Often associated with
"leftist" causes, these scholars continue in their writings to struggle with a
host of difficult and profound issues, such as law's impotence or
"epiphenomenality" ;52 its disingenuous claims to neutrality;" its
ethnocentricity; 54 and its "infamy" in contributing to the oppression of the
disempowered."
In terms of sheer volume and actual influence, however, by far the
more massive contribution to the law and development literature has been
made by lawyers who probably do not think of themselves as law and
development "types." This second category includes practitioner-written
pieces as well as a much more theoretical academic literature.
52. See, e.g., Sammy Adelman & A. Caesar Espiritu, Debt Crisis, Underdevelopment and the
Limits of the Law, in LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD, supra note 36, at 172, 182 (stating
that the role played by law in the debt crisis of the 1980s was "largely epiphenomenal"); Bilder &
Tamanaha, supra note 36, at 486.
53. See, e.g., Yash Ghai, Constitutions and Governance in Africa: A Prolegomenon, in LAW
AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD, supra note 36, at 51, 55 (suggesting that despite law's
appearance of autonomy and neutrality it "is a powerful means for the legitimation of Western
regimes, and is carefully cultivated by their rulers").
54. See, e.g., RAJNI KOTHARI, RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT: IN SEARCH OF HUMANE
ALTERNATIVES 192-93 (1989) (describing modemity's paranoid drive to fashion the world after
the Occidental ideal); Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic
Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 615, 618-19 (1992) (critiquing prevailing views of
democracy and development that are incompatible with the affirmation of ethnic differences); cf
Bilder & Tamanaha, supra note 36, at 481-82 (discussing the tensions inherent in claims of law's
ethnocentrism).
55. Peter Fitzpatrick, Law's Infamy, in LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD, supra note
36, at 27, 27 (suggesting "that the blithe advocacy of law in the cause of development is flawed in
its very foundation").
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In the last five years, there have been hundreds of articles written by
legal practitioners involved in the developing world. 6 In Professor Mark
Sidel's words, "[t]his output is almost entirely descriptive and oriented in a
wholly instrumental fashion to the requirements of trade and investment." 
57
Typical topics include trade and foreign investment regulation, taxation and
tax policy, banking law, concession law, dispute resolution, and technology
transfer. 8 Professor Sidel is correct in cautioning that "[w]e should not
impose an entirely scholarly lens on materials written, primarily, for
practical, utilitarian reasons." 59 Still, it is noteworthy that the overwhelming
thrust of this massive body of legal commentary is to urge the rapid and
full-blown liberalization and marketization of developing world
economies" (hardly surprising when one considers the financial interests
involved).
Alongside this practitioner-oriented work, there is also a large academic
literature relating to today's developing world transformations. Most of this
literature too can be characterized as addressing either marketization or
democratization. As to marketization, a significant part of the literature
addresses, from a variety of perspectives, the transitions from command to
market economies in the countries of the former Soviet bloc.61 The more
halting market-oriented reforms of Cambodia, China, Vietnam, and other
nominally Communist countries also have generated a proliferating body of
56. For a tiny sampling of such practitioner-oriented output, see infra note 599, listing recent
articles on Vietnam.
57. Mark Sidel, New Directions in the Study of Vietnamese Law, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 705,
713 (1996) (reviewing VIETNAM AND THE RULE OF LAw (Carlye A. Thayer & David G. Marr
eds., 1993)).
58. See id. at 712.
59. Id. at714.
60. See, e.g., Emil Bukhman, The Cart Before the Horse: Anticipatory Securities Regulation
in Kazakhstan, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 535 (1997); Danny E. Reed, Creating Competitive Market
Economies in Poland and Hungary, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 516 (1996); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz
& Alejandro Ferrate, Recommended Features of a Foreign Investment Code for Cuba's Free
Market Transition, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 511 (1996); Pham van Thuyet, Legal
Framework and Private Sector Development in Transitional Economies: The Case of Viet-nam,
27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 541,596 (1996).
61. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Protection and the Development of Free
Markets in Russia, in LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NEW RussiA 107, 108-11 (Bruce L.R. Smith
& Gennady M. Danilenko eds., 1993) (offering a comparative environmental perspective);
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, I 11 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (presenting a property perspective). Professors Roman
Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski have made especially notable contributions to this area. For
nearly a decade now, they have studied the post-Soviet transitions, beginning with the early
implementation stage. See ROMAN FRYDMAN ET AL., THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN CENTRAL
EUROPE (1993) (describing the privatization process and relevant legal framework in Central
Europe). They have focused most recently on the problem of "overwhelming insider-domination
of [Russia's] privatized firms." Roman Frydman et al., Investing in Insider-Dominated Firms: A
Study of Russian Voucher Privatization Funds, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL
EUROPE AND RUSSIA 187, 189 (Roman Frydman et al. eds., 1996).
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commentary.6 More generally, there have been dozens of recent law review
articles seeking to assist developing countries in their economic
liberalizations. 63 As with marketization, the work on democratization in the
developing world varies considerably in scope and quality. Besides the
massive political science literature on this subject,64 there is also a growing
body of work by lawyers and legal academics struggling with the issue of
the transplantability of Western-style democratic and rule-of-law
institutions in countries with vastly different histories and social structures.
This work ranges from highly abstract treatments; 65 to region- or country-
specific studies of democracy's preconditions,66 optimal institutions, 67 or
62. See, e.g., William P. Alford, Tasselled Loafers for Barefoot Lawyers: Transformation and
Tension in the World of Chinese Legal Workers, CHINA Q., Mar. 1995, at 22; Lan Cao, The Cat
That Catches Mice: China's Challenge to the Dominant Privatization Model, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 97 (1995); John T. Philipsborn, As Law Returns to the "Killing Fields," 76 JUDICATURE 204
(1993) (discussing Cambodia); Mark Sidel, Law Reform in Vietnam: The Complex Transition
from Socialism and Soviet Models in Legal Scholarship and Training, I 1 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J.
221 (1993); Mark Sidel, The Re-emergence of Legal Discourse in Vietnam, 43 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 163 (1994); William H. Simon, The Legal Structure of the Chinese "Socialist Market"
Enterprise, 21 J. CORP. L. 267 (1996).
63. For particularly thoughtful treatments, see, for example, Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall
Thomas, Encouraging Relational Investment and Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing
Countries in the Aftermath of the Mexican Financial Crisis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 539
(1996); and David W. Leebron, A Game Theoretic Approach to the Regulation of Foreign Direct
Investment and the Multinational Corporation, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 305 (1991). In addition, the
Asian Development Bank has compiled an excellent bibliography of academic literature on law
and development in the Asia-Pacific region. See OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, ASIAN DEV.
BANK, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: AN ASIAN BIBLIOGRAPHY (1997).
64. For influential texts in this area, see BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF
DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: LORD AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
WORLD 418-32 (1966), which suggests that conditions are more propitious for democracy where
the social and economic power of the landed aristocracy is in decline relative to that of the
bourgeoisie; Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and
Practical Implications, in AUTHORITARIANISM IN BRAZIL 142, 146-48 (Alfred Stepan ed., 1973),
which argues that international capitalism played an important role in facilitating the 1964
military overthrow of the Brazilian populist regime; Samuel P. Huntington, Will Countries
Become More Democratic?, 99 POL. SCI. Q. 193, 205-07 (1984), which links the success of
democracy in developing countries to U.S. foreign policy; Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social
Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 69, 75-77 (1959), which notes that "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances
that it will sustain democracy"; and Dankwart A. Rustow, Transitions to Democracy: Toward a
Dynamic Model, 3 COMP. POL. 337, 350, 361-63 (1970), which proposes a model of
democratization premised on the condition of national unity. For an excellent compilation of work
on democratic transitions in the developing world, see generally TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY,
supra note 27.
65. See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARAN
SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 5-11, 341-595 (1987) (criticizing
current democratic institutions and advocating instead a program of "empowered democracy").
66. See, e.g., Frances H. Foster, Information and the Problem of Democracy: The Russian
Experience, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 275 (1996) (observing that Russians cannot draw on a
common cultural understanding to lend meaning and legitimacy to constitutional guarantees of
free speech and information); Stephen Holmes, Crime and Corruption After Communism, E. EUR.
CONST. REV., Fall 1997, at 69, 69 (stating that a major obstacle to constitutionalism and the rule
of law in postcommunist countries is "the interweaving of private-sector crime with public-sector
corruption"); Andrew S. Levin, Civil Society and Democratization in Haiti, 9 EMORY INT'L L.
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effects;68  to "on-the-ground," village-to-village analyses of local
governmental processes.'
2. Policy and Practice
Consistent with the vast part of the law and development literature, the
ideology of free-market democracy forms the theoretical core of today's
international development policy and practice." This ideology is
propagated by the two institutions wielding by far the greatest influence on
the developing world-the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund'-as well as by the United States Agency for International
REV. 389, 392 (1995) (arguing through the example of Haiti "that the vitality and growth of civil
society are key factors in indigenous efforts to democratize developing countries"); Offe, supra
note 3, at 64, 65 (discussing the troubling absence in Eastern Europe of the "cultural foundations"
necessary to support the new market and democratic institutions).
67. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Constitutional Courts and Central Banks: Suicide Prevention or
Suicide Pact?, E. EuR. CONST. REV., Summer/Fall 1994, at 66 (arguing that establishing
constitutional courts and central banks in Eastern Europe might undermine as well as protect
democracy); Cass Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, E. EuR. CONST. REV., Winter 1993, at 35,
35-36 (criticizing the inclusion of social and economic rights in the new constitutions of
postcommunist Europe); Laura Underkuffler-Freund, Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1033, 1045-46 (suggesting that the inclusion of social and economic rights in some
developing country constitutions may be appropriate). Consider also the three-way discussion
among Professors Horowitz, Linz, and Lipset on the merits of parliamentarism as opposed to
presidentialism. Compare Donald L. Horowitz, Comparing Democratic Systems, J. DEMOCRACY,
Fall 1990, at 73, 74 (noting that democratic parliamentarism in many developing countries has
failed), with Juan J. Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, J. DEMOCRACY, Winter 1990, at 51, 52
(suggesting that parliamentary systems are "more conducive to stable democracy" than are
presidential systems), and Seymour Martin Lipset, The Centrality of Political Culture: The
Virtues of Parliamentarism, J. DEMOCRACY, Winter 1990, at 80, 82-83 (emphasizing the
importance of cultural factors to stable democracy).
68. See, e.g., Cynthia B. Schultz & Tamara Raye Crockett, Economic Development,
Democratization, and Environmental Protection in Eastern Europe, 18 B.C. ENVmL. AFF. L. REV.
53, 53, 62-63 (1990) (arguing that democratization in Eastern Europe has heightened concern for
environmental protection, which in turn has fostered democratization); Emily Stoper & Emilia
Ianeva, Democratization and Women's Employment Policy in Post-Communist Bulgaria, 12
CONN. J. INT'L L. 9, 10 (1996) (suggesting that democratization is unlikely to have a significant
impact on women's employment policies in Bulgaria).
69. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Role of Custom and Traditional Leaders Under the
Yap Constitution, 10 U. HAW. L. REV. 81, 94-97, 103 (1988) (describing the persistence of
custom and traditionalism in Micronesian politics despite a U.S.-style constitution); Jonathan
Hecht, Half-Cooked Rice and Pearls from the Sea: The Uses and Limits of Law in the
Development of China's Villagers Committee System (Apr. 16, 1997) (paper presented to the
Conference on Local Self-Government in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, Duke
University, May 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal) (studying the
relationship between law and democracy in the context of China's villagers committee system).
70. Cf. UNGER, supra note 2 (manuscript at 3) (referring to the prevailing "neoliberal
program" and "its defiming belief in convergence toward a single system of democratic and
market institutions"); Peter L. Berger, The Uncertain Triumph of Democratic Capitalism, in
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY REVISITED, supra note 17, at 1, 8 (describing the
current "triumphalism among those who believe in democracy and capitalism").
71. See, e.g., SUSAN GEORGE & FABRIZIO SABELLI, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: THE WORLD
BANK'S SECULAR EMPIRE 2, 4, 8-9, 13, 19 (1994) (stating that the World Bank's structural
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Development (USAD),72  the Asian Development Bank, 3 the Ford
Foundation,74 the Soros Foundation,7' the United Nations Development
Programme," the American Bar Association's Central and East European
Law Initiative,7 7 and a host of new private or quasi-private organizations
with names like "The Institute for Public-Private Partnerships" 7 or "The
Democracy Development Initiative."79  Moreover, many academics
involved in the developing world are working in some capacity to promote
markets" or democracy.81 Even law students are marketizing: The
adjustment loans have re-oriented entire economies toward individualistic, free-market
"Reaganomics"); Law and Development in Crisis, in LAW AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD,
supra note 36, at 1-2 (criticizing the hypocrisy and imperialism hidden in the orthodoxy of liberal
democracy championed by the IMF and the World Bank); DANI RODRIK, KING KONG MEETS
GODZILLA: THE WORLD BANK AND THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE I (Centre for Econ. Pol'y Res.
Discussion Paper No. 944, 1994) (noting that as "the world's leading multilateral lending
institution, the World Bank has advocated, at least since the late 1970s, a minimalist role for the
government"); Offe, supra note 3, at 65 (suggesting that in Eastern Europe "Western"-style
markets and democracy were presented as preconditions for assistance and cooperation from
multilateral organizations such as the European Union, NATO, and the IMF).
72. See Asian Development Bank, A Periodic Summary of Law-Related Projects in the Asia-
Pacific Region, Conducted by the Bank and by Other Multilateral Institutions, Bilateral
Assistance Institutions, Academics and the Private Sector, LAW DEV. BULL., Nov. 1997, at 6, 15-
17, 53, 59-60, 87-88, 90, 97-98 (describing programs sponsored by USAID).
73. "The [Asian Development] Bank's principal focus is on working with [developing
member countries] seeking to develop or liberalize market economies ...." Barry Metzger,
Emerging Trends and Issues in Legal and Judicial Reform in Asia-Perspectives and
Programming at the Asian Development Bank, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Roundtable
Meeting of Chief Justices and Ministers of Justice (Aug. 25, 1997), in LAW & DEv.: SEMINAR
PROC., 1997, at 8, 13. While the Bank has promoted judicial reform, its motivation (at least
ostensibly) has been economic-and not political-in character. See id. at 8-11 (describing the
economic orientation of recent legal and judicial reforms supported by the Bank); see also Asian
Development Bank, supra note 72, at 19-20, 41-43, 72-74, 80-82, 88-89 (describing Bank-
sponsored marketization projects in China, India, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia,
and Nepal).
74. See Asian Development Bank, supra note 72, at 31. The Ford Foundation dispenses
grants "to strengthen democratic values ... and advance human achievement around the world."
Judith Havemann, Lilly Endowment Is Nation's Top Giver, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1998, at A17
(internal quotation marks omitted).
75. See SOROS, supra note 1, at 6-10.
76. See Asian Development Bank, supra note 72, at 13,36-37, 113-15.
77. See Robert A. Stein, Lending Freedom a Hand: CEELI Brings American Legal Know-
How to Bosnia-Herzegovina, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1996, at 101, 101; ABA (CEELI), ASSISTING
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES (on file with The Yale Law Journal); ABA (CEELI), GUIDELINES FOR
ASSESSING DRAFT LAWS (on file with The Yale Law Journal).
78. See MICHAEL P. MCLiNDON, PRIVATIZATION AND CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT:
STRATEGIES TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC GROWTH at xviii (1996).
79. See Alfred F. Belcuore, Meeting the Founders: Russians and Kazakhs Work for
Democracy, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 461,461 (1994).
80. Scholars regularly participate (for example, through CEELI) in the process of drafting
market-oriented laws. See, e.g., ABA (CEELI), ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT LAW ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT FOR THE FEDERATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (June 1, 1995); ANALYSIS OF
NIZHNY NOVGOROD INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 6. In addition, a growing number of
academics, often in conjunction with institutions such as the Ford Foundation or the Soros
Foundation, advise developing governments on the development of transitional market
mechanisms. See, e.g., FRYDMAN ET AL., supra note 61, at x-xiii.
1998] Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity 19
government of Estonia recently asked six Georgetown law students and
their professors "to help determine what types of laws are required to start a
free-market system." 
82
Additionally, unlike in the 1960s and 1970s, the field of law and
development today is shaped significantlr by legal practitioners. There is
no question that practitioner-structured market interventions such as
privatization (frequently of telecommunications enterprises or major
utilities),83 cross-border offerings," or international mergers and joint
ventures" are having a tremendous impact on the economic landscape of
many developing and transitional countries. Indeed, because international
business transactions often mean potential profits in the order of hundreds
of millions of dollars 6-often much more than multilateral lending
institutions can offer-practicing lawyers wield decisive influence over
developing governments.
D. The Problem in the Current Paradigm
Despite frequent claims of "new paradigms" 87 and "lessons learned," 88
prevailing law and development orthodoxy recapitulates a basic and
81. For example, law professors frequently assist in drafting constitutional provisions, see
LUDWIKOWSKI, supra note 7, at 2-3, and in training judges, lawyers, and government officials in
developing countries, see Belcuore, supra note 79, at 461-62, 464-65; Stein, supra note 77, at 101.
82. Brooke A. Masters, GU Legal Eagles Flying to Estonia's Aid, WASH. POST, June 18,
1992, at D3. Reportedly, some of the students had "never studied antitrust law, the area they
[we]re summarizing for the Estonians. 'We look with a fresh eye, so we're suggesting things that
are not necessarily American or European,' said one student." Id The Georgetown-Estonia
project was funded by the U.S. Commerce Department's Commercial Law and Development
Program for Eastern Europe. See id.
83. The landmark privatization of Teldfonos de Mxico (Telmex), for example, was
structured and conducted in significant part by two Wall Street law firms, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen
& Hamilton and Sullivan & Cromwell, working together together with Goldman, Sachs, Mexican
government officials, and local Mexican counsel. See Prospectus of Telfonos de Mexico, S.A. de
C.V. at 67 (May 11, 1992) (on file with The Yale Law Journal). U.S. law firms also helped
privatize the national telephone companies of Argentina and Venezuela. See Susan Beck, Big
Deals: International, AM. LAW., Mar. 1992, at 44; Susan Carter & Craig Leon, Foreign
Investment: The Floodgates Open, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Mar. 1998, at S20.
84. See, e.g., Richard Forster & Robert Dwyer, Linklaters Takes Lead as Firms Build for the
Future, 16 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 21, 24 (1997) (describing recent cross-border securities offerings in
Russia and Eastern Europe).
85. See, e.g., John J. McKenna, North American Firms Compete for Latin American
hwestments, OIL & GAS J., Feb. 23, 1998, at 26, 26-27 (describing the recent wave of joint-
venture and merger-and-acquisition activity in the Latin American energy sector).
86. See Carter & Leon, supra note 83, at S20; Forster & Dwyer, supra note 84, at 21-28;
McKenna, supra note 85, at 26.
87. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 2, at 10 (stating that "[a] new
development paradigm has emerged, one that emphasizes market friendly approaches and stresses
the importance of private sector development").
88. See, e.g., Mary M. Shirley, The What, Why, and How of Privatization: A World Bank
Perspective, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S23, S3 1-S32 (1992) ("The present interest in privatization is
no fad.... Lessons have been learned ... and today's strategies reflect these lessons.").
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potentially fatal error of the earlier movement. It ignores ethnicity and
ethnic conflict in the developing world. To be sure, ethnic conflict figures
prominently in the human rights area, 9 particularly in the context of war
crimes.9" But the distinctive, structural relationship between ethnicity and
today's marketization and democratization efforts has been almost
completely overlooked by all lawyers and legal scholars involved in the
developing world, including those in the human rights area.
Why this has been so is itself fascinating. Practitioners probably view
ethnic tensions as lying far beyond the scope of their responsibility.91 Law
and economics scholars involved in marketization also tend to treat ethnic
conflict as beyond the scope of their analyses;92 although all behavior can
be described as preference-maximizing in a tautological sense, the
"preferences" and behaviors associated with ethnic hatred escape the kind
of rationality assumed in most economic models.93 Moreover, Western
discomfort with potentially invidious ethnic generalizations may go a long
way toward explaining the neglect of the ethnic dimensions of markets and
democracy in the developing world.'
For whatever reason, today's dominant law and development orthodoxy
regards ethnic conflict as just another aspect of underdevelopment, which
the universal prescription of markets and democracy is supposed to cure.
This Article challenges the prevailing orthodoxy. The particular ethnic
dynamics of many postsocialist and developing countries introduce deep
89. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966,660 U.N.T.S. 195,5 I.L.M. 352.
90. See, e.g., Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of
Rwanda, 7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349 (1997); Ruth Wedgwood, The Case for a Permanent
War Crimes Court, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONrrOR, Aug. 16, 1995, at 18.
91. See generally ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993) (lamenting the narrow
technical focus of most practicing lawyers); WILLiAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JusTIcE 8-9
(1998) (suggesting that the prevailing approach to lawyers' ethics severely restricts the range of
factors that lawyers may consider in decisionmaking).
92. In a related vein, Professor Mark Roe has observed that law and economics analysis tends
to be "American-centered" to the extent that it ignores the "risk of institutionally-induced
turmoil" and backlash present in less politically stable countries. Mark J. Roe, Backlash, 98
COLuiM. L. REv. 217,217-20,239 (1998).
93. Most economic models assume maximization of economic value by individuals whereas
"[i]n fact both state officials and social actors may be motivated by ends which are primarily non-
economic such as racism or ethnicity." Mushtaq H. Khan, Patron-Client Networks and the
Economic Effects of Corruption in Asia 10 (Winter 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
The Yale Law Journal); see also Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics
of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1003, 1007-08 (1995)
(suggesting that current economic theory focuses insufficiently on group loyalty and group
identity and thus "fails to predict the prevalence of cooperation and conflict in human affairs").
94. Even among the relatively few left-wing law and development scholars who still
challenge the orthodoxy of free-market democracy, ethnicity tends to be neglected in favor of
class-based analyses. See Hettne, supra note 41, at 15 (observing that for Marxists concerned with
development issues ethnic mobilization is usually described "as a class struggle in disguise"). For
a more nuanced view of the relationship between ethnicity and class that still suggests the ultimate
centrality of class conflict, see UNGER, supra note 2 (manuscript at 103-08).
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tensions into the very project of marketization and democratization. These
tensions, if left unaddressed, threaten to undermine the long-term success of
the development project.
I. UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND OVERACHIEVEMENT
This Part will explore the ethnoeconomics of the developing world and
highlight the prevalence of economically dominant ethnic minorities
throughout South and Southeast Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, Latin
America, and parts of the former Soviet Union. The reasons for, and the
circumstances surrounding, the economic dominance of these minority
groups at either the national or regional level vary enormously. In
particular, some groups may be economically dominant but not market-
dominant. That is, some groups may owe their economic dominance, in part
or in whole, not to superior "entrepreneurialism" but rather to factors that
will not persist under market conditions. The distinction between market-
dominant minorities and minorities that are not market-dominant lies at the
heart of the model developed in Part IV.
A. Ethnoeconomics in the Developing World
Although legal scholars almost never acknowledge the phenomenon,
historians and sociologists of the developing world long have recognized
the presence of one or more ethnic minorities who historically have
dominated economically the "indigenous" majorities around them.95 These
minorities may be found in virtually every part of the developing world.
95. See generally JEAN-LOUP AMSELLE, LES NEGOCIANTS DE LA SAVANE 13, 20-21 (1977)
(studying the commercially dominant Kooroko community in Mali); P.T. BAUER, WEST AFRICAN
TRADE: A STUDY OF COMPETITION, OLIGOPOLY AND MONOPOLY IN A CHANGING ECONOMY 65-
76 (1954) (studying the economic role in West African trade and entrepreneurial activity played
by African and non-African groups); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, PEDDLERS AND PRINCES: SOCIAL
CHANGE AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION IN Two INDONESIAN TOwNs 8-12, 51-53 (1963)
(discussing the dominance of Chinese traders in Javanese society); FRANK H. GOLAY ET AL.,
UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST AsiA 43, 115-17, 137, 166,
289, 395-97 (1969) (documenting the historical economic dominance of the Chinese in the
Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and South Vietnam); THE LEBANESE IN THE WORLD 343, 349,
389-91, 526-27, 598-99 (Albert Hourani & Nadim Shehadi eds., 1992) (describing the economic
success of Lebanese minorities in Latin America, the Caribbean, and West Africa); J.S. MANGAT,
A HISTORY OF THE ASIANS IN EAST AFRICA 1-26 (1969) (discussing the historical origins of
commercial dominance by Indians in East Africa); THOMAS SOwELL, RACE AND CULTURE 2
(1994) (noting that India's Gujaratis have been "prominent or predominant in business enterprises
from Fiji to virtually the entire eastern coast of the African continent"); Edna Bonacich, A Theory
of Middleman Minorities, 38 AM. Soc. REv. 583, 589-92 (1973) (presenting a model to explain
hostility against middleman minorities).
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For example, although Chinese affluence in Southeast Asia is well
known,96 the persistence and extent of their economic power remain
startling. In Indonesia, the Chinese represent less than five percent of the
population but control "an estimated 70 percent of the country's private
domestic capital and run three-quarters of its 200 largest businesses." 97 In
Thailand, the Chinese minority, roughly ten percent of the population,
historically has dominated the country's major economic sectors, including
all four of the country's largest private banks.9" Moreover, "[o]f the five
billionaires in Indonesia and Thailand in the late twentieth century, all were
ethnically Chinese." 99 In Malaysia, the relatively large Chinese minority
(roughly thirty-two percent of the population') historically dominated the
country's manufacturing, mining, retail trade, transportation, and
communications sectors' and still account "for the bulk of private
economic activity in Malaysia, despite discriminatory laws aimed at
limiting their clout." 102 In the Philippines, the ostensibly "aggressive"
Chinese (only about two percent of the population) reportedly control
almost forty percent of the corporate economy, including the country's four
major airlines.10 3 For centuries, the Chinese minority dominated small-scale
industry in Laos and retail trade in Vietnam and Cambodia."°4 In the
southern part of Vietnam, the Chinese owned "80 percent of all capital
invested in the manufacturing of textiles, iron and steel, and chemical and
allied products" as late as 1974.105 Today, as discussed further in Part V,
96. See, e.g., Dominique Turpin, Challenge of the Overseas Chinese, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6,
1998, at 8 (stating that "experts are unanimous that the overseas Chinese dominate medium- and
large-scale corporate capital in all Asian markets except for Japan and Korea").
97. THOMAS SOWELL, MIGRATIONS AND CULTURES 176 (1996); see Leo Suryadinata,
Indonesian Policies Toward the Chinese Minority Under the New Order, 16 ASIAN SURV. 770,
770 (1976).
98. See GOLAY Er AL., supra note 95, at 289; SOWELL, supra note 97, at 176; see also JAMES
C. INGRAM, ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THAILAND 1850-1950, at 36-37, 55-57 (1971) (explaining
that apart from rice cultivation, "an ancient and honorable occupation to the Thai," the Thals left
most entrepreneurial functions to the Chinese).
99. SOWELL, supra note 97, at 176 (citing JOEL KOTICN, TRIBES: How RACE, RELIGION,
AND IDENTITY DETERMINE SUCCESS IN THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY 180 (1993)).
100. See WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 796 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1997).
101. See GOLAY ET AL., supra note 95, at 350-52; RAJ K. VASIL, POLITICS IN BI-RACIAL
SocIETEs 203, 206 & tbl.16 (1984) (citing Malaysian government statistics illustrating corporate
dominance of Chinese in key economic sectors).
102. Keith B. Richburg, For Southeast Asia's Chinese, Success Breeds Discrimination,
WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1988, at A25.
103. See Cecil Morella, Ethnic Chinese Stay Ready, Hope to Ride out Crime Wave, AGENCE
FR.-PRESSE, Apr. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File; Richburg, supra note
102, at A25.
104. See TRAN KHANH, THE ETHNIC CHINESE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM
20-21 (1993); SOWELL, supra note 95, at 211 (" [The Chinese] owned approximately 70 percent
of small-scale industry in Laos and conducted more than 70 percent of the retail trade in Vietnam
and Cambodia.").
105. SOWELL, supra note 97, at 211 (footnote omitted); see KHANH, supra note 104, at 20-
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economic liberalization in Vietnam has led to a resurgence of Chinese
commercial dominance in the country's urban areas.
11
6
The Chinese are not the only economically dominant minority in Asia.
In Cambodia, the Vietnamese, who historically were viewed as more
"frugal," "industrious," and trade-oriented than the Khmers, dominated
certain skilled occupations. 7 In Burma, colonial laissez-faire policies led
to the disproportionate prosperity of the Indian minority relative to
indigenous Burmese; together with the British and (to a lesser extent) the
Chinese, the Indian minority dominated Burma's commercial sphere until
the 1960s."' In Sri Lanka, the Ceylon Tamils, historically more educated,
prosperous, and "advanced" than the Sinhalese majority, dominated both
the economic and political spheres until the mid-1950s.'" In Bombay,
capital of the western Indian state of Maharashtra, "clever and very
hardworking" South Indian "outsiders" traditionally dominated the
powerful private sector vis-h-vis the Maharashtrians."' In the Telangana
region of India, the Telanganas were "no match" for the better-educated,
"clever and cunning" people of the coastal Andhras."' In Assam, an oil-
rich state in northern India, Bengali immigrants (now roughly forty percent
of the population) historically have dominated commerce, professions, and,
until a recent wave of ethnic reprisals, government bureaucracy."
2
Moreover, this phenomenon is replicated throughout the countries of
Africa, where entrepreneurial "pariah" (non-African) minorities"3 coexist
106. See infra text accompanying notes 590 & 610-611.
107. Chou Meng Tarr, The Vietnamese Minority in Cambodia, RACE AND CLASS, Oct.-Nov.
1992, at 33, 34-35, 38; see Nayan Chanda, Wounds of History" Surging Resentment of Vietnamese
Could Spark New Pogroms, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 30, 1992, at 14, 15-16.
108. See GOLAY ET AL., supra note 95, at 210-11, 220-23, 251, 254; MARTIN SMITH,
BURMA: INSURGENCY AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 43-44 (1991).
109. See CHANDRA R. DE SILVA, SRI LANKA: A HISTORY 187, 236 (1987); B.H. FARMER,
CEYLON: A DIVIDED NATION 51 (1963); HOROWrrz, supra note 10, at 155-56,245-46,616-17.
110. HOROWrIz, supra note 10, at 173-74 (citations omitted); see id. at 170; MARY FAINSOD
KATZENSTEIN, ETHNICITY AND EQUALITY: THE SHIV SENA PARTY AND PREFERENTIAL POLICIES
IN BOMBAY 17-18, 30,33 (1979).
111. HORoWrrz, supra note 10, at 167, 673-74 (citations omitted); see MYRON WEINER,
SONS OF THE SOIL: MIGRATION AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN INDIA 236-43 (1978). Telangana and
coastal Andhra are both regions in the state of Andhra Pradesh. See WEINER, supra, at 221.
112. See HOROXVn2, supra note 10, at 112-13; Sanjoy Hazarika, India's Assam Cauldron
Bubbles Dangerously Again, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1982, at A2; Nilova Roy, Gandhi's Party
Losing in Divided Assam, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 1985, at A20; Ashutosh Varshney, After the
Assam Killings, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 22, 1983, at 27.
113. Since Vasco da Gama's time, Indians have dominated the economies of Kenya,
Tanzania, Uganda, and other East African countries. See MANGAT, supra note 95, at 1-9, 21-23,
63-96; H.S. MORRIS, THE INDIANS IN UGANDA 139-40 (1968); David Himbara, The Failed
Africanization of Commerce and Industry in Kenya, 22 WORLD DEV. 469,470-71 & tbl.1 (1994).
Similarly, since French colonial rule, the Lebanese have dominated many of the local economies
of West Africa. See Neil 0. Leighton, Lebanese Emigration: Its Effect on the Political Economy
of Sierra Leone, in TIE LEBANESE IN THE WORLD, supra note 95, at 579, 598-99; R. Bayley
Winder, The Lebanese in West Africa, in IMMIGRANTS AND ASSOCIATIONS 103, 105, 110-13
(L.A. Fallers ed., 1967). Today, for example, the Lebanese dominate Sierra Leone's diamond,
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with economically dominant African minorities,"' and in the Caribbean and
the West Indies."5 Latin America presents a slightly more complicated
picture."6 Although the social hierarchy in Latin America is usually thought
of in class terms, sociologists long have observed the existence of a
"pigmentocracy": that is, a social spectrum with taller, lighter-skinned,
Spanish-blooded aristocrats at one end, shorter, darker, Indian-blooded
masses at the other end, and a great deal of "passing" in between."' Thus,
gold, finance, construction, real estate, and retail industries and "control access to much
international capital in their role as agents and brokers." Leighton, supra, at 600.
114. The tendency of some African ethnic groups to dominate over others economically can
be seen at both the regional and national levels. For example, throughout northern Nigeria,
members of the Ibo minority historically dominated the local urban economies. See Robert
Melson & Howard Wolpe, Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical
Perspective, in NIGERIA: MODERNIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF COMMUNALISM 1, 8-9 (Robert
Melson & Howard Wolpe eds., 1971). In Uganda, the Baganda dominated economically over the
rest of the country even before the British employed them to help rule the country. See
HOROwrrz, supra note 10, at 163-64; MAHMOOD MAMDANI, POLITICS AND CLASS FORMATION
IN UGANDA 29-34, 41-44, 120-22 (1976); Bill Berkeley, An African Success Story? (Uganda),
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1994, at 22. In Kenya, the Kikuyu historically constituted (together
with the Indians) most of the country's elite capitalist class. See Michael Chege, The Political
Economy of Agrarian Change in Central Kenya, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF KENYA 93, 98-
99 (Michael G. Schatzberg ed., 1987); Himbara, supra note 113, at 476. In Rwanda, the Tutsi
minority was the economic elite vis-a-vis the Hutu majority during Belgian colonial rule, and
possibly much earlier. See GtIRARD PRUNIER, THE RwANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE
26-45 (1995). The widespread perception that Tutsis were "always" economically dominant may
reflect "cultural mythology" rather than historical fact. Id. at 40; see also RENt LEMARCHAND,
BURUNDI: ETHNOCIDE AS DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE 164 (1994) (discussing the "taboo" issue
of Tutsi economic dominance in Burundi).
115. In the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad, the Lebanese minority tended
to prosper disproportionately when "left alone to make money" and continue today to dominate
these countries' commercial and industrial spheres. David Nicholls, Lebanese of the Antilles:
Haiti, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Trinidad, in THE LEBANESE IN THE WORLD, supra note
95, at 339, 351-54, 359. In Guyana and Trinidad, Indians originally brought over to labor in sugar
plantations generally outperform their Creole counterparts in trade and commerce despite repeated
backlashes. See VASIL, supra note 101, at 237-38, 248-52. In Fiji, the professional and
commercial dominance of the Indian (and to a lesser extent, the Chinese) vis-a-vis the indigenous
Fijians is "staggering." Id. at 196; see also id. at 196-97 tbls.7-9 (citing wealth and income
statistics compiled by the Fijian government).
116. In contrast to Southeast Asia and Africa, intermarriage among ethnic groups (as well as
concubinage and polygamy) has been common in Latin America since the colonial era. See
MAGNUS MORNER, RACE MIXTURE IN THE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 25-26 (1967); Chua,
supra note 18, at 271-72. Indeed, perhaps "[n]o part of the world has ever witnessed such a
gigantic mixing of races .... " MORNER, supra, at 1.
117. Throughout Spanish America, the so-called sociedad de castas
was created by transferring to the New World the hierarchic, estate-based corporative
society of late medieval Castile and imposing that society upon a multiracial, colonial
situation. This colonial reality was characterized, first, by the dichotomy between
conquerors and conquered, masters and servants or slaves, and, second, by
miscegenation between these opposite groups. Hence it was inevitable that social
stratification and social status would become closely related to the division into ethnic
groups. The location of the existing ethnic groups within the hierarchic social structure
gave rise to what a Chilean student has ingeniously called "pigmentocracy." People
were classified in accordance with the color of their skin, with the white masters
occupying the highest stratum.
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as I have argued elsewhere, the phenomenon of an economically dominant,
ethnically distinguishable minority-here, the white, landowning, Western-
educated elite-is an important feature of many Latin American societies. 's
Central Asia is another developing region in which at least one ethnic
minority historically has been economically dominant vis-h-vis the
indigenous majority around them. In the vast region that today includes the
post-Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
and Uzbekistan, large waves of Russians (and to a lesser extent Germans
and Ukranians) arrived "either in the late tsarist period, in the 1920s and
1930s, or during the Virgin Lands period under Khrushchev."'' 19 For
reasons including tsarist-era repression of the Central Asian "half-
savages," 12 Soviet economic policies that were "ostensibly internationalist,
but evidently Russocentric," ' and different cultural predispositions," the
MORNER, supra note 116, at 54 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also MARVIN HARRIS,
PATTERNS OF RACE IN THE AMERICAS 38 (1964) (noting that in most Latin American societies
"Caucasoid" features were historically "preferred by all strata of the dominant caste; hence the
more Indian-looking the less desirable the mestizo type").
118. See Chua, supra note 18, at 271-79. This phenomenon in Latin America is quite stark in
countries with significant Indian populations-for example, Bolivia, Mexico, Peru, and most
Central American countries-and much more muted in relatively "Europeanized" countries such
as Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela, which have smaller (and in some cases, negligible) Indian
populations and which saw "enormous waves" of immigrants from Europe early this century.
MORNER, supra note 116, at 133-34; see HARRIS, supra note 117, at 97-98; Chua, supra note 18,
at 277-78.
119. KAREN DAWvISHA & BRUCE PARROTr, RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA:
THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 81 (1994); see Martha Brill Olcott, Nation Building and Ethnicity in
the Foreign Policies of the New Central Asian States, in NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ETHNICITY IN
RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA 209, 213 (Roman Szporluk ed., 1994) [hereinafter
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ETHNICITY] (noting that Soviet authorities deliberately encouraged the
immigration of ethnic Russians and other non-Asians to Central Asia in order to slow the rise of
local nationalism).
120. MARTHA BRILL OLCOTr, THE KAZAKHS 51, 58-69, 75, 90, 110 (1987); see also
CENTRAL ASIA 170 (Edward Allworth ed., 3d ed. 1994) (quoting tsarist official on Russia's
"civilizing role in Central Asia").
121. Ronald Suny, State, Civil Society, and Ethnic Cultural Consolidation in the USSR-
Roots of the National Question, in FROM UNION TO COMMONWEALTH 22, 27 (Gall W. Lapidus et
al. eds., 1992). Soviet policies often favored the needs of the "center" (Moscow) above those of
the "periphery" and the interests of local Russian minorities over those of the titular majorities.
See OLCOTr, supra note 120, at 248. Thus, Moscow's policy was to use resource-rich Central
Asia
as a kind of contiguous Third World that mined and grew raw materials but did not
process them. Although Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and, to a lesser extent, Kyrgyzstan all
had industrial sectors, these tended to be extraction industries rather than manufacturing
ones. They also remained overwhelmingly in Russian and European hands, particularly
at the administrative level.
Olcott, supra note 119, at 213.
122. Many of the Central Asian peoples were historically nomadic, such as the Kazakhs, the
Kyrgyz, and Turkmens. See, e.g., CENTRAL ASIA, supra note 120, at 10, 47. Other Central Asian
tribes had sedentary cultures:
The Uzbeks, together with the urban Tajiks, are heirs of the ancient sedentary
civilization of the mixed Turkic-Iranian population known before the revolution as
"Sarts." Oasis cities of present-day Uzbekistan like Samarkand and
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Russian-speaking minorities in Central Asia dominated the most advanced,
prestigious, and lucrative sectors of the economy for two centuries. 123
Today, despite accelerating rates of Russian emigration after 1989,
Russians constitute roughly thirty-seven percent of the population in
Kazakhstan; twenty-one percent in Kyrgyzstan, nine percent in
Turkmenistan, and eight percent in Uzbekistan. 24 As elsewhere in the
former Soviet Union, the Russian minorities in Central Asia remain
predominantly urban, not just at the republic level but also in all
subordinate territorial units."2 Moreover, in many of the Central Asian
republics, Russians still predominate in communications, construction,
engineering, electronics, industry, science, transportation, and the new
information-computing services sector. 26  Nevertheless, whether the
historical economic dominance of the Russian minorities in Central Asia
will persist under the new, post-Soviet regimes is highly questionable and
will be discussed specifically in the context of Kazakhstan in Part V.l27
Bukhara .... became an integral part of the burgeoning Islamic civilization that
extended from India in the east to North Africa and Spain to the west.
James Critchlow, The Ethnic Factor in Central Asian Foreign Policy, in NATIONAL IDENTITY
AND ETHNICITY, supra note 119, at 266,274.
123. See CENTRAL ASIA, supra note 120, at 164, 169, 180-81; JAMES CRITCHLOW,
NATIONALISM IN UZBEKISTAN 113-15 (1991); MICHAEL PAUL SACKS, WORK AND EQUALITY IN
SovIEr SocIETY 55-60 (1982); Robert J. Kaiser, Ethnic Demography and Interstate Relations in
Central Asia, in NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ETHNICITY, supra note 119, at 230, 232, 238-39
[hereinafter Kaiser, Ethnic Demography]. Although some Central Asian civilizations achieved
grandeur before Russia, illiteracy rates were extremely high and urbanization rates extremely low
among the Central Asian peoples until the late 1920s, when Stalin began cultivating indigenous
elites under korenizatsiia. See OLCOTr, supra note 120, at 193-96, 206; Robert J. Kaiser,
Nationalizing the Work Force: Ethnic Restratification in the Newly Independent States, 36 POST-
SOvIET GEOGRAPHY 87, 88 (1995) [hereinafter Kaiser, Nationalizing the Work Force].
124. See Chauncy D. Harris, The New Russian Minorities: A Statistical Overview, 34 POST-
SOvIET GEOGRAPHY 1, 4-6 tbl.1 (1993). These figures are from the Soviet Union's 1989 census.
125. See YURiY KULCHiK ET AL., CENTRAL ASIA AFrER THE EMPIRE 20-22 (1996). Among
Russians, 77% are urban dwellers in Kazakhstan, 70% in Kyrgyzstan, and up to 94%-97% in
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. See id. at 16.
126. See VALERY TISHKOv, ETHNICITY, NATIONALISM AND CONFLICT IN AND AFTER THE
SOVIET UNION 121-22, 125 (1997); Kaiser, Nationalizing the Work Force, supra note 123, at 94,
95 tbl.4, 103 tbl.9.
127. Throughout Central Asia, the Uzbeks, who form a significant minority in most of the
other Central Asian countries, see DAWISHA & PARROTr, supra note 119, at 85-86; Kaiser, Ethnic
Demography, supra note 123, at 256-58, have tended to be more prosperous than the majorities
around them. See, e.g., JEFF CHINN & ROBERT KAISER, RUSSIANS AS THE NEW MINORITY 229
(1996) (noting that Uzbeks in the Osh Oblast were "an economically privileged group locally");
Eugene Huskey, Kyrgyzstan: The Politics of Demographic and Economic Frustration, in NEW
STATES, NEW POLITICS: BUILDING THE POST-SOVIET NATIONS 654, 661 (Ian Bremmer & Ray
Taras eds., 1997) (explaining that in contemporary Kyrgyzstan, for example, Uzbeks in the Osh
region are far wealthier than the Kyrgyz, and as of 1990 "controlled, according to one estimate,
80 percent of the city's trade"). See generally Margaret Shapiro, Kirgizstan: New Freedom amid
Poverty, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1992, at A17 (describing economic conditions and reform
measures in Kyrgyzstan). Meanwhile, in Uzbekistan, the Crimean Tartar and Meskhetian Turkish
minorities have historically been disproportionately prosperous vis-A-vis the Uzbek majority. See
Christie Davies, Politics of Envy Taking Root in Ex-Soviet States, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore),
Nov. 16, 1992, at 22. Finally, the relatively small Korean minorities in many Central Asian
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B. Ethnoeconomics in the Developed World
The prevalence and visibility of economically dominant minorities in
developing countries starkly distinguishes the problems of ethnic conflict in
the developing and developed worlds. While some ethnic minorities in the
United States have outperformed other ethnic minorities 12 -- and by some
measures have outperformed the "white" majority t29 -the U.S. economy is
not dominated by any ethnic minority. 3 On the contrary, the core ethnic
problem in the United States is one that pits an economically and politically
dominant white majority against economically and politically weaker ethnic
minorities."' As a result, democracy poses no radical threat to an
economically dominant ethnic group in the United States.132 The same is
true throughout the industrialized West.
1 33
countries also have tended to be more entrepreneurial and more economically successful than the
indigenous majorities around them. See id.
128. See, e.g., David Brand, The New Whiz Kids: Why Asian Americans Are Doing So Well,
and What It Costs Them, TIME, Aug. 31, 1987, at 42; Benjamin Pimentel, Asian Americans: The
New Racial Bourgeoisie?, INTER PRESS SERV., Oct. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
INPRES File.
129. As of 1995, the median household income in the United States was $32,960 for whites,
$19,533 for blacks, $22,886 for Hispanics, and $38,347 for Asian/Pacific Islanders. See BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1995, at 472 (1995). The percentages of households in the above categories with monetary
incomes exceeding $100,000 are 6.3%, 1.9%, 2.3%, and 9%, respectively. See id.
130. See id. As I have already noted, there is a certain artificiality inherent in the ethnic
categories generally accepted in the United States. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
131. See Erik Hurst et al., The Wealth Dynamics of American Families, 1984-94, in 1
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcTIvrrY 267, 293, 295 fig.3, 306-09, 307 tbl.19, 308 tbl.20
(1998); see also MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH:
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 1-2, 5, 7 (1995) (focusing on wealth rather than
income to demonstrate that "whites and blacks constitute two nations" with blacks forming "the
sediment of the American stratificational order").
132. As has long been observed, democracy is always in a sense potentially inimical to the
interests of a wealthy minority. Thus, David Ricardo was willing to extend suffrage only "to that
part of [the people] which cannot be supposed to have an interest in overturning the right of
property." STEFAN COLLINI ET AL., THAT NOBLE SCIENCE OF POLITICS 107 (1983) (citation
omitted). Similarly, for Marx "private property and universal suffrage [were] incompatible."
Adam Przeworski, The Neoliberal Fallacy, in CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
REVISITED, supra note 17, at 39, 47 (citation omitted). In fact, however, in developed countries
such as the United States and the countries of Western Europe, democracy has not proved a
radical threat to markets. On the contrary, democracy throughout the industrialized West generally
has coexisted robustly with markets, though qualified, to be sure, by redistributive institutions
such as progressive taxation and social welfare. See Geoffrey Garrett, Global Markets and
National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?, 52 INT'L ORG. (forthcoming Fall 1998)
(manuscript at 3 1, on file with The Yale Law Journal) (concluding that in the OECD countries the
coupling of global markets with domestic spending and wealth redistribution has proved a stable,
"robust and desirable solution"); Przeworski, supra, at 47-48 (noting that "[t]here are 14
countries in the world today that have remained continuously capitalist and democratic for the
past half-century").
133. Because the categories employed in statistical research vary by country, the
ethnoeconomic status of minority groups across Western countries resists direct comparison. For
example, the United Kingdom tends to draw classifications along racial lines, whereas other
European countries focus on the national origins of their immigrants. See STEPHEN CASTLES,
The Yale Law Journal
Likewise, and in striking contrast to Southeast Asia, economically
dominant ethnic minorities do not exist in the more economically developed
societies of East Asia. In each of the "Asian Tigers," the ethnic majority-
the Japanese in Japan, the Koreans in South Korea, and the Chinese in
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore-is economically and politically
dominant."' The same is true of China where the Han majority (which
constitutes ninety-five percent of the population 35) has dominated
economically and politically over ethnic minorities like the Tibetans,
Uighurs, and Miao for three millennia.
3 6
HERE FOR GOOD: WESTERN EUROPE'S NEW ETHNIC MvINORITIES 99 (1984) (comparing Britain's
identification of racial minorities with West Germany's focus on "foreigner" status). Nonetheless,
a general pattern of lower economic status for ethnic minorities vis-a-vis the ethnic majority is
evident throughout the industrialized Western countries. In Canada, mean earnings are
significantly lower for ethnic and aboriginal minorities than for whites. See KRISHNA PENDAKUR
& RAVI PENDAKUR, THE COLOUR OF MONEY: EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS AMONG ETHNIC
GROUPS IN CANADA 2-4, 7-8, 26 (Research on Immigration and Integration in the Metropolis
Working Paper No. 96-03, 1996). In the United Kingdom, ethnic minorities are overrepresented in
the lower income brackets. See Department of Social Security: Households Below Average
Income Statistics Published, M2 PRESSWiRE, Nov. 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
M2PW File (citation omitted). In 1995, whites in the United Kingdom constituted 97% of the top
income quintile. See id. By contrast, nearly two-thirds of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were in the
bottom quintile. See id. Throughout Western Europe, the great majority of ethnic minorities and
immigrants are either unemployed or employed in the unskilled manual labor sector. See STEPHEN
CASTLES & MARK J. MILLER, THE AGE OF MIGRATION 182, 195-218 (1993); PETER STALKER,
THE WORK OF STRANGERS: A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION 95 (1994).
134. In Singapore, the Chinese constitute roughly 77% of the population, see 2 THE EUROPA
WORLD YEARBOOK 2903 (38th ed. 1997) (citing Singapore's 1990 census), and are an
economically, politically, and culturally dominant majority vis-ht-vis the country's Indian and
Malaysian minorities, see JOSEPH B. TAMNEY, THE STRUGGLE OVER SINGAPORE'S SOUL 20, 96-
103, 187 (1996). In Japan and Korea, ethnic minorities are not merely economically
disadvantaged, but practically nonexistent. See 1996 Britannica World Data, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA, 1996 BRrrANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR 638, 646 (Glenn M. Edwards ed., 1996). In
fact, it was only in 1997 that the Japanese formally acknowledged the existence of an indigenous
ethnic minority, the Ainu. See Japanese Parliament Passes 'Ainu' Minority Rights Bill, AGENCE
FR.-PRESSE, May 8, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File. In Hong Kong, the
English and Chinese are both prosperous, but the numeric strength of the latter (who constitute
99.99% of the population, cf WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS, supra note 100, at 753),
makes them the economically dominant group. See Angelica Cheung, Hong Kong Handover, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), July 1, 1997, at 18. In Taiwan, Han Chinese (including both the
Taiwanese Chinese and the Mainland Chinese) constitute roughly 99% of the population, with
non-Han aborgines (yuan-chu min) composing the other one percent. Even if the Taiwanese
(roughly 85% of the population) and the Mainlanders (14%) were viewed as distinct ethnic
groups, the Mainlander "minority" is not economically dominant. See ALAN WACIMIAN,
TAIWAN: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 16-17 (1994).
135. See JOHN KING FAIRBANK, CHINA: A NEv HISTORY 23 (1992) (noting that over one
billion Chinese trace their ancestry to the Han dynasty). This general statistic hides the fact that
ethnic minorities represent a majority in autonomous regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang. See
THOMAS HEBERER, CHINA AND ITS NATIONAL MINORITIES 93-94, 100 tbl.6.18 (1989) (showing
that as of 1987 non-Han groups made up 95.4% and 61.4% of the total population of Tibet and
Xinjiang, respectively).
136. See, e.g., HEBERER, supra note 135, at 19 (noting that although some non-Han peoples
did subjugate the Han and establish their own dynasties, "it was primarily the Han who
subjugated the other peoples and exacted tributes from them"). For the purposes of this Article, I
will assume, along with most Sinologists, that the "Han" Chinese may be viewed appropriately as
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C. Economic Dominance and Market Dominance
Why some ethnic groups dominate economically over others is a
formidable topic that this Article cannot possibly address adequately.
Although it is fashionable in some circles to attribute superior group
economic performance primarily to genetics, 37 the reasons for economic
dominance clearly vary from context to context, and explanations taking
account of historical and cultural factors show a far greater breadth of
understanding.'38 In any event, for purposes of this Article, the crucial
question is whether a particular ethnic group in a particular country is
market-dominant.
Not every economically dominant minority is a market-dominant
minority. Some groups-such as Russians in Central Asia (and elsewhere
in the former Soviet Union), Afrikaners in South Africa, and Spaniards in
Latin America-originally installed themselves as colonizers, using
military force and the powers of the state to ensure their own economic and
political dominance over subordinate majorities.'39 To the extent that these
groups owe their economic dominance solely or principally to nonmarket
factors, their historical economic dominance may not persist under
competitive market conditions. On the contrary, marketization may
dissipate their economic dominance by opening up opportunities to
disadvantaged groups previously prevented from participating fully in the
economy.
On the other hand, it is possible that decades of political control by an
ethnic minority may itself give rise to market dominance. In South Africa,
for example, whites today almost certainly are market-dominant (at least in
the near to midterm future), but surely this is in significant part because
they have relegated the black majority to inferior educational opportunities
and generally inhumane conditions for the past fifty years.
140
a single ethnic group. See, e.g., JACQUES GERNET, A HISTORY OF CHINESE CIVILIZATION 13 (J.R.
Forster trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1982) (1972); HEBERER, supra note 135, at 10-12. This is
not to deny important differences within China along provincial, north-south, and rural-urban
lines. See China Wants Foreign Banks to Boost Lagging Regions, REUTERS FIN. SERV., Jan. 4,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File; Deepening Regional Disparities Threaten
Chinese Renaissance, ASIA TmIES, Dec. 28, 1995, at 5.
137. In a recent, controversial book, Richard Hermstein and Charles Murray argue that
cognitive ability differs across ethnic groups, see RICHARD HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY,
THE BELL CURVE (1994), that these differences are inheritable and attributable in significant part
to genetics, see id. at 299-312, and that poverty in the United States is concentrated among those
with low I.Q.s, see id. at 371.
138. See, e.g., CLAUDE S. FISCHER ET AL., INEQUALITY BY DESIGN: CRACKING THE BELL
CURVE MYTH (1996).
139. See TED ROBERT GURR & BARBARA HARFF, ETHNIC CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS 24
(1994).
140. South Africa is discussed in greater detail infra Section V.A.
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The form of economic dominance in the developing world most likely
to indicate market dominance is that of noncolonizer, "entrepreneurial"
minorities such as the Chinese, Indians, and Lebanese."' It is often said that
these "middleman" minorities are "culturally" predisposed to
entrepreneurial success as a result of group differences in work habits,
savings propensities, or attitudes toward education and commerce.142 Thus
the Chinese in Southeast Asia (and elsewhere) are said to be driven by an
"intense profit motive" relatively absent among Malays and Filipinos; 43
the Vietnamese are "frugal," "industrious," and "inventive" compared to
the supposedly more artistically oriented Cambodians;'" Indians in the
Caribbean and throughout East Africa operate on tiny profit margins, live
extremely cheaply, and are felt to be "single-mindedly devoted to work and
accumulation." '45 Relatedly, a good deal of recent scholarship explains the
success of Chinese, Indian, Korean, and Lebanese communities in terms of
their solidarity and "social networking," in contrast to the Thai, who, for
example, "don't trust one another" and "relate to one another only in a
hierarchical way." '46 On this view, marketization in the developing world
141. As Professor Sowell has explained, "In one way or another, middlemen facilitate the
movement of goods from the producer to the consumer, without necessarily physically producing
anything themselves." SOWELL, supra note 97, at 27. Examples "include retailers, ranging from
pushcart peddlers to international merchants, and money-lenders, ranging from pawnbrokers and
petty loan sharks to international financiers." Il
142. Since Max Weber's classic essay, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,
many social scientists have explored the relationship between cultural attitudes and economic
success. Thus, in the 1950s, "Weber's Protestant Ethic [was] modernized into David
McClelland's 'achievement motivation' as a precondition of progress and into Edward C.
Banfield's 'amoral familism' as an obstacle." ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, RIVAL VIEwS OF
MARKET SOCIETY 19 (1992). More recently, Thomas Sowell and others have observed that
"[c]ultural attitudes toward commerce and industry have varied as much as attitudes toward
education." SOWELL, supra note 95, at 25. Professor Sowell also has noted elsewhere that "there
must be some cultural difference between the middlemen and those they serve. Otherwise, each
community or nation would supply its own middlemen." SOWELL, supra note 97, at 27.
143. Phuwadol Songprasert, The Economic Roles, Positions and Problems of the Chinese and
the Malay Muslims in the Thai Polity: A Comparative Study, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF
ETHNIC CONFLICT 119, 128 (S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe & Reed Coughlan eds., 1991); see also
SOWELL, supra note 97, at 191-92, 207.
144. See HENRY KAMM, DRAGON ASCENDING: VIETNAM AND THE VIETNAMESE 24 (1996);
Chou Meng Tan-, supra note 107, at 35. "Cambodians felt that they were culturally superior to the
Vietnamese, particularly in the fields of art, craft, literature and music" and in Khmer language
dismissed the Vietnamese "as lacking the capacity for the finer experiences of life." Id.
145. HOROWITZ, supra note 10, at 170; see also SOWVELL, supra note 97, at 318. Cultural
distinctions have been drawn in Eastern Europe as well. The Estonians and Latvians, for example,
are said to be especially hardworking (relative to Russians) because of their "Protestant work
ethic." Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Baltic Identities in the 1990s: Renewed Fitness, in NATIONAL
IDENTITY AND ETHNICITY, supra note 119, at 185, 190.
146. LAWRENCE E. HARRISON, WHO PROSPERS? How CULTURAL VALUES SHAPE
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SUCCESS 15 (1992); c JACQUES AMYOT, THE CHINESE AND THE
NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 80-81 (1972) (suggesting that the economic power
of the Chinese in Thailand stems in large part from cohesive kinship ties and complex patterns of
community associations); KOTKIN, supra note 99, at 206 (noting that the Sindhi diaspora "tends
to 'cling together' while Jain diamond merchants "are very close and everyone knows
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almost certainly would be expected to further the economic dominance of
these hardworking, capital-saving, "more cohesive and well organized"
entrepreneurial groups. 47
This conclusion, however, may overemphasize greatly the economic-
as opposed to the political-skills or savvy of so-called "entrepreneurial"
groups. For example, the tremendous wealth of the Chinese in Southeast
Asia may reflect good political connections and a "talent" for getting
monopoly privileges from the state as much as superior commercial
skills.'48 At the same time, the success of Indian and Lebanese merchants in
many African countries is often attributed to their allegedly corrupt and
illicit government connections." A slightly different line of thought
suggests that the success of all of these groups lies in the "divide-and-
conquer" strategies of European colonizers, who ensured that economic
control, to the extent that it was not monopolized by the colonizer, lay
"with a politically impotent class of pariah [non-native] businessmen." 15 0
To the extent that these political favoritism accounts are correct, it is by no
means guaranteed that the developing world's "entrepreneurial" minorities
will continue to enjoy economic dominance under genuine competitive
conditions.
Nevertheless, that certain ethnic minorities are better able than others to
exploit the economic possibilities of political favoritism may not be
fortuitous. If European colonial powers pursued a "divide-and-conquer"
strategy in Southeast Asia and Africa, their decision to deal profitably with
certain immigrant groups such as the Chinese or Indians surely had
something to do with the fact that these groups had dominated trade there
everyone") (citations omitted); id. at 234 (stating that the Koreans have begun to establish "their
own powerful global network"); MURRAY WEIDENBAUM & SAMUEL HUGHES, THE BAMBOO
NETWoRK: How EXPATRIATE CHINESE ENTREPRENEURS ARE CREATING A NEW ECONOMIC
SUPERPOWER IN ASIA 3-6, 23-59 (1996) (arguing that the "bamboo network" of expatriate
Chinese family-oriented enterprises accounts for Chinese economic dominance).
147. HOROwITZ, supra note 10, at 170.
148. See INGRAM, supra note 98, at 20 (noting that the economic "supremacy" of the Thai
Chinese reflected in part the government practice of granting them trade monopolies). I discuss
this possibility below more fully in the context of Vietnam. See infra Subsection V.C.3.b.; cf
PAUL KENNEDY, AFRICAN CAPITALIsM: THE STRUGGLE FOR ASCENDANCY 71-72 (1988) (noting
that in Uganda, officials in the Obote regime granted trade monopolies to prominent Indian
businessmen in exchange for lucrative directorship positions); Himbara, supra note 113, at 477
(noting that in Kenya in the 1970s "the most successful Kikuyu capitalists were notables in
President Kenyatta's own family or in key state institutions").
149. See, e.g., Didier Bigo, The Lebanese Community in the Ivory Coast: A Non-native
Network at the Heart of Power?, in THE LEBANESE IN THE WORLD, supra note 95, at 509, 509-
10; Greg Barrow, Kenyan Asians Fight Back as Politicians Call for Expulsion, GUARDIAN
(London), June 19, 1996, at 13.
150. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNrrIES 116 (rev. ed. 1991); see, e.g., Philip
Gourevitch, The Poisoned Country, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 6, 1996, at 59, 60 (stating that in
Rwanda and Burundi the Belgians pursued a policy of divide-and-conquer that favored Tutsis
over Hutus for educational, professional, and political opportunities).
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long before the European colonizers arrived on the scene."' Hence, the
political favoritism explanation ultimately may beg the question and return
the inquiry to cultural factors.
But cultural explanations also beg a more difficult question: Why do
certain ethnic groups develop commercially advantageous cultural traits?
Weber famously pointed to political exclusion as a potential explanation,
noting that minorities excluded from positions of political influence "were
driven with peculiar force into economic activity." 152 More recently,
rational choice theorists have attributed the economic success of certain
"ethnically homogeneous middlemen groups" to the small size and social
connectedness of these groups, which "give their members a unique means
of (informally) sanctioning contract breaches by other group members." 
1 53
It is not obvious whether these further explanations are sufficient.
Numerous politically excluded minorities do not attain economic success.
Likewise, there are plenty of numerically small ethnic groups that have not
become successful middlemen. 5 4 Resolving these issues is not necessary
151. In pre-colonial Indonesia, for example,
all foreign trade in the [Tabanan] kingdom-the main export was coffee, the main
import opium-was conducted by a single wealthy Chinese called a subandar, who
held a royal monopoly in exchange for a suitable tribute, the remainder of the small
resident Chinese population acting as his agents. Domestic trade was trifling ....
GEERTZ, supra note 95, at 25-26. Of course, this observation may be owing to Chinese
imperialism in Southeast Asia, which antedates Western colonialism. See CHARLES 0. HUCKER,
CHINA'S IMPERIAL PAST 1 (1975). Similarly, in East Africa, Indian merchants as early as the
second century A.D. functioned as "the principal suppliers of cotton cloth, beads, and sundry
manufactured articles and as importers of ivory, gold, iron, gum copal, ambergris, incense."
MANGAT, supra note 95, at 1.
152. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIc AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 39 (Tacott
Parsons, Routledge 1992) (1930). Weber specifically had in mind Poles in Russia and Eastern
Prussia, Huguenots in France, Nonconformists and Quakers in England, and Jews generally. See
id.
153. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REv. 338, 343 (1997) (footnote omitted); see Robert Cooter & Janet T. Landa, Personal Versus
Impersonal Trade: The Size of Trading Groups and Contract Law, 4 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 15
(1984); Sumner J. La Croix, Homogeneous Middleman Groups: What Determines the
Homogeneity?, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 211, 219 (1989); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically
Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL
STUD. 349, 355-57 (1981); see also Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 140-41 (1992)
(explaining that in the diamond industry, which historically has been dominated by Orthodox
Jews, most intra-industry disputes generally are resolved without recourse to the legal system);
Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling
Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 84 (1989) (exploring the "hypothesis that when people are
situated in a close-knit group, they will tend to develop for the ordinary run of problems norms
that are wealth-maximizing").
154. Indeed, it has been suggested that too high a degree of familial or clannish trust may in
some contexts obstruct entrepreneurialism. See GEERTz, supra note 95, at 131-32; KENNEDY,
supra note 148, at 143. Francis Fukuyama argues that familial or clannish trust, while allowing
the success of small, individual businesses, is actually an obstacle to economic success at the
national level. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 28-29 (1995). Fukuyama focuses instead on the importance of generalized social
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here. For purposes of the model proposed in Part IV, the crucial question is
whether the economic dominance of a given ethnic minority will tend to
persist or even increase under marketization, no matter what the underlying
explanation.'55
IV. MARKETIZATION, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND
ETHNONATIONALISM: A MODEL
Drawing on historical evidence and a wide-ranging social science
literature, this Part proposes a model to explore the consequences of
pursuing markets and democracy under the following conditions: (1)
economic underdevelopment; (2) severe ethnic divisions; (3) the presence
of a market-dominant ethnic minority; and (4) the presence of an
impoverished majority with claims to being the "true owners of the nation"
(often by virtue of their supposed "indigenousness"). Section A below
gives an overview of the model. Section B addresses the prevalence of the
model conditions in the developing world. Section C discusses the
outcomes predicted by the model if marketization and democratization are
pursued in countries satisfying the model conditions and demonstrates that
these outcomes are corroborated by historical evidence from throughout the
developing world. Section D considers possible counterexamples-
countries arguably satisfying the model conditions where markets and
democracy have not produced the model outcomes-and notes certain
factors that might complicate the model's application in real-world cases.
Finally, Section E highlights some general policy implications of the model,
preparing the way for the model applications in Part V.
A. Overview
Suppose country X satisfies the model conditions. Suppose that the
population of country X consists of two rival ethnic groups: a relatively
impoverished ethnic majority (the Ms) and a market-dominant ethnic
minority (the MDMs). Suppose, finally, that country X simultaneously
pursues marketization and democratization. In these circumstances, three
hypotheses can be advanced:
trust, as measured by the presence or absence of large multinational corporations, as a
precondition for success in the global economy. See id.
155. In many developing countries, this question may be impossible to answer until
marketization is actually in progress.
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I. Notwithstanding possible slight absolute gains in the Ms'
economic position as a result of marketization,*6 the MDMs'
economic dominance, coupled with the Ms' continuing pervasive
poverty, will provoke, maintain, or exacerbate intense
ethnoeconomic resentment among the disadvantaged Ms.
II. With democratization, this ethnoeconomic resentment among
the Ms will tend to be mobilized and transformed into a potent
ethnonationalist movement dedicated to eliminating the MDMs'
economic dominance.
II. As a result, marketization and democratization in country X will
be difficult, if not impossible, to sustain simultaneously. If all the
model conditions are fully satisfied, powerful pressures will push X
toward one or more of three basic outcomes: (1) an ethnically
targeted antimarket backlash; 157 (2) actions directed at eliminating
the MDMs (e.g., atrocity or expulsion); or (3) a retreat from
democracy.
Two points must be made before proceeding. First, in focusing on
ethnic division, I am not trying to minimize the importance of class conflict
or other potential lines of social division in developing countries. But in the
developing world, ethnicity has played a much greater role within class
conflict than social theorists generally have recognized."' Moreover, in the
last several decades, ethnicity has been a far more fertile source of political
mobilization and mass conflict than has either class or religion.159
156. If marketization produced tremendous and rapid economic gains among the Ms, then X
would no longer satisfy model conditions one (economic underdevelopment) and four (presence
of an impoverished majority). This happy but extremely unlikely possibility is discussed further
below. See infra text accompanying notes 204-205.
157. As discussed further below, by "antimarket backlash" I am not referring to after-market
redistributions, such as progressive taxation or welfare programs, but rather to ethnically targeted,
direct interventions into actual market functions-for example, through ethnically targeted
nationalizations or ethnically based restrictions on commercial activity. See infra text
accompanying notes 248-275.
158. The extent to which this is true obviously varies. For example, the role of ethnicity is
relatively small in "Europeanized" Latin American countries such as Argentina or Uruguay. The
model accounts for such variation through the model conditions.
159. See HORoWrz_, supra note 10, at xi, 105-06 (observing that "[ethnicity is at the center
of politics in country after country" and that "ethnic affiliations generally seem to elicit more
passionate loyalty than do class allegiances"); Frye, supra note 33, at 599 (noting that in the
attempted transitions to democracy in Czechoslovakia, Spain, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia,
ethnicity was "politicized to a much greater degree than class or religion"). The interrelationship
among etinicity, religion, and class is complex and beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to
say here that religion is one of many factors that may shape ethnic identity. See Hettne, supra note
41, at 17. Moreover, "[e]thnicity may overlap with class, in which case the result will be an
enforcement of class consciousness. Ethnicity may also cut across class, in which case the effect
on class consciousness may be the opposite." lId at 17.
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Second, neither the model nor the hypotheses depend on any particular
theory about why ethnic conflict occurs. 6 ' Specifically, I am not arguing
that economics in general, or economically dominant minorities in
particular, are at the root of ethnic animosity. 6 ' Indeed, the model
presupposes the presence of severe ethnic divisions. Furthermore, I am not
suggesting that democracy is necessary (or more likely than
authoritarianism) to trigger an ethnonationalist reaction. Rather, the point of
the model is that in developing countries where a market-dominant ethnic
minority is present, democracy can proceed only in deep tension with
markets. Instead of reinforcing the market's efficiency and wealth-
producing effects, democratization in such cases ordinarily will lead to
powerful majoritarian, ethnonationalist pressures. If such ethnonationalism
becomes sufficiently potent, one or more of the three hypothesized
outcomes likely will occur.
B. Definition and Prevalence of Model Conditions
The model's first condition-economic underdevelopment-occurs in
all developing countries by definition. Condition two-severe ethnic
divisions-refers to societies where powerful ethnic allegiances and
rivalries "permeate organizations, activities, and roles to which they are
formally unrelated,"162 and capital, labor, political parties, and many other
sectors of social life "are often organized along ethnic lines." 6 ' This
160. Just as there are many competing conceptions of ethnicity, see supra note 31, there are
numerous theories of ethnic conflict. Cultural pluralist theories focus on the clash of mutually
incompatible values among culturally divergent groups. See, e.g., J.S. FURNIVALL, COLONIAL
POLICY AND PRACTICE 303-12 (1948); M.G. Smith, Institutional and Political Conditions of
Pluralism, in PLURALISM IN AFRICA 27, 38, 53-54 (Leo Kuper & M.G. Smith eds., 1969). By
contrast, modernization and economic-interest theories stress group competition over resources
and opportunities, often highlighting the role of elites in fomenting conflict. See, e.g., Robert H.
Bates, Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa, 6 COMP. POL. STUD., 457,
457, 468-71 (1974); Bonacich, supra note 95, at 589; Melson & Wolpe, supra note 114, at 1-10;
infra note 211 (discussing different views of ethnic mobilization). Other well known theories of
ethnic conflict do not fit into either of these categories. See, e.g., HOROWrIZ, supra note 10, at
139-40 (critiquing both the cultural pluralist and modernization and materialist perspectives and
advocating a more inclusive theory of ethnic conflict); SMITH, supra note 10, at 5-6 (proposing "a
broad socio-historical approach" to understanding the modem ethnic revival). For an excellent
collection of essays analyzing ethnic conflict in developed as well as developing societies, see
ETHNICITY: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE, supra note 19.
161. Theories of economic determinism that ascribe all or most ethnic conflict to economic
causes generally have been discredited: "To argue, for example, that the Israeli-Palestinian
struggle is basically about economic values, or that the Quiet Revolution is mainly about
employment opportunities for educated Quebecois ... utterly trivializes and distorts the meaning
and stakes of these conflicts." ESMAN, supra note 31, at 234. Nevertheless, "[t]here is likely to be
an economic dimension to most ethnic conflicts." Id. at 231.
162. HOROwrrz, supra note 10, at 7-9.
163. Il This is not to suggest that some societies are "inherently or inevitably divided." Ian
Shapiro & Courtney Jung, South African Democracy Revisited: A Reply to Koelble and Reynolds,
24 POL. & SoC'Y 237, 243 (1996). On the contrary, ethnic divisions may shift or change over
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definition includes almost all of the postcolonial societies of Africa, Asia,
and the Caribbean as well as many countries in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union."6 Most Latin American countries also satisfy this
condition, even though political conflict in the region tends to be
"conceptualized mainly in terms of class rather than ethnicity or race." "6
The prevalence of condition three-the presence of a market-dominant
ethnic minority-has already been discussed.1 66 It is worth reiterating,
however, that not every economically dominant ethnic minority is market-
dominant for the purposes of this model. Moreover, market dominance need
not be caused by superior entrepreneurialism "built in" to a particular
group's genes or culture. Market dominance could, for example, also be the
result of decades of political subjugation by an ethnic minority. As we shall
see, condition three is a pivotal and often complex variable.
Finally, the vast majority of societies satisfying condition three also
meet condition four-that is, the presence of an impoverished majority with
claims that they are the "true owners of the nation."" In most of these
cases, the disenchanted majority asserts group priority by highlighting its
indigenousness.16' These claims of majority "indigenousness" are
frequently highly artificial and often the product of elite manipulation. In
Sri Lanka, for example, the majority Sinhalese regard themselves as "true"
Sri Lankans, and the Ceylon Tamils as foreign intruders, even though the
latter "arrived, on average, perhaps a thousand years ago, [and] can hardly
be regarded as immigrants." 169 Most of the economically dominant Indians
expelled from Burma (now Myanmar) in the 1960s had roots in the country
dating back generations. 7 Similarly, the vast majority of Chinese in
Southeast Asia today are citizens of the countries in which they live and are
time. See id.; see also Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Identity, in ETHNICrrY: THEORY AND
EXPERIENCE, supra note 19, at 111, 113 (describing the fluidity of ethnic boundaries).
164. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 34, at 14; SMITH, supra note 10, at 8-12; Horowitz, supra
note 51, at 18-20.
165. James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, A Cross-Sectional Study of Large-Scale Ethnic
Violence in the Post-War Period 16 (Sept. 30, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The
Yale Law Journal); see also Julian Pitt-Rivers, Race, Color, and Class in Central America and the
Andes, in 2 READINGS IN LATIN AMERICAN HISTORY 312, 317-18, 321 (John J. Johnson et al.
eds., 1985) (describing "the role ethnic distinctiveness plays in ordering the society of Latin
America" and noting that "there is no color bar but rather a color scale"). Julian Pitt-Rivers has
suggested that the correlation between class and color in Latin America is increasing rather than
decreasing. As growing numbers of unassimilated Indians move to the city, "[t]he result is a
continual influx of persons of mainly Indian physique into the proletariat. At the same time, the
immigration of Europeans into these countries has been very considerable in the last two decades,
and these Europeans have almost all been absorbed into the upper classes." Id. at 326.
166. See supra Section M.C.
167. HoRowrTz, supra note 10, at 202,206,208; see Horowitz, supra note 51, at 23-25.
168. See Horowitz, supra note 51, at 23-25.
169. HORowriz, supra note 10, at 203.
170. See GOLAY ET AL., supra note 95, at 209; SMITH, supra note 108, at 200-01.
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unlikely ever to return to China.171 Nevertheless, such groups are generally
treated as outsiders by "indigenous" majorities.172
C. Model Hypotheses
The basic thrust of the model is that, in countries satisfying the
specified conditions, marketization and democratization will tend to benefit
different ethnic groups, producing a highly volatile and potentially
destructive dynamic along the lines indicated by the three model
hypotheses. This Section will substantiate each of these three hypotheses
with historical and sociological evidence from the developing world.
1. Hypothesis I: Ethnoeconomic Resentment Against Market-
dominant Minorities
It is possible that in prosperous societies where everyone is thriving, the
fact that market policies favor a certain ethnic minority may not produce
serious destabilizing consequences.173 In developing countries, however, the
situation is starkly different. Although the details differ from country to
country, the overall story is remarkably similar. Marketization either
causes, maintains, or exacerbates the economic dominance of a particular
ethnic minority, and this economic dominance in turn causes, maintains, or
exacerbates intense ethnic resentment. The following provides a stylized
account:
X's leaders have initiated market-oriented economic reforms.174
Expectations are high, as these leaders have waxed eloquent about
the liberating and wealth-producing promise of the free market.
Early results, however, do not deliver on this promise.75 Among the
Ms, unemployment persists and possibly even increases. Similarly,
prices for some basic commodities may actually rise. Most Ms
continue to live in abject conditions. At the same time, the MDMs
prosper disproportionately. The Ms may or may not be better off
171. See SOWELL, supra note 97, at 180.
172. See, e.g., GEERTz, supra note 95, at 11-12, 77-78; VASIL, supra note 101, at 225-26;
WALTER F. VELLA, CHAiyO! KING VAJIRAVUDH AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAI
NATIONALISM 194-95 (1978); Horowitz, supra note 51, at 23-25.
173. In a cross-sectional study of ethnic violence, Fearon and Laitin found that "robust
growth in per capita income is strongly associated with a lower probability of large-scale ethnic
violence." Fearon & Laitin, supra note 165, at 18.
174. Such reforms typically include privatization, liberalization of trade and capital
restrictions, and elimination of price controls and state subsidies.
175. In a well known book, Gurr argued that when actual income is less than expected
income, people become frustrated, angry, and more disposed to violent conflict. See TED ROBERT
GuRR, WHY MEN REBEL 9, 12-14, 360-67 (1970); see also Fearon & Laitin, supra note 165, at 18
(predicting increased conflict whenever income growth is less than anticipated).
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from an absolute perspective, but any sense of improvement is
overwhelmed by their continuing poverty and the visible economic
dominance of the MDMs. 17 6 Frustrated by their relative lack of
success, the Ms regard the MDMs as greedy, exploitative, and
unscrupulous. As time passes, and the entrenchment of their
poverty becomes more palpable, the Ms' animosity toward the
MDMs may intensify. Ethnic scapegoating, violence, and even
rioting are genuine dangers.
For purposes of the model, it makes no difference whether this
ethnoeconomic resentment arises "from the bottom up" or results from
deliberate manipulation by political elites.177 Similarly, it makes no
difference whether a minority's disproportionate economic success under
market policies intensifies ethnic resentment, merely provides a convenient
focus for preexisting animus, or creates severe resentment where none
existed before. Regardless of which of these accounts applies in any given
case, the phenomenon of deep resentment against economically dominant
ethnic minorities has played out in every region of the developing world.
For example, throughout Southeast Asia, Chinese entrepreneurial success
has provoked the hatred and envy of indigenous majorities since the
colonial period.178 Time and again, the Chinese-seen as venal,
176. Although often neglected in standard economic modeling, the insight that people's
happiness may depend heavily on their relative position vis-,-vis other individuals or other groups
has been recognized by leading theorists in a broad range of disciplines. See, e.g., A.C. PIGOU,
THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 89-90 (4th ed. 1948) (quoting John Stuart Mill) (philosophy);
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 112-13 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds.,
Clarendon Press 1976) (1759) (economics); SAMUEL A. STOUFFER, THE AMERICAN SOLDIER:
ADJUSTMENT DURING ARMY LIFE (1949) (sociology); Guido Calabresi, About Law and
Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 553, 556 (1980) (law); Leon
Festinger, A Theory of Social Comparison Processes, 7 HUM. REL. 117 (1954) (social
psychology); Amartya Sen, Poor, Relatively Speaking, 35 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 153 (1983)
(economics). For a discussion of these and other sources, and for an excellent exploration of "the
positive and normative implications of relative desires, particularly with respect to law and legal
theory," see Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 6, 10-11, 31-32
(1992).
177. There is a broad literature discussing the manipulation of ethnic divisions by political
elites. See, e.g., JOHN BREUiLLY, NATIONALISM AND THE STATE 19-22 (2d ed. 1994); ESMAN,
supra note 31, at 230-31; GURR & HARFF, supra note 139, at 78-79, 83-85, 89; CHARLES TILLY,
FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION 69-84 (1978); Guyora Binder, The Case for Self-
Determination, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 223, 242 (1993); Donald L. Horowitz, Cause and
Consequence in Public Policy Theory: Ethnic Policy and System Transformation in Malaysia, 22
POL. SCi. 249, 255-56 (1989); Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Democratization and War,
FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1995, at 87-88; Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International
Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 17 & n.84 (1998). Below, I address
such political manipulation specifically in the context of democratizing countries. See infra text
accompanying notes 209-211.
178. See, e.g., LYNN PAN, SONS OF THE YELLOW EMPEROR 215 (1990); SOVELL, supra note
97, at 181-213. According to Sowell, large-scale emigration from China into Southeast Asia
began only after European colonial powers "consolidated their control in the region in the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and created stable conditions in which Chinese
immigrants could feel secure." Id. at 181.
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exploitative, and perverse 79-- have been portrayed as "draining away the
[nation's] wealth"' 80 and posing a "menace to all the principles of
economic vitality of the country.""18 Anti-Chinese violence is an integral
part of the region's history that continues to this day.'82 In Indonesia, for
example, where roughly six million working age people (almost all
Indonesians) are unemployed,"8 3 the Chinese are regular targets of arson,
vandalism, and ethnic rioting." Scapegoating of, and retaliation against,
Southeast Asia's "greedy" and "hoarding" Chinese "locusts" have visibly
intensified as a result of the region's recent financial crisis.'85
Are there any Southeast Asian countries where economically dominant
Chinese have not provoked violent resentment? Singapore is an obvious
exception, which also happens to prove the rule, because the Chinese there
have been an economically dominant majority since independence. The
only other possible negative case is contemporary Thailand, where relations
between the economically dominant Chinese minority and the Thai
majority appear to be amiable. 8 6 Nevertheless, for reasons discussed below,
the Thai "exception" may also confirm the rule. 7
Resentment and vindictive terror have been directed at other
economically dominant minorities in Southeast Asia and throughout the
developing world. Assamese have repeatedly attacked Bengalis.'88 Burmans
killed thousands of Indians during World War 1.189 More recently, a Tamil
179. See PAN, supra note 178, at 214-15; ADAM SCHWARTZ, A NATION IN WAITING 103
(1994).
180. SOWVELL, supra note 97, at 182.
181. AMYoT, supra note 146, at 32 (quoting from an anti-Chinese report sent from the
Philippines to the government of Spain in 1896). Early on, many Chinese immigrants remitted
profits back to their families in China. See SOWELL, supra note 97, at 182. As Professor Sowell
has observed, however, these remittances were tiny in comparison to the wealth generated by the
"overseas Chinese" for their host countries' economies. See id.
182. See, e.g., AMYOT, supra note 146, at26; SOWvELL, supra note 97, at 195,203,205.
183. See Paul Jacob, 6.3 Million Indonesians out of Job Last Year, STRAITS TIMES
(SINGAPORE), Nov. 8, 1996, at 18.
184. See Leah Makabenta, Indonesia: Ethnic Chinese Economic Success Fuels Racial
Tension, INTER PRESS Svc., Mar. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, INPRES File;
Seth Mydans, In Indonesia, Spark of Intolerance Lights Fires of Ethnic Rioting, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Apr. 9, 1997, at 1; Peter Waldman, As Good Times Roll, Indonesia's Chinese Fear for
Their Future, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1997, at A18.
185. Michael Sheridan, Bitter Asia Turns on Chinese "Locusts," SUNDAY TIMES (London),
Feb. 1, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; see also Indonesians Riot: Mobs
Blame Chinese for Money Crisis, NEWSDAY, Feb. 14, 1998, at A14. Dozens, possibly hundreds,
of Indonesian Chinese were killed in the recent riots that led to President Suharto's resignation.
See Richard Borsuk & Marcus W. Brauchli, Suharto Resigns, and Vice President Takes Over,
WALL ST. J., May 21, 1998, at A8; Uli Schmetzer, Fearful Ethnic Chinese Trying To Flee
Indonesia, C-. TRiB., May 17, 1998, at 4.
186. See Horowitz, supra note 51, at 19; Michael Vatikiotis, Sino Chic, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Jan. 11, 1996, at 22; James Fallows, Boom Times in Bangkok, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1994
(Magazine), at 18.
187. See infra Subsection IV.D.I.a.
188. See HOROW1rrZ, supra note 10, at 121,212-13.
189. See MICHAEL FREDHOLM, BURMA: ETHNICITY AND INSURGENCY 35 (1993).
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woman in Sri Lanka was randomly dragged off a bus, "doused with
gasoline, and set ablaze by a Sinhalese mob in which people danced and
clapped their hands while she died in agony." 190 In Kenya, after a military
coup in 1982, the starkly economically dominant Indian minority was
confronted with "the unleashed hatred of some of Kenya's 16 million
African majority."' 91 Looters and rioters targeted Asian shops and
businesses, smashed "what could not be looted," and raped at least twenty
Indian women. 192 In Tanzania, the retreat from a socialist economy in the
1980s precipitated the "reemergence of the country's sizeable Asian
minority as a powerful force in the economy."' 93 Majority fears that "the
non-indigenous community [would] overwhelm and take over everything"
led to bitter anti-Indian brutality. 94 Zambia's "very greedy" Indians, who
once were accused of purchasing the body parts of mutilated African
children, recently were targeted in mass riots. In one participant's words:
"Indians are the ones getting the chances. They've got millions and
millions.""19
In Africa, nonindigenous minorities are not the only targets of
resentment. There also have been ethnoeconomic reactions against
economically dominant African minorities, at both the national and regional
levels. In Kenya, post-independence urban growth (and ethnically-biased
state policies) reinforced the economic prominence of the "capitalistic"
Kikuyu,196 who in turn were terrorized and victimized by the Kalenjin, the
"rightful" owners of the country.'97 In Nigeria in 1966, tens of thousands of
Ibo were slaughtered indiscriminately by resentful mobs. 98 In both Rwanda
and Burundi, the ethnocidal conflict between the Hutu majority and the
Tutsi minority is inextricably connected with the historical socioeconomic
190. SOWELL, supra note 97, at 28.
191. Alan Cowell, A Fearful Reminder Lingers for Asians in Kenya, N.Y. TrMES, Sept. 1,
1982, at A2; see also Himbara, supra note 113, at 470 (discussing the economic dominance of
Indians in East Africa).
192. Cowell, supra note 191, at A20.
193. Keith B. Richburg, Tanzanian Reforms Opening up Socialist, One-Party.System, WASH.
POST, Mar. 24, 1992, at A14.
194. Id; see also Stephen Buckley, Policy Helps Tanzania Avoid Tribal Tensions Rife
Elsewhere in Africa, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1995, at A15 (discussing Tanzania's Indian
community).
195. Scott Straus, In Zambia, Race Hatred Simmers, BALT. SUN, Jan. 26, 1996, at 3A.
196. See Himbara, supra note 113, at 476-77; Frank Holmquist & Michael Ford, Kenya:
State and Civil Society the First Year After the Election, 41 AFR. TODAY, Fall 1994, at 7, 13; see
also KENNEDY, supra note 148, at 93-96 (discussing competing explanations for "the rise of the
mainly Kikuyu capitalist bourgeoisie" in Kenya). "Independence in 1963 brought Kenyatta to
power as well as an ethnic bias toward the Kikuyu .... Kenyatta was followed by Moi in 1978
with his bias toward the Kalenjin .... " Holmquist & Ford, supra, at 11.
197. Holmquist & Ford, supra note 196, at 12; see id. at 5, 7-9, 13.
198. See SOWELL, supra note 97, at 28.
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dominance of the latter.19 9 In Uganda in the 1960s and 1970s, the politically
dominant groups of the north repeatedly subjected the economically
dominant Baganda of the south to bloody purges.2"' Dozens of other
examples exist.
Depending on the context, the degree of the majority's resentment will
vary. In Indonesia, for example, the Arab minority has provoked much less
resentment than the Chinese.201 Resentment against the Lebanese-known
as the "Jews of West Africa" 202 and the "descendants of Judas" 203 in the
Caribbean-also has been relatively mild. Nevertheless, in conditions of
pervasive poverty, economically dominant ethnic minorities almost
invariably have been the targets of ethnically charged resentment on the
part of the relatively impoverished majorities around them.
To be sure, if market policies in a particular developing country
succeeded in bringing rapid prosperity to the great majority of Ms, the
ethnoeconomic resentment predicted by the model might well be avoided.2"
In model terms, a developing country that experiences such a "market
miracle" effectively would have broken out of model conditions one
(economic underdevelopment) and four (presence of an impoverished
majority). Unfortunately, such a scenario has never yet unfolded in any
developing country with a market-dominant minority.0 5
199. See LEMARCHAND, supra note 114, at 15-16; PRUNIER, supra note 114, at 39. In both
Rwanda and Burundi, the Tutsi were also politically dominant for many years. See Gourevitch,
supra note 150, at 59 (describing periods of Tutsi political domination in Rwanda and Burundi
before and after the colonial period).
200. See HOROWITZ, supra note 10, at 487,490; MAMDANI, supra note 114, at 291.
201. See HOROWITZ, supra note 10, at 117-18; Justus M. van der Kroef, The Arabs of
Indonesia, 7 MIDDLE E. J. 300, 310, 311, 318 (1953).
202. SOWELL, supra note 97, at 235.
203. Nicholls, supra note 115, at 339, 349.
204. Even then, ethnic accord is by no means guaranteed. Cf. Walker Connor,
Ethnonationalism, il UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 196, 197 (Myron Weiner &
Samuel P. Huntington eds., 1987) (criticizing the unwarranted presumption "that the wellsprings
of ethnic discord are economic and that an ethnic minority can be placated if its living standard is
improving").
205. As discussed above, there are no market-dominant minorities in the East Asian Tigers.
See supra text accompanying note 134. More generally, market reforms rarely produce immediate
and widespread benefits for large portions of the population. As Huntington has observed:
Economic liberalization... may produce some immediate benefits for a few groups
which are able to take advantage of new opportunities to make money. It is also very
likely, however, to impose widespread and often severe economic penalties on much
larger groups. Subsidies are ended, taxes are raised, budgets are balanced, workers are
discharged, businesses go bankrupt, prices rise, wages fall and production declines.
Enormous economic costs must be paid in order to achieve a promised long-term
economic nirvana that seems to recede indefinitely into the future.
Huntington, supra note 2, at 25; see Przeworski, supra note 132, at 39 (suggesting that market
reforms almost invariably "make most people worse off for some time to come").
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2. Hypothesis 1H: Ethnonationalism and Democratization
Hypothesis II predicts that with democratization, the Ms'
ethnoeconomic resentment against the MDMs will tend to be mobilized and
transformed into a potent ethnonationalist political movement along the
following lines:
Elections in X are about to take place. Deeply frustrated with their
continuing poverty and resentful of the MDMs' economic
dominance, the Ms are primed for an opportunity to set the ethnic
balance straight. Politician P, a shrewd and charismatic M, seizes
this opportunity. Deliberately fomenting the Ms' frustration and
fear, P scapegoats the MDMs, blaming them for X's economic and
social problems-a strategy that allows P to appear populist
despite his elite background.16 If possible, P depicts the MDMs as
a political threat: as a dangerous (and preferably historical) enemy
who want to "swallow up" the Ms.2 7 At first, more moderate
candidates disavow P's ethnic politics. P, however, makes his rivals
look like traitors. Soon, it becomes necessary for every candidate at
least to champion the indigenous majority, if not to join in P's more
venomous rhetoric. In the process, the Ms' ethnoeconomic
resentment is politicized and transformed into an ethnonationalist
movement that insists that X's land, wealth, and identity must be
reclaimed by the Ms, the true owners of the nation.
The general link between democracy and ethnic conflict is well
documented. 8 Many scholars have shown that in severely divided societies
206. Cf. Mansfield & Snyder, supra note 177, at 86 (observing that in 1920s Japan, the
adoption of a nationalist strategy "scapegoating Japan's alleged internal and external
enemies ... proved to be a way for militarist elite groups to appear populist in a democratizing
society").
207. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 51, at 19 (discussing how "[a]n ethnically differentiated
opposition can easily be depicted as consisting of... historical enemies").
208. Throughout Africa, Asia, and the former Communist bloc, ethnic conflict has been a
major reason for the failure of democratization. See, e.g., id. at 18-23; Michael Lind, A New Look
at Nationalism: A Defense of Liberal Nationalism, CURRENT, Oct. 1994, at 30, 33. At the same
time, "rapid democratization in autocratic societies often has correlated with heightened levels of
ethnic conflict." Orentlicher, supra note 177, at 62. Thus, Ted Gurr has observed that "[t]he
Soviet and Eastern European regimes relaxed coercive constraints on nationalism and intergroup
hostilities at a time when the institutionalized means for their expression and accommodation did
not yet exist, or were fragile and distrusted...'. The result has been a resurgence of communal
activism, both protest and rebellion." TED ROBERT GURR, MINORITIES AT RISK: A GLOBAL
VIEW OF ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICTS 137 (1993); see also Mansfield & Snyder, supra note 177,
at 88 ("Democratization typically creates ... high-energy mass politics" and appeals to
nationalism by "newly ambitious elites and the embattled old ruling groups"); Fareed Zakaria,
The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1997, at 22; 35 ("M]ithout a
background in constitutional liberalism, the introduction of democracy in divided societies has
actually fomented nationalism, ethnic conflict, and even war.").
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"where holding an election is like taking a census," "0 the very process of
political liberalization in democratizing autocracies presents new
opportunities for increased ethnic mobilization" and a politics dominated
by ethnic issues.21 More specifically, in democratizing countries with a
resented, economically dominant minority, politicians seeking votes will
have powerful incentives to scapegoat that minority and foment ethnic
hatred.211 Indeed, as an empirical matter, democratization in the presence of
an economically dominant minority has repeatedly given rise to potent
ethnonationalist movements that seek to use political power to "correct"
the ethnoeconomic imbalance.
In Malaysia, for example, laissez-faire market policies between 1957
and 1970 reinforced the economic dominance of the Chinese minority and
provoked growing resentment among the Malays, particularly among the
elites.2" 2 In the ethnically charged atmosphere following the anti-Chinese
riots of 1969,213 numbers of vying political organizations sought to
capitalize on the Malays' economic frustration and their fear of being
"swallow[ed]" by the Chinese.2" 4 Thus, Malay politicians, supported by
other Malay elites, advanced the view that ethnoeconomic imbalances were
at the heart of all Malaysia's problems, that herculean efforts to redistribute
wealth to the Malays were imperative, and that their election to power was
necessary if a "Malaysia for Malays" was to be realized.21 ' The result was a
209. Mansfield & Snyder, supra note 177, at 87.
210. Orentlicher, supra note 177, at 62; see Horowitz, supra note 51, at 19; Mansfield &
Snyder, supra note 177, at 87.
211. See, e.g., ESMAN, supra note 31, at 230-31 (citing examples of "officially inspired"
scapegoating of middleman minorities in Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, and Africa); Horowitz,
supra note 177, at 255-56 (arguing that Malay politicians and elites deliberately highlighted ethnic
disparities in wealth to achieve their own policy goals). There are different views as to why and
how ethnic mobilization occurs. Primordialists emphasize the deep historical, social, and possibly
even genetic foundations of ethnic identity and the "primal" need of individuals to defend that
collective identity when it is threatened. See GURR & HARFF, supra note 139, at 78-79; Frye,
supra note 33, at 607-08; supra note 31 and accompanying text. By contrast, instrumentalists view
ethnic or national identity as "an artifact-the deliberate creation of political activists bent on
mobilizing popular support." Binder, supra note 177, at 242; see BRASS, supra note 31, at 19-23;
GURR & HARFF, supra note 139, at 78-79. The model presented in this Article embraces various
forms of ethnic mobilization, whether primordial, artifactual, or something in between.
212. See, e.g., DAVID BROWN, THE STATE AND ETHNIC POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 26,
230-31 (1994); Horowitz, supra note 177, at 255-56. At the same time, the Chinese, who in
certain states comprise over 40% of the population, were increasingly seen as a political threat.
See Horowitz, supra note 177, at 255.
213. These riots, in which nearly 1000 people died, followed on the heels of federal and state
elections in which the Chinese opposition parties in the state of Selangor came close to taking
power. See GORDON P. MEANS, MALAYSIAN POLITICS: THE SECOND GENERATION 6-8 (1991);
Horowitz, supra note 177, at 255.
214. HOROWITz, supra note 10, at 190; see MEANS, supra note 213, at 3-4; Horowitz, supra
note 177, at 255-56.
215. See M. NAZRUL ISLAM, PROBLEMS OF NATION-BUILDING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
THE CASE OF MALAYSIA 71 (1988); MEANS, supra note 213, at 3-4; Horowitz, supra note 177, at
255-56.
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powerful ethnonationalist consensus among Malays that they, the
bumiputra (" sons of the soil"), were the only rightful owners of the
nation.216 A year after the Kuala Lumpur riots, the government adopted the
New Economic Program (" NEP") memorializing the special position of the
Malays.
217
In Sri Lanka, which has maintained a troubled parliamentary
democracy for half a century,218 the disproportionate economic and political
power of the Tamil minority had produced bitter resentment among the
Sinhalese by the 1950s.2 19 There was thus "a huge untapped 'vote bank"'
of frustrated Sinhalese that was waiting to be mobilized. Dennis Austin
explains:
The times produced the man. Solomon Bandaranaike, for all his
Oxford background, Catholic upbringing and legal training, was
quick to see the prize that was there. He left the UNP, converted
from Roman Catholicism to Buddhism, took up the cause of
'Sinhala Only' and began to campaign under the new socialist
banner of a Sri Lanka Freedom Party.22°
The "Sinhala Only" campaign united an unlikely array of Sinhalese
forces, and in 1956, Bandaranaike's party swept to power on promises to
declare Sinhala the sole national language and Buddhism the national
religion.22 Within three months of Bandaranaike's election, the new
Parliament enacted a bill proclaiming Sinhala the single national
language .1 2  "Sinhalisation"-accompanied by intensifying Tamil
opposition and violence-accelerated under the leadership of
Bandaranaike's widow, Sirimavo.21 "Elections easily became the opium of
the newly enfranchised," 224 and today the Sinhalese, through constitutional
216. See BROWN, supra note 212, at 242. During the 1969 election campaign, Dr. Mahathir,
who became Prime Minister in 1981, advised his Chinese constituents not to vote for him "'as he
would not represent their interests in Parliament."' Id (quoting K. VON VORYS, DEMOCRACY
WITHOUT CONSENSUS: COMMUNALISM AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN MALAYSIA 284 (1975)).
217. See CHIUSTOPHER ADAM ET AL., ADJUSTING PRIVATIzATION: CASE STUDIES FROM
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 224-25 (1992); Horowitz, supra note 177, at 266-68.
218. See DENNIS AUSTIN, DEMOCRACY AND VIOLENCE IN INDIA AND SRI LANKA at xvii
(1994).
219. See id. at 66.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 66-67 (footnote omitted).
222. See id. at 67.
223. Solomon Bandaranaike was assassinated in 1959. See id In the 1970s, after an extended
period of political turmoil and violence, Mrs. Bandaranaike forced through a new constitution
dedicated to "protect[ing] and foster[ing] Buddhism," id. at 69, purged the state apparatus and
armed forces of Christian and Tamil members, see id. at 69-70, and oversaw the adoption of
sweeping anti-Tamil educational and economic policies, see id at 70 & n.18; HOROWrIZ, supra
note 10, at 663-66.
224. AUSTIN, supra note 218, at 67.
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and other policies, continue to shut out the Tamils. 5 Meanwhile, Tamil
guerrillas have retaliated ferociously.226
India, by contrast, does not appear to have an economically dominant
ethnic minority at the national level.227 Nevertheless, democracy has meant
ethnic politics in a growing list of Indian states.22 Furthermore, in regions
of India where an economically dominant minority is present, Hypothesis II
has been borne out directly. Thus, in Bombay in the late 1960s, the
"nativist" Shiv Sena party rose to political prominence in just two years by
attacking the economically dominant South Indian minority and
championing "Maharashtra for Maharashtians."2 29 Around the same time
in Telangana, the nativist Praja Samiti party gained political ascendancy by
targeting and scapegoating the economically dominant coastal Andhra
minority. 3 More recently in Assam, a student-based Assamese party swept
to power in 1985 by calling for the expulsion and disenfranchisement of
economically dominant Bengali immigrants3 1 In classic ethnonationalist
rhetoric, Assam's new Chief Minister declared, "The jobs, the businesses
and other economic activities and precious land which rightly belonged to
the indigenous people have been grabbed by the outsiders." ' 2
225. See id. at 67-75.
226. See id. at 68-7 1.
227. See id. at 8; Paul Brass, The Politics of India Since Independence, in Introduction to IV
NEW CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF INDIA 19-34 (1990), reprinted in ETHNICiTY 301 (John
Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith eds., 1996); Mira Kamdar, India: Multicultural Democracy at
the Millennium, WORLD POL'Y J., Fall 1996, at 71.
228. See, e.g., BRASS, supra note 31, at 177-79 (analyzing Hindu-Sikh political polarization
in Punjab); John F. Bums, A Violent Goal: Hindustan for Hindus, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1995, at
A6 (discussing Hindu nationalist political success in Maharashtra); Steven R. Weisman, Gandhi's
Party Loses in Assam, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1985, at A4 (stating that in a growing list of Indian
states, including Andhra Pradesh, Assam, and Punjab, elections have been polarized along
religious or sectarian lines).
229. KATZENSTEIN, supra note 110, at 18; see id. at 30, 33-34; Myron Weiner, Political
Change: Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, in UNDERSTANDING POLICAL DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 204, at 33, 36. The Shiv Sena fared well in Bombay electoral politics but not elsewhere
in the Maharashtra state, where there was no conflict with South Indians. See HOROWNIz, supra
note 10, at 38. After 1968, the Shiv Sena sought to enlargen its political base by shifting its
criticism to "antinationalis[t]" groups like Muslims and Communists, though this effort was not
successful. KATZENSTEIN, supra note 110, at 34-35.
230. See KAIZENSTEIN, supra note 110, at 30; Weiner, supra note 229, at 217-19, 238-40,
244-45.
231. See Weisman, supra note 228, at A4. For a description of the student-based Assam
party, see generally Ashutosh Varshney, After the Assam Killings, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Mar. 22, 1983, at 27. Although the Assamese student movement started on a general anti-Bengali
note, calls for deportation technically were directed only at the relatively recent (and principally
Muslim) Bengali immigrants from Bangladesh and not at the Hindu Bengalis who, for the most
part, settled in Assam much earlier. See id.
232. Sanjoy Hazarika, India's Assam State Demanding Ban on Migration, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
13, 1987, at A12. India, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka are aberrational in their relatively stable
(although by no means unproblematic) histories of democratization. In most of the developing
world, where democracy has been tried, it has either failed altogether or proceeded much more
fitfully, supplanted regularly by military coups and extended periods of authoritarianism. In these
cases, too, democratization has generally borne out the model's second hypothesis. Thus, in one
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Hypothesis II is also corroborated by the recent (not always successful)
transitions to democracy in the non-Russian republics of the former Soviet
Union. Elections in these countries-where Russians for seventy years were
economically and politically dominant-almost without exception have
taken on potent ethnonationalist dimensions, as captured by slogans like
"Estonia for Estonians," 3 " Georgia for the Georgians," '3  " Kazakhstan-
for-the-Kazakhs,"3-5  "Latvia for Latvians," " "Lithuania for
Lithuanians," 237  "Moldavia for Moldavians," " "Ukraine for
Ukrainians," 9 and "Uzbekistan for Uzbeks."24  Typically, such slogans
are followed by the enactment of legislation discriminating against ethnic
Russians.241
Indeed, in virtually all of the cases discussed, ethnonationalist
sloganeering during the electoral process has led to the election of leaders
from a majority ethnic group and ultimately to the emergence of what
of the Philippines' first presidential elections, Ramon Magsaysay won a landslide victory in 1953
championing "Filipinization" and promising to "wrest" the country's retail sector from Chinese
hands. GOLAY ET AL., supra note 95, at 65-66. In Haiti, in a succession of democratic experiments
early this century, the "unpopular [Lebanese] ethnic minority became a convenient whipping boy
for aspiring politicians." Nicholls, supra note 115, at 359. In Fiji, Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni
Rabuka came to power in 1987 in a bloodless coup championing "the Fijian way of life." Fiji
Coup Leader Vows to Limit Indians' Power, L.A. TIMES, May 17, 1987, at 5 (quoting Rabuka's
post-coup news conference). Since then, Rabuka has openly called for the departure from power
of the "immigrant race" of Indians who want "complete control of Fiji." Bob Drogin, Trouble in
Paradise: Behind Fiji's Facade, Turmoil Brews, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1991, at 2 (quoting from
Rabuka's biography, "No Other Way") (citation omitted). In Fiji's 1992 elections, Rabuka and
his party won 30 of the 37 parliamentary seats reserved for Fijians under a new constitution
enacted in 1990. See Nildi Tait, A Divided Fiji Faces Further Division, FIN. TIIES, Feb. 18,
1994, at 4. In Kenya, which just reopened itself to multi-party elections in 1992, politicians are
again championing the expulsion of Asians, who politicians allege have "taken over the economy
and [are] exploiting native Africans." Greg Barrow, Kenyan Asians Fight Back as Politicians Call
for Expulsion, GUARDIAN (London), June 19, 1996, at 13; see Jay Ross, Kenya's Asians Troubled
by Criticism of Their Financial Dealings, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1982, at A19; Louise Tunbridge,
Asians' Alarm at Kenya Call for Expulsions, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June 18, 1996, at 18.
Politicians have also voiced concerns about "commercial imperialism" by the Kikuyu minority.
See Holmquist & Ford, supra note 196, at 13.
233. Mikhail Kalmykov, Estonia Urges Speedy Conclusion of Border Deal with Russia,
RUSSIAN INFO. AGENCY ITAR-TASS, Jan. 27, 1997, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, TASS
File.
234. Ren6 Lemarchand, The Siren Song of Self-Determination, UNESCO COURIER, June
1993, at 29, 30.
235. Andrew Higgins, Russians Flee the Outposts of Empire; Settlers Fear for Future in
Kazakhstan, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 12, 1995, at 15.
236. Juris Kaza, Tiny Baltic State Keeps Charging a Touchy Debate over Who Should
Belong, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 27, 1996, at 6.
237. Galina Afanasyeva, Lithuanian Fascism Becomes Legal, Moscow NEvs, June 30, 1995
at 6.
238. Horowitz, supra note 51, at 24.
239. Roger Boyes, Embers of Ancient Hatred Glow Again, TIMES (London), Aug. 19, 1996,
at 14.
240. Frank Viviano, Ethnic Tensions Tear at Uzbekistan, S.F. CHRON., July 24, 1990, at Al.
241. For examples of such ethnonationalist legislation, see CHINN & KAISER, supra note 127,
at 103, 112-13,228-29.
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scholars have called an "ethnocratic state," which acts as the agent of the
majority ethnic group with respect to ideology, social policy, and resource
distribution.242 In an ethnocratic state, recruitment to elite positions in the
civil service, armed forces, and government is disproportionately and
overwhelmingly from the ethnic majority.24 3 Moreover, the state's stance on
language, religion, and moral values-that is, the national ideology-
derives primarily from the culture of the ethnic majority.2' Finally, the
constitutions, laws, and political structures of an ethnocratic state generally
serve to reinforce the monopolization of power by the ethnic majority.245 In
these ways, " [i]n country after country, a single ethnic group has taken
control over the state."2
Once again, however, there may be an escape route-this time turning
not on the extraordinary success of markets247 but on the extraordinary
success of democracy. If in ethnically divided countries the democratic
process itself could work a profound characterological change among
voters-diffusing their ethnonationalism and permitting them to see all
their fellow citizens as participants in a common enterprise-then
Hypothesis II could be avoided. Unfortunately, in the developing world
democracy does not appear to have this effect. On the contrary, as this
Section has shown, democratization has had precisely the opposite effect,
exacerbating ethnic tensions and galvanizing ethnonationalist movements in
conditions of economic and political underdevelopment.
3. Hypothesis III: Model Outcomes
Thus far, the model has traced the formation of ethnoeconomic
resentment against market-dominant minorities, the transformation of that
resentment in the course of democratic electoral competition into an
ethnonationalist political movement, and the subsequent installation of an
ethnocratic state. Now consider the following scenario:
P comes to power in X on a playform of "X for the Ms." The state
apparatus is now composed disproportionately of Ms and is openly
regarded as the agent of the Ms' interests. Due in part to his own
electoral strategy, P confronts an aroused population of Ms who
view the continued presence of the economically dominant MDMs
242. See BROWN, supra note 212, at 36-37; Weiner, supra note 229, at 35-37.
243. See BROWN, supra note 212, at 36-37.
244. See id. at 37.
245. See id.
246. See Weiner, supra note 229, at 35.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 204-205 (discussing the possibility of a "market
miracle").
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as intolerable. The Ms demand that P take decisive action in order
to make good on his campaign rhetoric. What are P's options?
In these circumstances, P cannot both satisfy the democratic will and
permit the MDMs to continue operating under market conditions.
Accordingly, Hypothesis I predicts that if the Ms' ethnonationalism
becomes sufficiently potent, one or more of three outcomes become highly
probable: (1) an ethnically fueled, antimarket backlash; (2) measures aimed
at eliminating the MDMs; or (3) a retreat from democracy.
a. Antimarket Backlash
Time and again throughout the developing world, governments, both
authoritarian and democratic, have responded to the "problem" of an
economically dominant minority by adopting policies aimed at correcting
the ethnoeconomic "imbalance." Such policies have rarely, if ever, taken
the form of Western-style social welfare measures-that is, post-market
redistributions administered by a relatively sophisticated state apparatus.
On the contrary, ethnocratic states in these conditions characteristically
have pursued ethnically targeted governmental intrusions into market
processes, principally by nationalizing industries controlled by the resented
minority or by imposing ethnically based restrictions on economic
activity.248
Nationalization has been a recurrent phenomenon in the developing
world. As I have shown elsewhere, conventional wisdom overemphasizes
the extent to which nationalizations in the developing world have been
based on socialist or communist ideals. 249 Notwithstanding the Marxist
rhetoric occasionally adopted by nationalizing leaders, nationalization
programs in developing countries have almost never sought to eliminate
private property or to eradicate all economic classes ° On the contrary, in
the vast majority of cases, nationalization in developing countries
fundamentally has been an expression of economic nationalism, particularly
directed at economically dominant ethnic minorities."1 To name just a few
examples, ethnically targeted nationalizations or confiscations have
occurred in postcolonial Burma,"2 Indonesia, 3 Kenya, 4 Malaysia,"
248. See ESMAN, supra note 31, at 231-32.
249. See Chua, supra note 18, at 261-62.
250. See id. at 262. In only a few exceptional cases (for example, Cuba and Vietnam) has
there been a full-fledged effort to eliminate private ownership of resources altogether. See id. at
302 n.582.
251. Nationalistic nationalizations have been directed not just at these ethnic "internal
foreigners" but also at Western "imperialist" foreigners. Id. at 263-66.
252. See, e.g., GOLAYETAL., supra note 95, at2l 1; Chua, supra note 18, at 253-54, 270.
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Pakistan, 6 the Philippines.2 7 Sri Lanka,25 Thailand, 9 and Uganda 260 and
most recently have been championed by indigenous politicians in South
Africa2 61 and Zimbabwe.
262
At the same time, ethnocratic governments also have attacked the
economic power of economically dominant minorities by "supersed[ing]
market processes of competition and manipulat[ing] the rules governing
access for the benefit of their ethnic constituents. 263 Nowhere have
ethnically discriminatory economic restrictions been more prevalent than in
Southeast Asia. Indeed, after World War II,
there was scarcely a country where the Chinese could pursue their
callings or their commercial preferences without disapproval or
interference. In Thailand Chinese aliens were excluded from
twenty-seven occupations, in Cambodia from eighteen .... [T]o
suffer harsh economic discrimination of one kind or another was
part of being Southeast Asian Chinese.2'
A stark but typical example is the "Filipinization" law passed in the
Philippines in 1954 that explicitly banned the Chinese from "engag[ing]
directly or indirectly in the retail business." 265 The law was defended as
"not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the
253. See, e.g., GOLAY ET AL., supra note 95, at 137, 166, 193-95; Chua, supra note 18, at
269.
254. See, e.g., Himbara, supra note 113, at 470-72.
255. See, e.g., Chua, supra note 18, at 247.
256. See, e.g., id. at 250-51.
257. See, e.g., id. at 255.
258. See, e.g., id. at 269-70.
259. See, e.g., GOLAY ET AL., supra note 95, at 299-306; Chua, supra note 18, at 251-52,
270.
260. See, e.g., SAMUEL DECALO, Coups AND ARMY RULE IN AFRICA 174-75 (2d ed. 1990);
MAMDANI, supra note 114, at 260-69. 1 have also shown that the waves of nationalizations earlier
this century in Latin American countries like Bolivia, Mexico, and Peru had ethnic as well as class
dimensions. See Chua, supra note 18, at 272-79.
261. See Chris McGreal, Bitterness over Land Grab, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 2, 1998, at
II.
262. See Gumisai Mutume, South Africa-Economy: Thumbs Down for Privatization, INTER.
PRESS SERV., July 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, INPRES File.
263. ESMAN, supra note 31, at 230; cf. SOWELL, supra note 97, at 266 (discussing antimarket
economic policies enacted in Eastern Europe to counter the overrepresentation of Jews in
commerce, industry, and the professions).
264. PAN, supra note 178, at 217.
265. GOLAY ET AL., supra note 95, at 66-67; see also id. at 430 (describing similar legislation
passed by Cambodia in 1957). An earlier manifestation of anti-Chinese legislation in the
Philippines actually reached the United States Supreme Court. In 1926, when the Philippine
Islands were under United States rule, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the Chinese
Bookkeeping Act of the Philippines prohibiting the keeping of account books in any language
other than English, Spanish, or a local Filipino dialect. See Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S.
500 (1926). Finding that the Act "was chiefly directed against... Chinese merchants," most of
whom spoke only Chinese, id. at 511, 513, the Court held that the Act denied the Chinese equal
protection of the laws in violation of the Philippine Bill of Rights. See id. at 524-25.
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expression of the legitimate desire or determination, of the people, through
their authorized representatives, to free the nation from the economic
situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it. ,, 266
In a similar vein, in the late 1960s, Uganda's Prime Minister Obote
passed laws establishing "a developmental socialism" largely to "cut the
[economically dominant Baganda] down to size."267 Around the same time,
Kenya passed a number of licensing and trade laws effectively barring
Indians-including citizens of Kenya-from trading in rural areas and "all
noncentral parts of major cities and towns." 268 Although none of these three
countries enforces these laws any longer, ethnically based restrictions are
today robust in countries such as Fiji,269 Malaysia,270 Sri Lanka,27 1 and, as
discussed further below, South Africa,2 2 as well as in the Indian states of
Andhra Pradesh, Assam, and Maharashtra.273 Such restrictions-" the
antithesis of laissez-faire"274 but not necessarily normatively unjustified-
include ethnically based quotas on corporate asset ownership and other
ethnically based restrictions on commerce, employment, finance, land
ownership, licensing, and government contracts.275 This basic aspect of
developing country commercial law is almost never discussed in the
marketization literature.
266. GOLAY ET AL., supra note 95, at 66-67 n.77 (citation omitted); see VICTOR PURCELL,
THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 544-46 (2d ed. 1965); Antonio S. Tan, The Changing Identity
of the Philippine Chinese, 1946-1984, in CHANGING IDENTITIES OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN
CHINESE SINCE WORLD WAR II, at 177, 184 (Jennifer W. Cushman & Wang Gungwu eds., 1988)
(describing the law).
267. David E. Apter, Democracy for Uganda: A Case for Comparison (The Quest for World
Order), 124 DAEDALUS 155, 156 (1995); see also MAMDANI, supra note 114, at 24246
(describing the historical economic prominence in Uganda of the Buganda dngdom and the Obote
government's anti-Baganda measures in 1966).
268. Himbara, supra note 113, at 472.
269. See HOROwITZ, supra note 10, at 655; MICHAEL C. HOWARD, Fill: RACE AND POLITICS
IN AN ISLAND STATE 333-34, 365 (1991); BPu V. LAL, BROKEN WAVES: A HISTORY OF THE FuI
ISLANDS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 224-27 (1992).
270. See ADAM ET AL., supra note 217, at 214-15; HOROwrrZ, supra note 10, at 654;
Horowitz, supra note 177, at 264-71.
271. See AUSTIN, supra note 218, at 70, 82; Chandra Richard de Silva, Sinhala-Tamil Ethnic
Rivalry: The Background, in FROM INDEPENDENCE TO STATEHOOD 111, 118, 211 (Robert B.
Goldmann & A. Jeyaratnam Wilson eds., 1984); Chandra Richard de Silva, Sinhala-Tamil
Relations and Education in Sri Lanka: The University Admissions Issue-The First Phase, 1971-
77, in FROM INDEPENDENCE Td STATEHOOD, supra, at 125, 130-31.
272. See infra Section V.A.
273. See HOROwriz, supra note 10, at 656-57; Myron Weiner, The Pursuit of Ethnic
Equality Through Preferential Policies: A Comparative Public Policy Perspective, in FROM
INDEPENDENCE TO STATEHOOD, supra note 271, at 63, 73-74.
274. GOLAY ET AL., supra note 95, at 35.
275. See, e.g., ADAM ET AL., supra note 217, at 214-15 (describing NEP in Malaysia);
HOROWrrz, supra note 10, at 654-56 (describing general range of preferential programs in
ethnically divided societies); HOWARD, supra note 269, at 333-34 (describing restrictions on land
ownership in Fiji); KATZENSTEIN, supra note 110, at 143-45 (describing employment quotas and
other "nativist" policies in Maharashtria); Suryadinata, supra note 97, at 770-71 (describing anti-
Chinese policies in Indonesia).
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b. Eliminationist or Final "Solutions"
As a historical matter, ethnically discriminatory nationalizations and
commercial restrictions have almost invariably backfired. On the one hand,
they have had drastically negative economic effects. 6 In particular,
nationalization (often euphemistically labeled "state capitalism" or
"bureaucratic entrepreneurship" )277 in the developing world repeatedly has
resulted in grossly inefficient, corrupt government enterprises.278 On the
other hand, ethnically targeted restrictions have proven notoriously
ineffective; economically dominant minorities have managed to frustrate
such restrictions consistently through evasion (e.g., bribery or use of
indigenous frontmen) or sheer indispensability.279 As a result, ethnically
based backlashes against the market do not satisfy-and may even
exacerbate-the ethnonationalist demands that generated them.28
To respond to increasingly virulent majority pressures, P may move to
more draconian measures targeting the MDMs, ranging from oppressive
exclusionary policies to forced repatriation or expulsion, and finally (in
some cases) to pogroms, extermination, and genocide.8 ' Throughout the
developing world, majority-based governments have responded to the
economic dominance of hated minorities by trying in effect to eliminate
them. The least egregious of such eliminationist strategies include
burdensome language requirements, discriminatory immigration and
citizenship policies, discriminatory policies for admission to education, and
policies designed to eradicate the resented minority culture.282
276. See ESMAN, supra note 31, at 231-32; Himbara, supra note 113, at 474-77.
277. GOLAY ET AL., supra note 95, at 58; Himbara, supra note 113, at 474.
278. See, e.g., GOLAY ET AL., supra note 95, at 56-57 (describing the corruption, inefficiency,
and heavy losses incurred by government corporations in the Philippines); Himbara, supra note
113, at 474 (noting that Kenya's "state capitalism" program in the late 1970s and early 1980s led
to widespread corruption and gross inefficiency); Shirley, supra note 88, at S32 (noting that
public enterprises in the developing world are typically unproductive and inefficient and often
require government bail-outs financed through taxes or inflation).
279. See Bonacich, supra note 95, at 592. For example, in Southeast Asia, "[a]ttempts to
control the Chinese [through] [il]icensing systems have been thwarted by the willingness of
indigenous businessmen, whom they were intended to benefit, to sell their import and export
permits to the Chinese who possessed what they lacked--organization, contacts, experience and
capital." Id. (citation omitted).
280. To return to the terms of the model: X's economy is now stagnating under the massive
inefficiencies of state-run, "indigenized" enterprises, and most Ms are probably worse off than
before P was elected. See, e.g., ADAM ET AL., supra note 217, at 226 (noting that Malaysia's
indigenization drive in the 1970s "failed to maintain the value of assets appropriated for the
Bumiputra"); Himbara, supra note 113, at 474-75 (detailing the dismal and thoroughgoing failure
of Kenya's "Africanization" program).
281. See BROWN, supra note 212, at 27; ESMAN, supra note 31, at 231-32; Bonacich, supra
note 95, at 592.
282. See, e.g., AUSTIN, supra note 218, at 67; (describing Sri Lanka's "Sinhala Only" bill
declaring Sinhala to be the sole national language); HOROWTrZ, supra note 10, at 660-66
(describing ethnic preferences in education in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Tanzania); Suryadinata,
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Such discriminatory policies have led to the elimination of the resented
minority in one of two ways. First, policies of ethnic exclusion have
frequently led to massive emigrations. In the 1950s and 1960s, for example,
state-condoned prejudice and policies targeting the Chinese in Indonesia
and the Indians in Burma led to the flight of thousands of people.283 In
Rwanda, anti-Tutsi policies initiated by Hutu leaders "started a mass
exodus of refugees abroad, which eventually took some 130,000 Rwandese
Tutsi to the Belgian Congo, Burundi, Tanganyika and Uganda by late
1963."284 In Kenya, thousands of Indians have left in the last few years,
fearing a "wholesale expulsion of Asians." 285 In Fiji, calls for the mass
deportation of Indians coupled with ethnic violence have caused over
30,000 Indians to leave the island since 1987.286 Finally, since the late
1980s, emerging ethnonationalist movements in virtually all of the non-
Russian republics of the former Soviet Union have spawned discrimination
against the Russian-speaking population ranging "from subtle prejudice
and discriminatory language and citizenship laws, to job-firings and even
violence. 287 As a result, more than two million Russians and other
Russophone nationals have "abandon[ed] their homes" for "the disarray of
post-Soviet Russia."2 88
Second, exclusionary policies sometimes have had the goal-and, to a
lesser extent, the effect-of coerced assimilation. For example, in Southeast
Asian countries such as Indonesia and Vietnam, mandatory naturalization
laws, bans on Chinese language newspapers, schools, and movies,
restrictions on "Chinese religion, beliefs and customs," and name change
policies sought to absorb the Chinese into the indigenous community and
supra note 97, at 780 (describing language bans and discriminatory education policies targeting
the Chinese minority in Indonesia).
283. See M.C. RiCKLEFS, A HISTORY OF MODERN INDONESIA SINCE C. 1300, at 267 (2d ed.
1993) (describing the exodus of Indonesian Chinese following the 1959 enactment of a decree
banning "aliens" from rural trade); J.A.C. Mackie, Anti-Chinese Outbreaks in Indonesia, 1959-
68, in THE CHINESE IN INDONESIA 77, 120 (J.A.C. Mackie ed., 1976) (describing the persecution
of the Chinese in Indonesia); Martin Smith, Burma's Ethnic Minorities: A Central or Peripheral
Problem in the Regional Context?, in BURMA: THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE IN A DIVIDED
SOCIETY 101 (Peter Carey ed., 1997) (stating that 300,000 Indians left Burma following Ne Win's
mass nationalizations during the 1960s).
284. PRUNIER, supra note 114, at 51 (citation omitted).
285. Ross, supra note 232, at A19.
286. See Philip Shenon, Fiji Uproar over Plan to Bring in Chinese, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
1995, at A9; Tait, supra note 232, at 4.
287. Robert P. Devecchi, Prepared Testimony on Forced Migration in the Newly Independent
States of the Former Soviet Union Before the House Commitee on International Relations and
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights (May 22, 1996), in FEDERAL NEvS
SERVICE, available in LEXIS, News library, FEDNEW file; see also CHINN & KAISER, supra
note 127, at 190, 194, 198-201. Emigration rates (i.e., Russian emigrants as a percentage of the
Russian population) from 1989 and 1993 were 10.4% in Lithuania, 10.9% in Uzbekistan, 17.1%
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thus to eliminate them as a distinct ethnic minority.28 9 For many students of
ethnic conflict, assimilation represents a glimmer of hope for societies long
riven by ethnic hatred." Others view assimilation as "cultural
genocide.""29 In any event, assimilation is not always possible or
effective.292
Developing world leaders also have found more direct ways to
eliminate economically successful "outsider" minorities. 93 Following a
pattern exemplified by the extraordinary history of Jewish expulsions,2 94
Indonesia ejected the Chinese en masse in 1960295 and Vietnam did the
same in the late 1970s.296 In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge expelled
thousands of Vietnamese between 1975 and 1978.297 In Burma during the
Second World War, an estimated 500,000 Indians were chased out of the
country by young nationalists of the Burma Independence Army.2 98 In
289. See, e.g., GOLAY ET AL., supra note 95, at 404-06 (describing attempts to assimilate the
Chinese in Vietnam); Suryadinata, supra note 97, at 776-82 (describing assimilationist
educational and cultural policies directed at the Chinese minority in Indonesia).
290. See, e.g., Wendell Bell, Ethnicity, Decisions of Nationhood, and Images of the Future, in
ETHNICITY AND NATION-BUILDING: COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL AND HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES 285-86 (Wendell Bell & Walter E. Freeman eds., 1974) (asserting the possibility
of assimilation into a single global culture); Horowitz, supra note 51, at 19 (observing that in
Taiwan and Thailand rates of ethnic intermarriage correlated positively with improved ethnic
relations and with prospects for democracy).
291. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 60
(1991); see, e.g., CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 15-16 (1993); Wendy Brown-Scott, The
Communitarian State: Lawlessness or Law Reform for African Americans?, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1209, 1224-26 (1994); Deborah Waire Post, Reflections on Identity, Diversity and Morality, 6
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 136, 161-62 (1990-91); Gerald Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color:
Critical Legal Studies and the Law of Race Relations, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043, 1062 (1988).
292. The assimilation of many Eastern European Jews, for example, in Czechoslavakia,
Hungary, Latvia, and Romania had little or no effect on their ultimate fate in the Holocaust. See
SOVELL, supra note 97, at 267.
293. See Weiner, supra note 229, at 36.
294. The Jewish Exodus from Egypt took place some time between 1450 and 1200 B.C. See
MICHAEL GRANT, THE JEWS IN THE ROMAN WORLD 8 (1973). Subsequently, Jews were expelled
from Rome in 139 B.C. (although Jews do not appear to have been economically dominant in
ancient times). See id. at 31. They were, furthermore, expelled from England in 1290, France in
1394, Spain in 1492, Cologne in 1424, Augsburg in 1439, and Moravia in 1454. See SOWELL,
supra note 97, at 236, 242, 248. The wealth that the Spanish Jews were forced to leave behind
helped finance the voyage of Columbus that led to the discovery of the Western Hemisphere. See
id. at 248. In Russia, anti-Jewish pogroms in the 1880s "set off one of the great mass exoduses in
history." Id. at 264.
295. See PAN, supra note 178, at 217; RICKLEFS, supra note 283, at 267.
296. See SOWELL, supra note 97, at 212. The mass exodus of Chinese from Vietnam in 1977-
1978 also reflected in part deteriorating relations between Vietnam and China. See RAMSES
AIMER, THE ETHNIC CHINESE IN VIETNAM AND SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS 50 (1991); YUAN-
LI WU & CHUN-HSI WU, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 86 (1980). According to
the Vietnamese govermnent, only those Chinese illegally residing in Vietnam were being
expelled. See AMER, supra, at 48. The Chinese version of the expulsions was very different. See
id. at 47. For an evenhanded discussion of the Sino-Vietnamese dispute surrounding the exodus of
Chinese from North Vietnam to China, see id at 46-53, 57-80.
297. See Tarr, supra note 107, at 33.
298. See Smith, supra note 283, at 101; Weiner, supra note 229, at 36.
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Uganda, Idi Amin deported all Indians and Pakistanis in 1972, then
distributed their assets as spoils to his military officers.299 In most of these
cases, the economy suffered drastically as a result of the expulsions?"0
Finally, economically dominant minorities have been eliminated
through pogroms, mass killings, and genocide. In the Philippines, Spanish
colonialists massacred all but 2000 of Manila's 26,000 member Chinese
minority in 1603.301 Chinese also were killed en masse in Vietnam in
1792302 and in Indonesia in 1965 and 1966.303 In Cambodia, "[i]n an orgy of
violence" in 1970, "more than 4000 Vietnamese were killed in under a
month." 304 Two hundred thousand Chinese-half of the Chinese population
in Cambodia-were subsequently killed between 1975 and 1979.205 In
Burma, thousands of Indians were killed in the 1930s and 1940s."' Most
recently in Rwanda, between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Tutsi were
exterminated from April to June 1994.307
As noted earlier, I do not argue that economic factors alone motivated
these atrocities. I also do not claim that nonprosperous ethnic minorities are
never persecuted. Nonetheless, it remains the case that in country after
country, large populations of economically dominant ethnic minorities
repeatedly have been subjected to severe reprisals, ranging from cultural
oppression to extermination.
c. Retreat from Democracy
The previous two outcomes contemplate an ethnocratic government
acting in accordance with majoritarian ethnonationalist sentiment (which
the government itself may have incited) through either market interventions
or eliminationist measures. In the third model outcome, the government
defies the democratic will and seeks to accommodate the resented market-
dominant minority. There are several reasons why an ethnocratic leader
might adopt this pro-market but antidemocratic strategy. He might, for
example, wish to harness the minority's skills to revive his country's
299. See DECALO, supra note 260, at 174-76; MAMDANI, supra note 114, at 302-12.
300. See SOWELL, supra note 97, at 322; Weiner, supra note 229, at 36. Out of "economic
desperation," some governments later sought the return of the minorities they had expelled.
SOWELL, supra note 97, at 322.
301. See Morella, supra note 103; cf. PURCELL, supra note 266, at 501, 513-14 (explaining
that about 23,000 Chinese were killed in 1603); DAVID JOEL STEINBERG, THE PHILIPPINES 40-41
(2d ed. 1990) (discussing hostility towards the Chinese majority).
302. See Harish Mehta, Ups and Downs of Chinese Businessmen in Vietnam, Bus. TIMES
(Singapore), June 30, 1994, at 16.
303. See PAN, supra note 178, at 218.
304. Tarr, supra note 107, at 34.
305. See SOWELL, supra note 97, at 213; Tar, supra note 107, at 34.
306. See FREDHOLM, supra note 189, at 29-37; SMITH, supra note 108, at 44.
307. See PRUNIER, supra note 114, at 263; Morris, supra note 90, at 350.
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flagging economy. Alternatively, he and his cohorts may simply have been
"bought out" by the wealthy minority. Or he may have been subject to
overwhelming pressure from international organizations and international
business interests. In any event, the pursuit of ethnically tolerant policies in
the face of an aroused, ethnonationalist majority almost invariably has
required a significant retreat from democracy.
In some cases, this retreat is obvious, as when an accommodationist
leader disbands the legislature, cancels elections, or otherwise suppresses
political competition. The autocratic regime of Indonesia's General Suharto
provides an example of this phenomenon. Suharto seized power militarily
in 1965, bringing to an end the "guided democracy" of his predecessor
Sukarno, 5 whose economic policies-including the nationalization and
"indigenization" of major industries-had produced catastrophic results." 9
Suharto proceeded to quash rival political parties and to extinguish
opposition of all types. 310 In return for the support of the World Bank and
the IMF, Suharto's government adopted open door laissez-faire policies to
encourage foreign investment and rapid economic growth.311 To that end,
after an early "unprecedently radical" crackdown on the Chinese in East
Java, Suharto reached out to the Chinese business community.312 Indeed,
beyond simply granting the Chinese economic freedom, Suharto
affirmatively directed "lucrative rent-seeking opportunities to them." 313 In
exchange, the Indonesian Chinese, with their "business expertise,
international connections, and preexisting business links with the armed
forces, 314 financed Suharto's pet projects, both personal and public,315
while at the same time serving as "miracle workers" for Indonesia's
economic development.316 The resulting resurgence of Chinese economic
dominance contributed to rising pribumi resentment and left the Chinese
"uncomfortably dependent" on the aging Suharto for protection.317
308. RICKLEFS, supra note 283, at 287-89.
309. GOLAY ET AL., supra note 95, at 192-98; see also D.R. SARDESAI, SOUTHEAST ASIA
266-67, 272 (4th ed. 1997) (describing "the economic morass and bankruptcy" brought on by
Sukarno's economic policies).
310. See RICKLEFS, supra note 283, at 287-88, 294, 299; John Colmey, Life on the Run with
Indonesia's Democratic Outlaws, TIME, May 26, 1997, at 46.
311. See RiCKLEFS, supra note 283, at 291.
312. Mackie, supra note 283, at 120.
313. William Ascher, From Oil to Timber: The Political Economy of Off-Budget
Development Financing in Indonesia, 65 INDON. 37, 53 (1998).
314. Id. at 55.
315. See id. at 54-55. Thus, Indonesian Chinese businessmen have reportedly covered over
$400 million in foreign-exchange losses of the Bank Duta, which is indirectly owned.by Suharto;
paid for the Taman Mini theme park monorail as a favor to Suharto's wife; financed a biography
of Suharto; and, most recently, salvaged Indonesia's newly established but collapsing
petrochemical industry. See idt
316. G. Bruce Knecht, Wealth Hazards, NAT'L REV., Nov. 21, 1994, at 56; see Ong Hock
Chuan, Indonesian Riots Force Income Gap into Spotlight, ASIA TIMES, Jan. 6, 1997, at 1.
317. Knecht, supra note 316, at 57.
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Suharto's resignation, coupled with the recent outburst of anti-Chinese
violence, confirm that Indonesia remains enmeshed in the model dynamic
described here.31
Even short of abolishing legislatures or canceling elections, majority-
elected leaders also can thwart democracy by permitting themselves to be
bought off by the resented ethnic minority. Although a certain amount of
corruption is perhaps inevitable, too much corruption effectively can
subvert the political process, replacing democracy with kleptocracy." 9
The most extreme retreat from democracy in defiance of an ethnic
majority occurs when an economically dominant ethnic minority itself
seizes political power. Prime examples of autocratic rule by economically
powerful ethnic minorities are South Africa under the apartheid regime,2
Rwanda and Burundi under Tutsi-dominated military rule;3"' and decades of
Kikuyu-dominated politics and exclusion in Kenya.322 As I have argued
elsewhere, the social structure of many Latin American countries also can
be viewed as a variation on the same dynamic.323
In summary, the model hypothesizes that, in developing countries
satisfying the model conditions, the combined pursuit of marketization and
democratization will produce powerful pressures likely to lead to one or
more of three outcomes: (1) an ethnically fueled backlash against markets;
(2) a backlash against the resented minority; or (3) a retreat from
democracy. The history of the developing world repeatedly and consistently
has corroborated these predicted outcomes. Nevertheless, in the next
Section I discuss potential counterexamples to the model. I then address
certain factors that may complicate the application of the model to real-
world cases.
318. Cf Borsuk & Brauchli, supra note 185, at A8 (discussing Suharto's resignation in the
face of "deadly riots" and "social and economic chaos"); Schmetzer, supra note 185, at 4
(describing the recent violence targeting Indonesia's "hated [Chinese] merchant class").
319. See, e.g., Daniel King & Jim LoGerfo, Thailand: Toward Democratic Stability, J.
DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1996, at 102, 115. A well known example of this phenomenon is the ostensibly
democratic but notoriously corrupt Philippines regime of Ferdinand Marcos (before he declared
martial law), which was very friendly to Chinese economic interests. See, e.g., STERLING
SEAGRAVE, THE MARcos DYNASTY 22-25, 286-88, 377-79 (1988) (describing the close personal
and business links between Ferdinand Marcos and wealthy Filipino Chinese); see also infra
Subsection IV.D.I.b.
320. See GURR & HARFF, supra note 139, at 24.
321. See Gourevitch, supra note 150, at 58-59.
322. See DONALD L. HOROWnrIZ, A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA? 86 (1991). Needless to
say, not all members of such politically dominant minorities benefit equally. Iraq's ruling elite, for
example, "consists of a small clique within the Sunni Muslim minority, most of whom come from
Saddam Hussein's hometown of Tikrit." GURR & HARFF, supra note 139, at 24.
323. See Chua, supra note 18, at 274-76; supra notes 116-118.
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D. Potential Exceptions and Complications
The model hypotheses are not intended to be universal laws of nature.
Somewhere in the developing world a country may exist in which an
impoverished majority feels no resentment against a rich, market-dominant
minority--or at least not sufficient resentment to trigger the model
outcomes. Indeed, this is arguably the case in present day Thailand and the
Philippines, two often-cited "success stories" for free-market democracy in
the developing world.324 Closer examination, however, reveals that these
countries may not be exceptions to the model but instead may actually
confirm it.
1. Possible Negative Cases
a. Thailand
In Thailand, which began democratizing in 1992 and has a more or less
established market economy,3" relations today between the Thai majority
and the economically dominant Chinese minority appear to be excellent. 6
Historically, however, anti-Chinese resentment certainly existed. It was
Thailand's King Vajiravudh who coined the term "Jews of the Orient."3 27
Moreover, beginning in the late 1930s and recommencing in the 1950s, the
Thai government adopted a series of antimarket policies aimed at
counteracting the growing economic power of the Thai Chinese."
324. See, e.g., Carl Lande, Consensus Politics and Economic Growth, Bus. TIMEs
(Singapore), Jan. 28, 1995, at 3 (expressing optimism about the prospects for Philippine
democracy and economic growth); Lennox Samuels, Thailand Looks West in Move to Democracy,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 26, 1996, at IA (noting that many people view Thailand as
having successfully expanded "Western-style" democracy while maintaining robust economic
growth).
325. See HAGGARD & KAUFMAN, supra note 3, at 103-06, 242-44, 248; Peter Eng,' Thais
Hesitantly Remember, BALT. SuN, June 1, 1997, at 5F.
326. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 51, at 19 (noting that, compared to earlier decades,
relations between Thais and Chinese are now "far less prone to conflict, and rates of intermarriage
[are] higher than is typical of deeply divided countries"); Fallows, supra note 186, at 18
("Compared to the situation in neighboring countries, racial frictions in Thailand are
mild.... Chinese Thai and ethnic Thai alike seem to have agreed to act as if they share a common
nationality.").
327. VELLA, supra note 172, at 193-94.
328. These policies included the nationalization of Chinese-dominated industries, the creation
of a state corporation designed to compete with Chinese in the rice, salt, tobacco, petroleum, and
pork trades, and the enactment of a host of anti-Chinese commercial restrictions-all consistent
with model outcome one. See GOLAY Er AL., supra note 95, at 300-05; DAVID K. WYATr,
THAILAND: A SHORT HISTORY 254 (1984); Songprasert, supra note 143, at 119, 122-23; Ng Chee
Yuen & Norbert Wagner, Privatization and Deregulation in ASEAN: An Overview, ASEAN
ECON. BULL., Mar. 1989, at 212.
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Starting in the 1930s, the Thai government began a systematic and
often ruthless campaign to assimilate the Chinese into Thai society.329 The
use of the Chinese language was restricted, Chinese schools were
monitored, newspapers were shut down, and Chinese culture was generally
suppressed.33 ° More subtle pressures for assimiliation played a role as well.
For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, the "ladder to success in
[Thailand] ... consisted of Thai education, Thai surnames, Thai language,
and even intermarriage with Thai families."331 In any event, for reasons
about which many have speculated (including the close cultural affinity
between the Thais and the Chinese" as well as the supposed relative
receptivity of Thais to foreigners 333), "Chinese have almost blissfully
assimilated into Buddhist Thailand." 
334
In Thailand today, many Thai Chinese speak only Thai, intermarry with
Thais, and consider themselves as Thai as their indigenous counterparts.
335
Although half of Bangkok is thought to be of some Chinese ancestry, the
Thai Chinese generally feel no allegiance to China.336 Perhaps most
strikingly, the country's top political leaders, including the current Prime
Minister, are often of Chinese descent, 337 although they frequently have
Thai surnames and speak little or no Chinese. In fact, the current
equilibrium in Thailand suggests a manifestation of model outcome two: To
the extent the Thai Chinese have assumed the ethnic identity of the Thai
majority, they effectively have been eliminated as a distinct ethnic
minority.338 Even if this outcome proves stabilizing and seems benign, it is
open to question whether an assimilationism achieved through decades of
329. See WYATT, supra note 328, at 254-55.
330. See id. Today, there are still restrictions on the use of the Chinese language. A local
cable television network recently was forced to cancel its Chinese-language shows "after the
government cited standing regulations limiting broadcasts to Thai or English with Thai subtitles."
Vatildotis, supra note 186, at 23.
331. WYATt, supra note 328, at 292.
332. "Thais and Chinese began with the same ethnic roots. Most Thais descend from people
who lived in southwestern China until they were forced southward by the Mongols." G. Bruce
Knecht, Thais That Bind, NAT'L REV., Nov. 21, 1994, at 58. Moreover, "[h]istorically, Thailand's
relations with China were close. Thai kings paid tribute to China's medieval emperors. In return,
China offered a lucrative trading relationship." Michael Vatikiotis, Ties That Bind, FAR. E. ECON.
REV., Jan. 11, 1996, at 24, 25. Finally, it is said that Thailand "absorbed Chinese culture as part of
Thai culture." Vatikiotis, supra note 186, at 24.
333. For a controversial comparison of the "receptivity" of the Thai as compared with the
Javanese, see G. Wiliam Skinner, Change and Persistence in Chinese Culture Overseas: A
Comparison of Thailand and Java, 16 J.S. SEAS Soc'Y 86 (1960).
334. Knecht, supra note 316, at 59.
335. See La Croix, supra note 153, at 221; Vatikiotis, supra note 186, at 22.
336. See Vatikiotis, supra note 186, at 24; Knecht, supra note 332, at 58.
337. See Vatikiotis, supra note 186, at 23. Chuan Leekpai, who is of Hokkien Chinese origin,
reassumed Thailand's prime ministership in 1997. See Ted Bardacke, Banharn 'Broke Electoral
Law,' FiN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1996, at 4; Nayan Chanda, Blown Away, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec.
25, 1997 & Jan. 1, 1998, at 22, 26.
338. See sources cited supra note 291.
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cultural eradication and economic discrimination is an end that justifies its
means.
A final recent twist is worth noting here. With the growing power of
China in the last several years-not to mention expanding business
opportunities on the mainland-an increasing number of Thai Chinese are
reclaiming their Chinese identity. For example, many Thai Chinese are
sending their children to newly-established Chinese language schools,
visiting China in record numbers, and reassuming Chinese surnames.
339
Whether this counterassimilationist trend in Thailand will eventually have a
destabilizing effect remains to be seen.
b. The Philippines
Another possible counterexample to the model is the contemporary
Philippines. While most Filipinos have some Chinese ancestry, there
remains a discrete and insular "pure" Chinese minority who control an
extraordinarily disproportionate share of the nation's wealth, who speak
Chinese, seldom intermarry with Filipinos, and generally are viewed as
aggressive, secretive, and clannish.' Yet, arguably, despite the presence of
a market-dominant minority, marketization and democratization in the
Philippines have successfully proceeded without triggering any of the
negative consequences predicted by the model."4
This argument, however, may reflect a naive view of democracy in the
Philippines. Despite President Clinton's recent praises,' 42 the Philippines
may in fact exemplify a variant of model outcome three. Since colonial
Spanish times, a small hacendero class has controlled the country's politics
by using their land ownership and influence over tenants. Well before
Ferdinand Marcos's crony dictatorship,
[b]ehind the facade of democracy stood the fundamental fact
that .... [a] few self-aggrandizing rich families controlled every
facet of society. Washington was proud that its former colony had
become a showcase of political democracy and downplayed the fact
339. See Vatikiotis, supra note 186, at 22-23.
340. See Richburg, supra uote 102, at A25.
341. The Philippines has been described as experiencing a "resurgence of democracy."
Maritis D. Vitug, Sentimental Journey, FILIPINAS MAG., Jan. 31, 1995, at 11. Former President
Fidel Ramos championed the courting of foreign investment and a free-market economy
generally. See CLARK D. NEHER & ROSS MARLAY, DEMOCRAcY AND DEVELOPMENT IN
SOUTHEAST AsIA 59 (1995). Current President Joseph Estrada has remained dedicated to free-
market policies, rejecting currency controls as a method of protecting the Philippine economy
from the spread of the recent Asian market crises. See Philippine Industrialist Defends Currency
Control Proposals, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Sept. 16, 1998, available in LEXIS, News
Library, DPA File.
342. See Vitug, supra note 341, at 11.
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that the same families who had dominated their respective
provinces for centuries now controlled the Senate and the House of
Representatives."
Moreover, despite her "People Power" platform, commentators agree
that President Corazon Aquino-herself heir to a huge hacienda-" hardly
made a dent in the personalistic, patrimonial system that was antithetical to
democracy." 3" During Aquino's presidency, "of the 200 elected
congressional representatives, 132 came from established landowning
families and another 39 were relatives of big landowners." 5 Not
surprisingly, no significant land reform has yet occurred in the
Philippines. 46 Today, a few dynastic families continue to "support[]
political democratization because [they] always ha[ve] been able to
dominate the process and determine the outcome."7 Moreover, many
would argue that the relatively pro-Chinese, accommodationist policies
currently favored by the Filipino political elite are not the product of a
democratic process but rather, in Suharto-like fashion, have been bought
and paid for by wealthy Chinese34 -- again consistent with model outcome
three.
Just thirty years ago most Chinese in the Philippines were restricted
from citizenship and subjected to sweeping commercial restrictions. 49 Even
today, election leaflets are circulated with slogans such as "The Philippines
Is Ours-Do Not Give It To the Chinese!" 350 Hundreds of Chinese are
kidnapped (and often brutally murdered) each year because "they have
more finances, they have more money than the others."351 The importance
343. NEHER & MARLAY, supra note 341, at 54; see also Florian Coulmas, Democracy in
Asia?, SWiss REv. WORLD AFF., Apr. 1997, at 4, 5-6 (stating that most voters in the Philippines
are uneducated tenant farmers who are dependent on large landowners and who do not have the
necessary political awareness to vote for their own interests); The Old Firms, ECONOMIST, May
11, 1996, at S1O (noting that historically land and political influence in the Philippines were
vested in a small number of powerful Chinese, Filipino, and Spanish families, whose "wealth and
power were rarely diluted").
344. NEHER & MARLAY, supra note 341, at 57.
345. Id. at 58.
346. See id.
347. Id. at 54.
348. See John T. Omohundro, Social Networks and Business Success for the Philippine
Chinese, in 1 THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 65, 78-79 (Linda Y.C. Lim & L.A. Peter
Gosling eds., 1983) (noting that wealthy Philippine Chinese often establish alliances with
powerful Filipino "patrons"); Philippines Targets Marcos Ally's Guam Assets, REUTER ASIA-
PAC. Bus. REP., Sept. 15, 1993 (describing the investigation of an allegedly corrupt relationship
between a Filipino Chinese billionaire and late president Marcos), available in LEXIS, World
Library, REUAPB File.
349. See, e.g., WU & Wu, supra note 296, at 53, 177-78.
350. Richburg, supra note 102, at A25.
351. Intimidated Chinese Community Easy Prey for Kidnappers, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Apr.
25, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File (quoting a Filipino policeman); see
Morella, supra note 103.
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of these episodes should not be exaggerated. Nevertheless, it is too early to
conclude that the Philippines is an exception to the model.
2. Complicating Factors
This Section will briefly raise some factors that may complicate the
model's application to real-world cases. Needless to say, developing
country demographics are never as simple as the model suggests. Quite
often, no single ethnic group will represent a majority. This is true, for
example, of Kazakhstan, which will be discussed below. 5 2 Moreover,
developing countries almost always comprise more than two ethnic groups,
and ethnic rivalries will overlap and compete in complex ways.
In a developing country characterized by ethnic divisions, resentment
against a prosperous minority may be overshadowed by much greater
animus directed at another ethnic minority, which may or may not be
economically dominant. Group dynamics may also be interdependent.
Assume, for example, that in country X marketization benefits rival ethnic
groups A and B equally. But assume further that historically, B has always
been subordinate to ethnic group C in X's economic hierarchy. If
marketization lifts B above C, it is possible that members of A will actually
consider themselves less well off, despite the improvement of their own
position, because of B's relative success.
353
Furthermore, as already suggested, it will not always be clear in a given
developing country whether an economically dominant minority is market-
dominant. This complicating factor, which will be discussed further below,
bears profoundly on appropriate policy directions.354 In addition, ethnic
dynamics are by definition not static.3 5 Thus an ethnic minority that is
market-dominant now may cease to be so in the future for a variety of
reasons.
Finally, the internal ethnodynamics of a marketizing country may be
complicated by the presence of a substantial foreign investor community.
As I have explored elsewhere, majority-based resentment and antimarket
reactions often have been directed at these groups as well.356 Indeed, with
some adjustments, the MDMs in the model could, in principle, be foreign
investors who prosper visibly and disproportionately under marketization.
The focus of this Article, however, is not on these "external foreigners" but
352. See infra text accompanying notes 498,532.
353. Cf. McAdams, supra note 93, at 1023, 1084 (noting that individuals care deeply about
intergroup status).
354. See infra Subsections V.B.3.b, V.C.3.b.
355. See Horowitz, supra note 163, at 113.
356. See Chua, supra note 18, at 263-66.
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on internal ethnic minorities who often come to be regarded by the majority
as "foreigners within." 
357
E. General Policy Implications of the Model
Although the policy directions suggested by the model will be highly
case sensitive (as Part V will illustrate), it may be useful to highlight here
some general insights that the model produces. First and foremost, the
model insists that marketizing and democratizing policymakers
acknowledge and address the ethnodistributional consequences of their
work. In particular, those shaping law and development today should pay
careful attention to whether, in any given developing country, marketization
favors certain ethnic groups over others. In developing countries in which a
market-dominant minority is present, lawyers and policymakers must alert
themselves to the strong likelihood that the combined pursuit of markets
and democracy eventually will lead either to a retreat from markets, a
retreat from democracy, or ethnic eliminationism. The core questions then
become: Which of the three outcomes offers the lesser evils? Are there
ways to contain and direct such outcomes? From this perspective, ethnically
conscious market interventions-which may be viewed as a relatively
benign manifestation of model outcome one-may well represent the best
realistic alternative. Longer-term strategies would include efforts to study
and redress the underlying causes of market dominance in particular cases.
At the same time, it is essential to try to determine whether, in any
given country, a market-dominant ethnic minority exists. As already noted,
many economically dominant minorities, including so-called
"entrepreneurial" groups like the Chinese, may owe their economic success
in part to nonmarket factors such as political favoritism or corruption. To
the extent that this is the case, marketization may simply create
opportunities for disadvantaged groups previously excluded from the
market.
Finally, in countries with a market-dominant minority, it is imperative
that lawyers and policymakers find ways to disperse effectively and visibly
some of the market-generated wealth to the local population. Wealth
spreading proposals run counter to the maximum marketization philosophy
now in fashion. Measures to disperse share ownership invariably reduce the
proceeds received by a privatizing government. More generally, strategies
to build a broader-based public participation in the benefits of marketization
often have significant short-term efficiency costs. Nevertheless, lawyers
and policymakers who continue to ignore the ethnodistributional problems
357. Il
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of the developing world do so at their peril. With these considerations in
mind, we turn now to the model applications.
V. APPLICATIONS
This Part will apply the model developed in Part IV to South Africa,
Kazakhstan, and Vietnam. This selection of countries rests on a number of
considerations. First, the applications will demonstrate that countries with
very different cultures, geographies, and historical backgrounds manifest
strikingly similar ethnoeconomic and ethnopolitical phenomena. Further,
the case studies will demonstrate that the model is robust, applying to all
developing states in which a market-dominant minority is present. At the
same time, the applications will make clear that the widely varying reasons
for different groups' economic dominance will have crucial policy and
normative implications. Finally, South Africa, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam are
all countries receiving extraordinary attention today from the international
business and legal communities. Yet the fact that each is a potential site of
collision among the forces of markets, democracy, and ethnicity has been
(with the possible exception of South Africa) almost entirely overlooked.
Although directions for policy formulation are suggested below, the
following applications are not how-to guides. They are merely a first step
toward candid analysis of the ethnic dimensions of law and development.
A. South Africa
1. Background
In early 1990, after decades of brutally enforced apartheid rule,358
Frederik de Klerk's Afrikaner-based government took the world by surprise
and initiated negotiations for democratization with the African National
Congress (ANC),359 thus "deliberately embark[ing] on a process that would
end white minority rule." 360 By the end of 1992, a deal had been struck. The
358. For discussions of apartheid, see generally MICHAEL ATrWELL, SOUTH AFRICA:
BACKGROUND TO THE CRisis 92 (1986); ALEX HEPPLE, SOUTH AFRICA 13-15 (1966);
HOROWITZ, supra note 322, at 11; and MERLE LIPTON, CAPITALISM AND APARTHEID 23 (1985).
359. Organized in 1912 (originally as the African Native National Congress) and legalized in
1990, the ANC was for decades "a liberation movement in exile." Henrik Sommer, From
Apartheid to Democracy: Patterns of Violent and Nonviolent Direct Action in South Africa, 1984-
1994, 43 AFR. TODAY 53, 58 (1996); see generally T.R.H. DAVENPORT, SOUTH AFRICA: A
MODERN HISTORY 236-37 (4th ed. 1991).
360. Hermann Giliomee, Democratization in South Africa, 110 POL. SCI. Q. 83, 83 (1995).
De Klerk's decision, which earned him a Nobel Peace Prize, has been attributed to numerous
factors, including the strangling economic effect of international ostracization; the collapse of the
former Soviet Union, which had historically backed the ANC; the weakening white demographic
base; the increasingly intense anti-apartheid position of Afrikaner church leaders and academics;
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ruling National Party "abandoned the idea of a rotating troika presidency
and other extraordinary devices to counteract the will of the majority," and
in exchange the ANC accepted a power-sharing system for five years.361 On
the economic front, the ANC agreed to abandon its longstanding demands
for nationalization and "socialist economics" in return for the National
Party's promises "to promote black advancement through affirmative
action and [restitution]." 36
Since taking power, the Government of National Unity (first under
Nelson Mandela and now under Thabo Mbeki)363 has remained committed
to undoing the effects of apartheid through land reform, wealth
redistribution, the promotion of education, and intensive public works
programs,3 4 although many of these programs remain aspirational.365
Nevertheless, following a Cabinet shake-up in March 1996, the South
African government adopted a new market-oriented national economic
strategy (known as the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution policy, or
"GEAR") clearly committed to privatization, fiscal restraint, widespread
economic deregulation, and full-fledged promotion of foreign investment.
3 66
the lesson of Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe); and fear of Afrikaner extinction in the face of growing
black education, awareness, and anger. See id. at 84-92.
361. 1d. at 97. In June 1996, the National Party, led by de Klerk, withdrew from Mandela's
National Unity government and established itself as an official opposition party. See New
Constitution Comes into Effect, Marks End of Transition, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Feb. 3, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File. The new constitution, which went into effect on
February 4, 1997, did away with the power-sharing provisions included in the interim
constitution, which had governed South Africa since May 1994. See id.; Lionel Williams, South
Africa's New Constitution Takes Effect Today, AFR. NEWs, Feb. 4, 1997, available in LEXIS,
World Library, AFRNWS file.
362. Giliomee, supra note 360, at 97; see Caspar W. Weinberger, South Africa, FORBES, Dec.
5, 1994, at 35.
363. Mbeki took over the presidency of the ANC in December 1997, when Mandela
voluntarily stepped down. Mbeki is also deputy president of the state and is expected to succeed
Mandela officially when he retires in 1999. See Bryan Pearson, Mbeki Tastes Victory, AGENCE
FR.-PRESSE, Dec. 17, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
364. See AFRICAN NAT'L CONGRESS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME: A POLICY FRAMEWORK 15-57 (1994); SouTH AFR. DEP'T OF LAND AFFAIRS,
WHITE PAPER ON SouTH AFRICAN LAND POLICY (1997).
365. See Gumisai Mutume, South Africa Development: Not Yet Growth with Equity, INTER
PRESS SERV., July 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, INPRES File; Christopher
Ogden, The Post-Miracle Phase, TIME INT'L, Sept. 16, 1996, at 46, available in LEXIS, News
Library, TIM file. Land reform is one area where significant genuine reforms have begun. See
Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994, 6 JSRSA 2-515; Development Facilitation Act 67 of
1995, 6 JSRSA 2-536 (1997); Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996, 6 JSRSA 2-572
(1997); Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996, 6 JSRSA 2-578 (1997); Land
Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, 6 JSRSA 2-631 (1997).
366. See Chris Harmse, Economic Value System: Economic Transition Under Apartheid and
the Post Apartheid Government's Proposed New Macro-Economic Strategy, AAMBEELD, Nov.
1996, at 34; South Africa's Ag Minister Briefs Senate, AFR. NEWS, July 31, 1997, available in
LEXIS, World Library, AFRNWS file (containing a statement by South African Agriculture
Minister Derek Hanekom before the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and
Forestry). Since the adoption of GEAR, tensions have heightened between the ANC and the South
African Communist Party. Many members of the Communist Party view the free-market
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Although the new South African Constitution has been hailed as one of the
most progressive in the world--establishing, among other things, the right
to access to adequate housing, health care, food and water, and social
security 67 -the specific form of South Africa's postapartheid economic and
social policies remains to be seen.
2. Satisfaction of Model Conditions
South Africa easily satisfies most of the model conditions. Condition
two (severe ethnic divisions) is almost certainly met; South Africa remains
for the moment a nearly paradigmatic case of an ethnically divided
society.3 61 Condition three (the presence of a market-dominant minority) is
likely satisfied at present as well. The white minority, constituting roughly
thirteen percent of the population but owning over eighty-five percent of
the country's arable land3 69 and, at least until recently, dominating all of the
country's largest conglomerates,37 represents an ethnic minority whose
economic dominance would be almost certain to persist under free-market
conditions in the near to midterm future. Condition four is also satisfied.
Notwithstanding the significant (and potentially serious) divisions among
black South Africans,37' they clearly represent an impoverished majority
orientation of GEAR as a betrayal of the more socialist Reconstruction and Development
Programme with which the ANC campaigned in the 1994 elections. See Patrick Bond,
Neoliberalism Comes to South Africa, MULTINAT'L MONITOR, May 1996, at 8, 9, 12; William
Mervin Gumede, ANC's African Nationalist Core Will Be Under Siege at Mafikeng, SUNDAY
INDEP., Nov. 2, 1997, at 5.
367. See S. AFR. CONST. arts. 26, 27; Williams, supra note 361. The new South African
Constitution also contains a Bill of Rights prohibiting discrimination by the state or any person
against anyone on the grounds of "race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language
and birth." S. AFR. CONST. arts. 9(3), 9(4).
368. Ian Shapiro and Courtney Jung have argued that South Africa is not a "fundamentally
divided society," pointing out impressive "commonality among [South Africans] of different
races" and demonstrating that the extant cleavages in South Africa-whether racial, ethnic,
religious, or linguistically based-are "anything but static." Shapiro & Jung, supra note 163, at
241, 244. This may be true, but it is also true that black and white South Africans generally
continue to live and work in a segregated fashion and that rates of intermarriage between the
groups remain extremely low. In any event, for the purposes of the model it is sufficient that
"racial divisions have played, and continue to play, a profound part in South African politics" and
society, as Shapiro and Jung readily concede. Id. at 243.
369. See Mutume, supra note 365; South Africa's Ag Minister Briefs Senate, supra note 366.
370. See Sudarsan Raghaven, Black Owners Take a Piece of a Major South African Firm,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 16, 1996, at 7; Mutume, supra note 365; South Africa's Ag
Minister Briefs Senate, supra note 366. Historically, English-speaking South Africans dominated
the country's most lucrative economic sectors, including banking, insurance, big business, and the
mining industry; this generally remains the case today, despite many Afrikaner movements early
this century to promote "Afrikaner advancement into key positions of [economic] power and
influence." ATrWELL, supra note 358, at 72; see id. at 65-66, 71-72. On the other hand,
Afrikaners, many of whom were historically farmers, still own most of South Africa's land. See
id. at 64-65; LIPTON, supra note 358, at 389 tbl.13.
371. See HOROWITz, supra note 322, at 71-75.
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with claims to being the true owners of the nation.372 Hence ethnonationalist
slogans, such as "Africa for the Africans" and "Africa is Black Man's
Country," have persisted since the nineteenth century.373
Interestingly, whether South Africa is economically underdeveloped
(condition one) is a more complicated question, because apartheid
essentially created two economies. Unlike most developing countries, South
Africa began the process of industrialization, with the discovery of
diamonds and gold, over a century ago.374 The country's roads, railways,
and hospitals are at least as impressive as those of most developed
nations.37 Despite the heavy toll of international sanctions, South Africa
has a per capita income of about $3,000, roughly comparable to an Eastern
European country such as Hungary. 376 By 1992, over eighty percent of
South African whites were in high- or middle-income categories. 77
The picture is different, however, in black South Africa. The income of
approximately seventy percent of black South Africans (fifty-seven percent
of the total South African population) falls below the international
minimum subsistence level, and over forty percent of the labor force
(almost all black South Africans) is unemployed.7 More than half of all
urban Africans still "live in backyard shacks or squatter settlements."
3 79
Infant mortality and life expectancy rates for black South Africans are on a
par with those of the poorest developing countries.38° Predictably, South
Africa has one of the least egalitarian wealth distributions in the world, with
372. This is true despite the fact that most Afrikaner families have long-established roots in
South Africa. As Professor Horowitz has observed:
Practically every step the Afrikaners took to secure their precarious collective existence
had elements of both [nationalist aspiration and racial ideology) embedded in it. The
Great Trek north from the Cape in the 1830s, for instance, was precipitated by the
desire to escape some unpleasant features of British rule and threats to cattle and
security from Africans on the eastern frontier. The Afrikaners thought they were
creating or preserving a nation out of a people threatened with "extinction,"
particularly by an increasingly powerful British colonialism, but they were
simultaneously acting as conquerors of Africans.
Id. at 10 (internal citations omitted).
373. Ld. at 13-15.
374. See ATrwELL, supra note 358, at 47-49, 52-53; Background on South Africa, 85 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 8, 13 (1985).
375. It was in South Africa that some of the world's first heart transplants were performed,
see R.W. Johnson, Whites in the New South Africa, DISSENT, Summer 1996, at 134, 136, and even
travel guides wax exuberant about the high quality of South Africa's roads and railways, see, e.g.,
FODOR'S SOUTH AFRIcA at xviii, 2 (1996) (describing South Africa's roads as "immaculately
paved" and a ride on the famous Blue Train as "glorious" and "a standard for luxury").
376. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 28, at 312; Giliomee, supra note 360, at 98-99; South
Africa's Ag Minister Briefs Senate, supra note 366.
377. Giliomee, supra note 360, at 99. During the 1993 GATT negotiations, South Africa was
classified as a "developed" rather than "developing" country. Bond, supra note 366, at 12.
378. See Giliomee, supra note 360, at 99; Ogden, supra note 365, at 48.
379. Giliomee, supra note 360, at 99.
380. See id. On average in South Africa, whites live 11.5 years longer than blacks. See
Mutume, supra note 365.
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the top five percent of the population consuming more than the bottom
eighty-five percent.38 ' This lack of broad economic development makes it
plausible to view South Africa as an economically underdeveloped country
for purposes of the model.
3. Analysis
Assuming that it qualifies as a developing country, South Africa is a
pivotal test case for the model. Marketization and democratization are
simultaneously taking place in the presence of a resented, market-dominant
white minority. Accordingly, despite the remarkably peaceful transition to
democratic rule, South Africa's future rests precariously on its ability to
confront and address the enormous instability created by the black
majority's empowerment in the face of outrageously disproportionate white
wealth.
Given South Africa's racial history and persisting ethnoeconomic
inequities, the chances of a "democratic miracle" in which voters "become
policy- and issue-oriented ... and shed their racial or ethnic concerns" 382 is
practically nonexistent. Similarly, there is virtually no prospect of a
"market miracle," which in South Africa would require fantastic
improvement in the black economic sectors (fueled perhaps by booming
black corporations383 and an explosion in the employment of black workers
coupled with massive wealth redistribution), such that black South Africans
are generally lifted out of poverty. Although it is too early to draw final
conclusions, and notwithstanding some impressive achievements,3" "the
vast majority of black South Africans are no better off economically [today]
381. See Bond, supra note 366, at 8; South Africa's Ag Minister Briefs Senate, supra note
366.
382. Hermann Giliomee & Charles Simkins, Conclusion, in THE AWKWARD EMBRACE:
DEMOCRACY AND DOMINANT-PARTY RULE IN SOUTH AFRICA, MEXIco, TAIWAN AND
MALAYSIA (Hermann Giliomee & Charles Simkins eds.) (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 345,
on file with The Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter THE AWKWARD EMBRACE].
383. There is some evidence of corporate empowerment among black South Africans. In the
last several years, "15 black-controlled companies worth more than $1.7 billion have been listed
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, up from none in 1993." Ogden, supra note 365; see also
Paul Richardson, S. Africa Privatisation Seen Boosting Black Business, REUTERS, Sept. 4, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File (describing the progress of black businesses). It is
unclear, however, how deep this black empowerment goes. Critics have charged that "white
captains of industry have simply created a tiny black superelite to serve as a buffer" between the
white business community and the black-controlled government. Dele Olojede, Building a Better
South Africa, NEWSDAY, June 6, 1997, at A6.
384. According to the government, since 1994 "more than one million homes have been
electrified and water has been reticulated to one million people." South Africa's Ag Minister
Briefs Senate, supra note 366.
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than they were three years ago." 385 Further, "the apartheid-era ghettos of
the past" are still swelling by roughly a million people a year. 6 If
anything, as many commentators have warned, "reliance on the market at
the expense of government direction and intervention," while delighting
domestic and international bond traders, will very probably exacerbate the
plight and frustration of the great majority of black South Africans in the
near to midterm.387 Meanwhile, expectations among the black majority are
dangerously unrealistic. 88
The model predicts that, absent a stunning transformation in black
South African economic prospects, powerful pressures will push South
Africa toward one or more of the following possible outcomes: an
ethnically fueled antimarket backlash, actions aimed at eliminating the
white population, or a retreat from democracy. The following discussions
very briefly suggest how the model predictions are beginning to play out in
the South African context.
a. Antiwhite, Antimarket Backlash
The aggressive and popular efforts by the South African government to
attract foreign investment and promote trade liberalization have prompted
many international commentators to assert that the commitment to
unfettered markets "has never been as dominant in South Africa as it is
today." 389 Although the South African government has little incentive to
dispel such a perception among the international community, this is not
entirely accurate. While vigorously courting international markets on the
one hand, the South African government is on the other hand intervening in
South Africa's internal markets in significant, ethnically motivated ways,
consistent with the model's first outcome.
For example, the government is in the process of adopting, along with
land restitution policies, certain restrictions on the use and alienability of
385. Ogden, supra note 365; see also Kurt Shillinger, Mandela Passes ANC Torch;
Successor Aims for Development, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 21, 1997, at A2 (noting that employment
levels in South Africa have declined over the past 18 months).
386. Ogden, supra note 365.
387. Bond, supra note 366, at 8.
388. In a pre-1994 election poll, 81% of black South Africans "said that they expect[ed] the
new government to make sure that 'people like me can live like most whites."' Hermann
Giliomee & Charles Simkins, The Dominant Party Regimes of South Africa, Mexico, Taiwan and
Malaysia: A Comparative Assessment, in THE AWKWARD EMBRACE, supra note 382 (manuscript
at 1,24).
389. Bond, supra note 366, at 9; see also Newton Kanhema, Mbeki Predicts Bright Economic
Future for South Africa, AFR. NEWs, Feb. 4, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6607901 (noting that
Deputy President Thabo Mbeld is "increasingly optimistic" about South Africa's ability to attract
foreign investment); South Africa's Ag Minister Briefs Senate, supra note 366 ("[T]rade and
investment promotion are increasingly important thrusts of our Government.").
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rural, and thus principally Afrikaner, land.3 9° Specifically, the draft
Extension of Tenure Security Bill
proposes that where people live on rural land with the consent of
the owner or person in charge, they may only be evicted if two
criteria are met. First, the occupier's right of occupation must be
lawfully terminated-for example, through a fair dismissal or the
expiry of a contract. Second, the court must decide whether (and if
so when) eviction is justified.
At present, the law allows a land-owner to dump on the side of
the road people who have lived on the land for decades, who have
nowhere else to go, and who have done nothing to cause or justify
an eviction. Most reasonable people would agree that this is not
just. The law must be changed.39
The proposed restrictions, which also cover black tribal land but which the
government concedes would almost exclusively affect whites,3 92 have
generated bitter opposition from some white landowners, who claim that
the draft bill "boils down to blatant discrimination. It establishes
completely new rights at the expense of existing property rights." 393
At the same time, the South African government is expected in the near
future to pass a national water bill radically altering the existing structure of
water ownership and access. As described in the White Paper on a National
Water Policy for South Africa, during the apartheid regime "access to
water for use in agriculture [was] even more skewed than access to land."394
For decades, riparian laws (tying use of water to ownership of land) were
enforced, and dams, pumping stations, and pipelines were built to divert
South Africa's water to "a privileged minority of private land owners."395
390. See Explaining the Rationale Behind the Bill, LAND INFO (Communications Directorate,
Dep't of Land Aff., Pretoria, S. Afr.), Feb.-Mar. 1997, at 4,4-5.
391. Id. The draft Extension of Tenure Security Bill was proposed by the South African
Department of Land Affairs after an extensive multi-party consultation process commencing in
July 1996. See id. at 3-4.
392. In theory, the draft bill applies to all rural land owned by whites or blacks. According to
the government, however, principally white farmers will be affected, because of the following
"paradox":
Many more people live [on rural black tribal land] than on [white] commercial farms.
But there are very few evictions from tribal land. Although they are the most crowded
areas of the country... they continue to give shelter to people evicted from "white"
land. They suffer the results of eviction-they are seldom the cause of eviction. The
reason is that people in these areas live according to an ethic which accepts that you
cannot willy-nilly dump people with nowhere to go.
Id. at5.
393. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
394. DEPARTMENT OF WATER AFF. & FORESTRY, WHITE PAPER ON A NATIONAL WATER
POLICY FOR SOUTH AFRICA 12 (Apr. 1997).
395. Id. at 14.
1998]
70 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108: 1
As a result, between twelve and fourteen million black South Africans are
currently "without access to safe water and over 20 million without
adequate sanitation."396
The proposed water law would abolish the existing riparian system and
effectively nationalize "South Africa's scarce water resources" with the
government serving "as custodian of the 'public trust."' 39 7 Current water
users would then be required to apply to the government for a license in
order to continue their existing water use.3 98 Water users would pay for their
use of water according to a variable pricing system.39 9 An exception would
be made for water "for basic human needs," which would be provided free
of charge."0 Although water resources are often state-owned and state-
distributed even in highly marketized economies, the proposed
nationalization and redistribution of water in South Africa would negatively
affect whites (principally Afrikaners) almost exclusively for the benefit of
nonwhites. Indeed, the proposed water reforms are aimed explicitly at
reversing the "inefficient racial spoils system" of the apartheid era, which
eroded significantly "both the right to dignity and the right to life amongst
the Black majority."401
Finally, the recently released Employment Equity Bill (substantially
patterned on the Malaysian affirmative action model) is expected to come
before Parliament this year.402 Although the proposed law does not impose
quotas for black representation in the workplace, it "requires every business
to have an affirmative action plan" directed at "inclusion in the economy of
those sections of the population previously excluded."'  The bill, which
many say "opens up a vast sphere of state intervention," is "vehemently"
396. Id at 9.
397. ld. at 14 (citation omitted). The government's current position is that the proposed
restructuring of South Africa's water system, which aims at "redress[ing] the results of past racial
discrimination," will not require compensation to existing water users under the property clause
of the new South African Constitution. Id. at 8. For an excellent historical and philosophical
discussion of the property clause of the South African Constitution, see generally Andre J. Van
der Walt, Property Rights, Land Rights, and Environmental Rights, in RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE NEw SoUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 455 (Dawid van Wyk et al. eds.,
1995).
398. See DEPARTMENT OF WATER AFF. & FORESTRY, supra note 394 at 4, 17. Thus,
"[w]ater use allocations will no longer be permanent" but instead will endure for a reasonable
period. Id. at 4. "If no application is made for the registration of an existing water-use, it will be
assumed that that use has been abandoned ... ." 1d, at 18.
399. See id. at 23.
400. Id.
401. 1L at 7.
402. See R.W. Johnson, Pretoria to Impose Affirmative Action on Businesses, TIMES
(London), Sept. 8, 1997, at 14; Christo Volschenk, Affirmative Action Law Coming, CAPE TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1997, at 15.
403. Volschenk, supra note 402, at 15. The proposed legislation threatens heavy penalties for
noncompliance. See Affirmative Action the Only Way for South Africa: Mandela, AGENCE FR.-
PRESSE, Feb. 6, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
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supported by the black middle class and opposed by the business
community.'
To varying degrees, all these measures represent derogations of free-
market policies-whether by curtailing the conventional bundle of rights of
landowners, by nationalizing resources, or by restricting employment
decisions. They are also all ethnically driven, even if occasionally drafted in
formally race-neutral language. If, however, the economic situation of the
black African majority does not improve significantly in the near future, the
retreat from market policies in South Africa may well begin to take a more
extreme form.
Nationalization and expropriation were for years-and until quite
recently-a central plank of the ANC.4°" While it is currently popular to
view nationalization as a phenomenon of the past, as I have discussed
above and elsewhere, in the developing world waves of privatization and
free-market euphoria have repeatedly given way to renationalization
programs expressly targeting wealthy ethnic minorities. 40 6 In South Africa,
privatization initiatives over the last several years have met with significant
opposition, principally from the influential trade unions.0 7 The politically
powerful Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) continues to
advocate "a bigger, not smaller, public sector to satisfy the country's huge
social and economic needs.""' ° COSATU has also ridiculed big business
efforts to transfer wealth to blacks as "no more than corporate camouflage
which retains power and control in the small group of shareholders and
their directors." '9 Support for nationalization among black South Africans
remains substantial.41
404. Johnson, supra note 402, at 14.
405. See ATrWELL, supra note 358, at 203; Giliomee, supra note 360, at 97; Andi Spicer,
ANC Mining hzdustry Plans Spark Concern, INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 25, 1994, available in
1994 WL 2583793; South Africa: ANC Rethink on Nationalisation, AFR. ECON. DIG., Nov. 19,
1990, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTAFR File. Indeed, the Freedom Charter, still "the
closest thing to a statement of principles by non-white South Africa," specifically calls for the
transfer of the country's "mineral wealth," banks, and "monopoly industry" to "the people as a
whole." ATrVELL, supra note 358, at 90 (quoting from the Freedom Charter). The Freedom
Charter was drafted in 1955 by the ANC and other nonwhite groups. After decades of "semi-
obscurity," recent events in South Africa have given the Charter renewed status. See id.
406. See Chua, supra note 18; supra text accompanying notes 248-262.
407. See A Labor Perspective on the South African Economy, MULTINAT'L MONITOR, May
1996, at 10, 10; Bernard Simon, Privatisation, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1997, at 4. But see Bongiwe
Mlangeni, South Africa: Privatization of SAA in the Pipeline, INTER PRESS SERV., Oct. 29, 1997,
1997 WL 13257416 (reporting that airline worker unions in South Africa favor the privatization
of South African Airways and believe that job losses will not be extensive).
408. Simon, supra note 407, at 4; see also Bond, supra note 366, at 14 (stating that COSATJ
has advocated job creation by reorienting the economy to meet basic needs production). COSATU
has also called for "more cautious engagement with the world economy." Bond, supra note 366,
at 14.
409. Bond, supra note 366, at 14.
410. See Giliomee & Simkins, supra note 388 (manuscript at 29); Gumisai Mutume, Thumbs
Down for Privatization, INTER PRESS SERV., July 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7076286.
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b. Eliminationist Strategies
At the same time, as long as terrible black poverty and extraordinary
white wealth persist, one would also expect to see the beginnings of
antiwhite eliminationism. Although the government has not wavered from
its commitment to a multiracial democracy,41' there long has been in South
Africa an influential, exclusionary strand of African nationalism, according
to which indigenous Africans are the sole legitimate owners of the soil.412
As late as 1989, participants at the inaugural meeting of the Pan-Africanist
Movement chanted, "One settler-one bullet!" '413 At the moment, these
Africanist movements generally are perceived as a fringe phenomenon,
supported by a relatively small percentage of the population414 Moreover,
despite the recent crime wave in South Africa,415 there have been
remarkably few reports of explicitly antiwhite violence. Nevertheless, there
are plenty of signs already of black backlash against white religions,4 6
language,"' codes of morality,4 18 teachers,4 9 pedagogy,420 television,421 and
Winnie Madikizela Mandela, who still has adoring populist followers, continues to attack the
government's economic gradualism and instead champions more immediate delivery of economic
and social benefits. See Gumede, supra note 366, at 5. Mrs. Mandela recently declined to run for
the post of ANC deputy president. See Alec Russell, Winnie Mandela Bows out of Race for Key
ANC Post, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 18, 1997, at 17.
411. See Michael Collins, Grandfather and Leader, Mandela Speaks, UPI, Apr. 23, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File (quoting Mandela's call for "national unity");
Russell, supra note 410, at 17 (quoting newly-elected Mbeki as stating that "[d]emocracy does
not threaten white people in this country").
412. See HOROWITZ, supra note 322, at 13-15. As early as the 19th century, a movement had
begun to "keep 'Africa for the Africans.' Id. at 13. In the 1950s, "[t]o the ANC's declaration in
the Freedom Charter of 1955 that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white ... ,'
the Africanists rejoined in their journal that '[t]he African people have an inalienable claim on
every inch of the African soil."' Id. at 13-14 (internal citation omitted). In the seventies, "Black
Consciousness" leaders repeatedly declared that South Africa "belongs exclusively to Blacks."
Id. at 15. Even among Africanists, however, there is disagreement over the ultimate place of
whites in South Africa. See id. at 6, 15.
413. Id. at 14.
414. On the other hand, commentators have suggested that "the ANC has increasingly
abandoned its 1994 election appeal of nonracialism for an explicit call to African solidarity."
Giliomee & Simkins, supra note 382 (manuscript at 344).
415. See Judith Matloff, Murderous Society? High Crime Rate in South Africa Cuts Across
Racial, Economic Lines, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 13, 1995, at 7.
416. Dali Tambo, the host of a popular television show, criticized Afrikaner Christianity as
homophobic, "primitive, Calvinist and Victorian, a spiteful, angry, intolerant culture.... And
totally hypocritical." Bill Keller, Apartheid's Gone, and Anything Goes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28,
1994, at A7; see also J.P. Peires, Suicide or Genocide? in HISTORY FROM SOUTH AFRICA:
ALTERNATIVE VISIONS AND PRACTICES 34-35 (Joshua Brown et al. eds., 1991) (discussing Xhosa
suspicions about white missionaries) [hereinafter HISTORY FROM SOUTH AFRICA].
417. Strikingly, black hostility has been directed almost exclusively against Afrikaans (the
"language of the oppressor"), as opposed to English, which is generally accepted as the
"business" language. See Rohan Minogue, Afrikaners in Rare Unity over Their Language,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTuR, Aug. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS
File; Patrick McDowell, Language Battle Heats up as TV Switches Tongues, ASSOC. PRESS, Feb.
4, 1996, 1996 WL 440998.
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the "White way of life" generally.422 Perhaps as a result, "[m]any suburban
whites live in jail-like homes guarded by vicious dogs, razor wire, and
armed security guards summoned by panic buttons. ' 42 Thus, despite the
government's assurances,424 roughly 18,000 whites, many of them affluent
and educated, leave the country each year.4' Although the significance of
isolated incidents should not be exaggerated, it remains telling that a
leading ANC official, stopped last November for driving while intoxicated,
could tell the policeman: "When Mandela dies, we wili kill you whites like
flies." 426 It takes little imagination to envision the emergence of charismatic
African leaders espousing eliminationist policies. If not outright violence
against whites, these policies might include laws targeting the public use of
Afrikaans, suppressing white schools and churches, and otherwise treating
whites as cultural or political enemies within the state.427
418. Black South Africa has reacted in many ways to the "intolerant" and "hypocritical"
Afrikaner morality code, for example, by legalizing abortion, homosexual activity, and sexually
explicit films and magazines. Keller, supra note 416, at A7.
419. See Ingeborg Lichtenberg, S. African Black Pupils Vow to Evict White Teachers,
REUTERS, Aug. 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File; Gumisai Mutume,
Radical Students Want White Teachers out, INTER PRESS SERV., Aug. 3, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, INPRES File.
420. See Melanie Walker, History and History Teaching in Apartheid South Africa, in
HISTORY FROi SoUTH AFRICA, supra note 416, at 268, 269; Anton Christen, South Africa After
Apartheid, Swiss REv. WORLD AFF., May 1996, at 6, 7 (noting recent demands that the
University of Witwatersrand renounce its "superfluous, colonialistic and alienating" image as a
liberal, English-speaking university).
421. See, e.g., C.A. Hamilton, A Positional Gambit, in HISTORY FROM SOUTH AFRICA, supra
note 416, at 288, 293.
422. There is a small but growing movement, for example, to introduce Ubuntu--"the
traditional Black African sense of the collective, according to which a person is a true human
being only through and with others"-into the workplace, university education, and business
management practices. See Christen, supra note 420, at 7. In response, numerous Afrikaner-based
organizations have sprung up to fight for "the preservation of Afrikaner culture." Gumisai
Mutume, Afrikaners Try to Keep Flag Flying, INTER PRESS SERV., Jan. 26, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, INPRES File.
423. Matloff, supra note 415, at 7.
424. Like Mandela before him, Mbeki advocates "anon-racial society [that] is in the interests
of both black and white." Pearson, supra note 363. At the same time, Mbeki has publicly warned
whites that unless they "voluntarily" share their wealth, "they could face 'race riots' in three to
five years." Id.
425. See Johnson, supra note 375, at 135; Fredric Chambon, A World Turned Upside Down,
WORLD PRESS REV., Oct. 1996, at 18.
426. David J. Lynch, A Wary Nation Looks to a Time of Transition, USA TODAY, Dec. 15,
1997, at 17A; Mandela's ANC Fuelling Racial Tension in S. Africa, Opponents Say, AGENCE FR.-
PRESSE, Nov. 9, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File. The ANC "apologised
unreservedly for [the official's] alleged remarks." Senior ANC Official Faces Inquiry on Racism
Charges, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Nov. 14, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File. It is
also worth noting that in 1993, Peter Mokaba-who today is included in President-to-be Mbeki's
"inner circle"-led ANC Youth members in singing "Kill the Boer" and a month later urged
blacks to "direct [their] bullets against de Kerk." Brendan Boyle, ANC Youth Leader Says Turn
Guns on De Klerk, REUTERS, Aug. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File; see
also Gumede, supra note 366, at 5.
427. See Gilbert A. Lewthwaite, African Nationalism Debate Is Growing in South Africa,
BALT. SUN, June 25, 1997, at 1A.
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c. Antidemocracy Backlash
A retreat from democracy in South Africa could take at least three
different forms. First, the white minority could reseize power militarily and
either restore apartheid nationally (highly unlikely) or establish a
prosperous white homeland in South Africa.4" Second, an ethnonationalist
African leader could overthrow the current market-friendly,
accommodationist, democratic regime.429 Finally, an accommodationist
government could continue liberal, pro-market policies by defying
increasingly hostile majority will and suppressing electoral competition.
Along these lines, several points about South Africa's current political
structure are worth raising.
To begin with, South African parliamentary elections are conducted
wholly by proportional representation according to a party-list method.
Thus, in order to be elected to Parliament (which requires a high ranking on
the party list), local politicians must be well regarded among the leaders of
the party hierarchy.43 This national party-list method may give the current
ANC leadership a means of sifting out ethnonationalist extremists in a way
that would not be possible with a constituency-based representation system
(although obviously the party list in the end cannot be at complete odds
with popular support). In addition, many political analysts in South Africa
argue that undemocratic internal political procedures of the ANC have
allowed the current leaders to sweep away all formidable extremist
opposition within the party structure.431 Some commentators fear that the
excessive dominance of the ANC may well turn South Africa into a variant
of a one-party dominant regime similar to those historically in place in
countries like Mexico or Taiwan.43' On all of these points, further inquiry is
required.
428. See Johnson, supra note 375, at 137. Calls by Afrikaner separatists for the establishment
of a "Volkstaat" or Afrikaner homeland-technically permissible under the new constitution-
have not diminished. See Christen, supra note 420, at 6; Michael Hamilyn, New Constitution a
Human, Liberal and Comprehensive Document, NEW STRAITS TIMES, May 9, 1996, at 1.
429. In recent years, the Pan African Congress and COSATU have become increasingly
critical of South Africa's economic and social direction. See Lewthwaite, supra note 427;
Mandela Faces Friction, BALT. SUN, July 9, 1997, at 12A. One black African labor leader
recently suggested that "the ANC's soul [may] already [be] too far lost, given the policies it has
adopted since coming to power." A Labor Perspective on the South African Economy, supra note
407, at IA.
430. See Giliomee & Simkins, supra note 388 (manuscript at 17-18, 44).
431. According to Professors Giliomee and Simkins, recent developments in South Africa
indicate a legislature that is neither strong nor independent and "leadership intolerance of any
criticism of an ANC minister by representatives of the party regardless of the charges levelled
against him or her." Id. (manuscript at 41).
432. See Giliomee, supra note 360, at 103-04. For an illuminating comparative analysis, see
generally TIIE AWNVKARD EMBRACE, supra note 382.
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4. Directions
None of these warnings is new for South Africa. On the contrary, most
of these troubling outcomes have already been prophesied, with varying
degrees of doomsaying, in the burgeoning literature on post-apartheid South
Africa.433 The model's distinctive contribution here lies in the counsel it
offers to lawyers and policymakers participating in South Africa's
transformation. As already noted, prevailing law and development
orthodoxy effectively presumes that the cures currently prescribed for
economic and political underdevelopment-markets and democracy-will
also cure ethnic conflict. By contrast, the model insists that lawyers and
policymakers recognize that marketization and democratization-to the
extent that they are successful, to the extent that they do just what they are
supposed to do-will, in countries like South Africa, in fact tend to catalyze
ethnic conflict in a highly determinate and predictable fashion. Markets and
democracy cannot be regarded as solutions to the dangers of ethnic strife in
a country like South Africa. They are, at least in the short and midterm, part
of the problem.
What then is the solution? One position is that the best way to address
the dangers of racial strife is through race neutrality. On this view (which
has a familiar United States counterpart)' race-based interventions
necessarily mirror the race-based apartheid regime, invariably perpetuating
destructive racial politics and racialist thinking. The policy thrust of this
view is that South Africa should address its problems not through ethnically
based interventions into the marketplace, but rather through race-neutral
progressive taxation, social welfare policies, and the other conventional
components of the liberal activist state, which, over time, will be the best
corrective for economic imbalance and racial strife.
This view, which perhaps seems appealing from afar, runs a
tremendous risk of blindness-almost of willful blindness-to South
African realities. Post-apartheid South Africa already has progressive
433. See, e.g., Janet Cherry, Development, Conflict and the Politics of Ethnicity in South
Africa's Transition to Democracy, 15 THIRD WORLD Q. 613, 628-29 (1994); Giliomee &
Simkins, supra note 388 (manuscript at 29-30); Wilmot James & Daria Caliguire, Renewing Civil
Society, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1996, at 56, 60; Johnson, supra note 375, at 135; Courtney Jung &
Ian Shapiro, South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy, Opposition, and the New
Consitutional Order, 23 POL. & Soc'Y 269, 297-99 (1995).
434. See, e.g., NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIvE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND
PUBLIC POLICY 168-95 (1975) (arguing that affirmative action in the United States stigmatizes
minorities and entrenches invidious stereotypes); Antonin Scalia, Commentary, The Disease as
Cure, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 154 (stating that the U.S. affirmative action system "is based
upon concepts of racial indebtedness and racial entitlement rather than individual worth and
individual need; that is to say ... it is racist"). See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action,
107 YALE L.J. 427, 444 (1997) (laying out the now familiar "move[s] and countermove[s] in the
colorblindness debate").
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taxation,4 35 and the government is probably doing as much as it currently
can with respect to social welfare programs. Conceivably, in the best of
worlds, race-neutral policies might be the optimal approach to South
Africa's difficulties over a long stretch of time. But when it is remembered
that the townships today are not shrinking but growing-at a rate of a
million black Africans a year46--pursuing the "best of all worlds" solution
becomes a luxury South Africa is unlikely to be able to afford.
If in another five or ten years it remains the case (as it quite possibly
will) that the "vast majority of Blacks are no better off than they were," 437
there is a very real danger that a black majority will find it intolerable to
live under a "race-neutral" political and economic system whose reality is
massive black imnmiseration and massive white wealth. Obviously, in a
country as dependent on global markets as South Africa,435 "the
government cannot.., violate rights, particularly property rights, without
incurring serious financial and economic costs." 439 Nevertheless, the notion
that the black majority will act as rational, long-term wealth-maximizers,
cognizant that antiwhite measures may discourage foreign investment, is
unrealistic. Indeed, from the point of view of township inhabitants, unlikely
to benefit from marketization and globalization within their lifetimes,
extremist measures might in fact be "rational."" In any event, whatever
the merits of a race-neutral approach in a country like the United States, it
may be in South Africa the best recipe for racial violence, expropriation,
and an eventual collapse of democracy.
At the same time, it should not be overlooked that the recently adopted
South African Constitution gives protections to minorities that in principle
would guard against confiscatory practices and racial eliminationism.44' In
comparison with most developing countries, South Africa is unusual in
having an independent constitutional court that is generally perceived to be
politically legitimate.' Such an institution gives South Africa a potential
line of defense against ethnonationalist abuses that is generally unavailable
in the developing world.443 Nonetheless, it is surely naive to expect a
435. See Charles Sinikins, The New South Africa: Problems of Reconstruction, J.
DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1996, at 82, 93.
436. See Ogden, supra note 365.
437. Id.; see Shillinger, supra note 385, at A2.
438. Imports and exports currently represent more than 60% of South Africa's gross domestic
product. See Giliomee & Simkins, supra note 388 (manuscript at 24).
439. Id (manuscript at 40).
440. An excellent recent exploration of the relationship between political backlash and
economic efficiency can be found in Roe, supra note 92, at 218-21. Professor Roe writes that "in
some systems, politics may lash back," id. at 218, and "disrupt otherwise efficient [economic]
arrangements.... [A]nd this backlash potential complicates economic analysis." Idl at 217-218.
441. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. arts. 9, 11, 12, 20, 25.
442. See Giliomee & Simkins, supra note 388 (manuscript at 39).
443. See Vincent T. Maphai, The New South Africa: A Season for Power-Sharing, J.
DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1996, at 67, 80.
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constitutional court only a few years old to stand against an incited black
majority-particularly if that court has been insistent on race neutrality.
Zimbabwe also had a longstanding tradition of constitutionalism, and
ethnonationalist nationalizations are occurring there even today.4'
If the model applies to South Africa, the somber reality is that the
nation will almost certainly be forced down one (or more) of the three paths
discussed above: a retreat from democracy, an ethnically targeted retreat
from free-market policies, or attempts to eliminate the white population.
From this point of view, carefully tailored, ethnically conscious market
interventions might well be the best of the "second best" solutions
available to South Africa. For example, however distasteful they may be to
some Westerners, ethnically based employment preferences might be the
best way of forestalling full blown nationalization or antiwhite violence.
Indeed, such initiatives may be responsible in part for the success South
Africa has had thus far in maintaining racial accommodation.
It is far from clear, however, that the current measures will be sufficient
to resist the powerful antiwhite, antimarket pressures that undoubtedly will
intensify unless the government finds ways to spread market-generated
wealth rapidly, visibly, and significantly to the black African population. If
the model is correct, the South African government should be championing
broad-based black participation in the marketization process, even at the
expense of short-term growth. It should be working to disperse the benefits
of privatizations, international joint ventures, and the like to the great
majority of blacks who continue to live in the country's grossly
impoverished rural areas or urban slums. This might be achieved through
subsidies and loans or, more controversially, through quotas or ownership
restrictions.4" Unfortunately, the government has abandoned many of its
more ambitious redistributive proposals over the last few years, including
programs to provide low-cost housing, promote worker ownership, and
make cheap credit widely accessible." 6
Yet even these kinds of interventions-already opposed by many in the
business community on grounds that they "will balloon the government
deficit"447 -may not be enough to assure the sustainability of free-market
democracy in South Africa. It may be that the only way to dismantle the
conditions of ethnoeconomic violence in South Africa is through more
radical transformations, perhaps along the lines of Roberto Unger's
visionary program to reimagine the institutional arrangements of markets
444. See source cited supra note 262.
445. See Chua, supra note 18, at 293. This approach has some precedent in Latin America,
where "popular capitalism" initiatives have been tried on a limited basis with considerable
success. Id.
446. See Bond, supra note 366, at 10-12.
447. Id. at 12.
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and democracy."5 Other radical, innovative reforms-for example, Andre
van der Walt's challenge to the supposed race neutrality of the entire
"common law ownership paradigm" 49 -have also been proposed.
Finally, along with ethnically conscious retreats from the market, there
might also be room for ethnically conscious interventions in the democratic
process. A growing literature, for example, explores the possibility of
adjusting districting rules and vote counting rules-in a way consistent with
the principle of one man, one vote-to ameliorate ethnic tensions.450 In
addition, some scholars and policymakers have advocated as important for
preserving ethnic stability various "power-sharing" devices to "counteract
the will of the majority" and to ensure protection of the white minority.451
Although these avenues are worth considering, the thrust of the model is
that if South Africa's extreme ethnoeconomic imbalances are not
vigorously addressed, the prospects of creating interracial coalitions by
tinkering with the democratic process almost certainly will be dismal.
B. Kazakhstan
1. Background
Kazakhstan is a large country-larger than all of western Europe-with
a small population. 2 It is prodigiously rich in oil, gas, and mineral
deposits.45 Kazakhstan is also landlocked, sandwiched between Russia and
China, with Iran, Pakistan, and war-torn Tajikistan to the south.4'
448. See UNGER, supra note 2 (manuscript at 108-208).
449. A.J. van der Walt, Property Rights and Land Policy: Some Remarks on Land Reform in
South Africa 27 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal). Van der
Walt advocates a shift "towards the creation of new, needs-driven rights that do not fit into [the
traditional] paradigm." Id.
450. See, e.g., HOROWITZ, supra note 10, at 628-52 (discussing the roles that different
electoral systems have played in fostering or retarding ethnic tensions).
451. Thomas Koelble & Andrew Reynolds, Power-Sharing Democracy in the New South
Africa, 24 POL. & Soc'y 221,221 (1996); see HERIBERT ADAM & KOGILA A. MOODLEY, SOUTH
AFRICA WITHOUT APARTHEID: DISMANTLING RACIAL DOMINATION 207, 242-43 (1986);
HOROWrrZ, supra note 322, at 137-39; AREND LuIPHART, POWER-SHARING IN SOUTH AFRICA 6-
9, 80-81 (1985). In two influential essays, Jung and Shapiro opposed the inclusion of mandated
power-sharing arrangements in the permanent South African Constitution, arguing that such
arrangements tend to discourage effective opposition institutions, which are "basic ingredients of
a viable democracy." Jung & Shapiro, supra note 433, at 270; see Shapiro & Jung, supra note
163, at 238-39. As noted earlier, the new South African Constitution actually abandoned the
power-sharing provisions included in the interim constitution. See supra note 361.
452. See Michael Mandelbaum, Introduction to CENTRAL ASIA AND THE WORLD 6 (Michael
Mandelbaum ed., 1994). Kazakhstan's population as of 1994 was roughly 17 million, about six
percent of the United States'. See CHINN & KAISER, supra note 127, at 187 (citing statistics on
Kazakhstan); CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 1994, at 210 (1994) (discussing Kazakhstan).
453. In addition to immense oil and gas reserves, Kazakhstan is the major source of
nonferrous metals (including zinc, lead, titanium, magnesium, and chromium) in the former
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The consensus is that the Kazakh people formed in the mid-fifteenth
century by breaking away from Uzbek tribes.455 By the late seventeenth
century, Kazakh hordes controlled most of what is now Kazakhstan. 56 In
the early nineteenth century, Russians began settling in the northern Kazakh
steppe. The two cultures clashed head-on. The Kazakhs were "half-
savage"4 7 nomads, defined by their migratory, livestock-breeding way of
life.458 Russian farming settlements thwarted Kazakh migration by
monopolizing potential pasturelands and precious water sources, provoking
Kazakh resentment and raids.459
With Russian expansion of trade in the Middle and Far East,
pacification of the Kazakh steppe became an imperial priority.460 By the
1850s, all of present-day Kazakhstan had been conquered.
461
Prerevolutionary Kazakhstan was a cauldron of discontent, marked by
widespread seizure of land by Russian authorities, 62 forced sedentarization
of Kazakhs,6 3 Kazakh revolt and rebellion,' and fierce Russian retaliation
in which thousands of Kazakhs were killed or forced into exile.
465
After the Russian Revolution, first Lenin and then Stalin adopted a
"divide and conquer" strategy in Central Asia.466 Hoping to counteract the
rise of nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism in the region, 67 Moscow in
Soviet Union and has some of the largest iron and gold deposits in the world. See Gordon Elliot,
Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev, Foreign Investment & Oil, 53 LA. L. REv. 1243, 1250 (1993).
454. See CIA, supra note 452, at 209; Mandelbaum, supra note 452, at viii.
455. See OLCoTr, supra note 120, at 3, 8. The Kazakhs broke away from the Uzbek khanate
after the Uzbeks were defeated by the Mongols. See id.
456. See id. at 11-12. Although divided into three hordes (federations or unions of tribes,
unrelated by blood), the Kazakhs shared a common language, culture, and economy and viewed
themselves as one people. See id.
457. Id. at 75 (citation omitted).
458. See id. at 18. The Kazakhs grazed their herds on "common pasturelands over which
tribes had usage rights but did not own." Id Thus, to the Kazakhs, "land had no intrinsic value";
wealth was based on the size of one's herd, not acreage. Id.
459. See id. at 18.
460. See id at 57-58. Since "trading caravans to Persia, China, India, and the Central Asia
khanates had to pass through the Kazakh territories," Russia wanted to safeguard these lucrative
trading routes and to strengthen their defensive line. Id.
461. See GREGORY GLEAsON, THE CENTRAL AsIAN STATES: DISCOVERING INDEPENDENCE
33 (1997); cf. Qlcott, supra note 120, at 72-73 (describing Russian conquests through the first half
of the century).
462. See OLCOTr, supra note 120, at 90, 100.
463. See id. at 91-92, 97-98.
464. See id. at 111-12, 118-26. A 1916 imperial decree conscripting Central Asians to fight
against Turkey triggered a violent uprising, in part because many Central Asians felt a kinship
with Turks. The uprising included organized attacks on Russian forces and major telegraph and
railroad connections. See id. at 121-22. When the revolt was finally extinguished, "virtually all
sectors of Kazakh society had united in protest against Russian authority." I& at 124.
465. See id. at 121, 125.
466. See Olcott, supra note 119, at 211-12.
467. Toward the same end, Russian authorities changed the Kazakh writing system twice:
first from Arabic (the traditional language of the literati in Central Asia) to Latin beginning in the
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1924 created-paradoxically, as many commentators have noted46 -the
new Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tadzhik, Turkmen, and Uzbek Soviet Socialist
Republics.469 For Kazakhstan, the Soviet period was a combination of
Russian exploitation and significant economic development. Moscow's
policy was to use Kazakhstan "as a kind of contiguous Third World"
source of raw materials and as a dumping ground for prisoners and
undesirables.47 ° Soviet collectivization policies (between roughly 1926 and
1939) led to a shocking 1.5 million Kazakh deaths, attributable in some
cases to violence but more commonly to starvation.47 At the same time,
starting in the 1950s, Soviet economic policies brought to Kazakhstan
agricultural modernization, numerous heavy industries, and science and
research facilities such as the Soviet space exploration center in Baikonur-
along with millions of Russians and Ukrainians and terrible ecological
destruction.472
Since independence, 473 Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev has embarked on
aggressive marketization. In the last several years, the government has
eagerly embraced IMF reforms,47 4 adopted over 130 market-friendly
laws,47 expanded trade vigorously,4 7 6 privatized (after a slow start) most of
1920s, and then from Latin to Cyrillic beginning in 1940. See CENTRAL ASIA, supra note 120, at
79-82.
468. Many have observed that Soviet nationality policies, over a span of 70 years, produced
"two outcomes antithetical to the officially proclaimed goals of merging nationalities and
transcending ethnic distinctions." Philip Goldman et al., Introduction to FROM UNION TO
CoMMoNWEALTH, supra note 121, at 1-2. First, these policies led to the emergence of nations and
national identities in many communities that previously had not achieved ethnic consciousness.
Second, they created in the new republics the preconditions for independent existence, including
their own political elites and educated middle classes and their own administratively defined
territories. See id.
469. See GLEASON, supra note 461, at 49-50; JACK F. MATLOCK, JR., AUTOPsY ON AN
EMPIRE 34-36 (1995). Thus, among the Central Asians, previously "an undistinguished mass of
various self-identifying tribes or city-states .... [c]losely related nomadic families who had
differed from one another primarily in the manner of their migrations suddenly received passports
that identified them as 'Kazakhs' and 'Kyrgyz,' and found themselves living in neighboring
republics." Olcott, supra note 119, at 211-12.
470. Olcott, supra note 119, at 213. These unwanted groups included deported Chechens,
Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, and other North Caucasian peoples. See id.
471. See OLCOTr, supra note 120, at 184-85.
472. See GLEASON, supra note 461, at 52; Olcott, supra note 119, at 213. A large swath of
land around Semipalatinsk, the Soviet Union's primary nuclear weapons testing site, has been
rendered largely uninhabitable. See GLEASON, supra note 461, at 19. In addition, the Aral Sea has
been reduced to half its former size by irrigation and unwise damming. See id. Indeed, industrial
pollution is ubiquitous. See id.
473. In contrast to the Baltic and most of the Slavic republics, none of the Central Asian
states were eager for statehood. Kazakhstan declared independence in 1991; it was the last of the
former Soviet republics to do so. See GLEASON, supra note 461, at 3.
474. See Kazakhstan on Target for Fresh IMF Funding, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Dec. 20, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File; Anthony Robinson & Sander Thoenes, An El
Dorado Rises from the Ashes, FIN. TIMES, July 11, 1996, at 1.
4"5. See Sander Thoenes, Trust of People Key to Reform, FIN. TIMES, July 11, 1996, at 3.
These laws, among other things, streamlined the tax code, permitted repatriation of profits,
liberalized prices, and established an autonomous central bank. See, e.g., Kazakhstan's Mineral
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its industrial giants, including the country's major oil and gold facilities,477
and signed dozens of multimillion dollar international deals.47s By and
large, these marketization measures have been successful; most
international observers today regard Kazakhstan as "the
wealthiest ... [and] the most politically stable" of the Central Asian
republics479 and "a leading player" in the post-Soviet world.48
Notwithstanding the strikingly effective "sociocultural-and
particularly linguistic-[R]ussification" of Kazakhstan during the Soviet
era (even today many urban Kazakhs speak only Russian),4 1 there can be
no doubt that anti-Russian feeling exists among Kazakhs. 82 Perestroika
exposed "the false accusations, purges, deportations, and [mass] deaths"
inflicted on the Central Asian people during the Stalin era, provoking bitter
and widespread outrage. 3 Independence in Kazakhstan (as in the other
post-Soviet republics) brought the enactment of exclusionary language,
citizenship, and education policies,4 4 as well as a revival of Kazakh culture
Wealth Makes a Good Base for Middle Class Growth, MARKET EUR., Jan. 1, 1997, available in
1997 WL 9452244; Transition Indicators: Kazakhstan, QUEST ECON. DATABASE: EBRD
TRANSITION REP., Nov. 1995, at 45.
476. By the first half of 1995, all export quotas had been abolished and most import and
export licensing requirements loosened or eliminated. See Transition Indicators: Kazakhstan,
supra note 475, at 45. The Nazarbayev government has also pursued new export routes, for
example, by opening a railway to the Chinese port of Lyanyungan, by concluding an agreement to
build a pipeline from Tengiz to the southern port of Novorossiisk, and by reaching an
agreement--over the protests of the United States and Russia-to send oil to Iran for refining. See
Robinson & Thoenes, supra note 474, at 3; Rumblings from Kazakhstan, JANE'S FOR. REP., Feb.
6, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Sander Thoenes, Tough at Home,
Tactful away, FIN. TIMES, July 11, 1996, at 3. The government has also sought trade and
investment relationships with Singapore and Malaysia, among others. See, e.g., Kazakhstan Enters
into Investment Pact with Malaysia, NEW STRAITS TIMES, May 28, 1996, at 28; Grace Sung,
Kazakhstan President Urges S'poreans to Invest in His Country, NEW STRAITS TIMES, May 31,
1996, at 60.
477. Privatization began with a modest target-to reduce the state sector to 30-40% of gross
domestic product-and took off slowly. See GLEASON, supra note 461, at 91. In the last few
years, however, the government has privatized most of its industrial giants, including the
country's largest oil and gold facilities, mostly through sales to foreign interests. See Charles
Clover, Kazakhs Steeled to Take Hard Line with Partners, FIN. TIMES, July 2, 1998, at 8; Charles
Clover, Privatisation, June 17, 1998, at 2; Yuri Kushko, Kazakh Unions Say Privatisation Creates
Ghosttowns, REUTERS EUR. Bus. REP., Apr. 2, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
REUEUB File; Sander Thoenes, Gold Mining, July 23, 1997, at 5.
478. See, e.g., Sander Thoenes, The 1996 Diary of Deals, FIN. TIMES, July 11, 1996, at 4.
479. Kazakhstan's Mineral Wealth Makes a Good Base for Middle Class Growth, supra note
475.
480. Keith Molkner, A Comparison of the Legal Regimes for Foreign Investment in Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, I 1 INT'L TAX & BUS. L. 71, 73 (1993).
481. CHINN & KAISER, supra note 127, at 193; see Neil Melvin, Russia and the Ethno-
Politics of Kazakhstan, WORLD TODAY, Nov. 1993, at 208, 209.
482. See, e.g., CHINN & KAISER, supra note 127, at 194-96.
483. Gail W. Lapidus, From Democratization to Disintegration: The Impact of Perestroika
on the National Question, in FROM UNION TO COMMONWEALTH, supra note 121, at 49.
484. See, e.g., CHINN & KAISER, supra note 127, at 190, 194, 198-201; TISHKOV, supra note
126, at 128. The required teaching of the "Kazakh version" of history has been a particular source
of ethnic friction. See Melvin, supra note 481, at 209.
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and symbols.485 Such "Kazakhization" policies (fueled perhaps by "the
alarmist rhetoric of the media in the Russian Federation" )416 led to the
departure of an estimated half million Russians in 1994.487
Nevertheless, in the last few years, even as marketization has
intensified, Kazakh-Russian relations in Kazakhstan seem to have
stabilized. In contrast to some of its neighbors,488 no significant episodes of
interethnic violence have occurred in post-independence Kazakhstan.4 9
Moreover, in the last several years, Russian emigration from Kazakhstan
has slowed dramatically,490 with significant numbers of Russians actually
returning to Kazakhstan.49' All of this has made Kazakhstan something of
an intriguing "success story" for academics and businesspeople alike. The
only major glitch occurred in 1994, when President Nursultan Nazarbayev,
who has ruled the country since independence, dissolved Parliament and
took a sharp turn toward authoritarianism.49
485. See NEIL MELVIN, RussIANs BEYOND RussiA: THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
109 (1995). In September 1992, for example, the Parliament passed legislation returning many
cities to their traditional names: Tselinograd City became Akmola, Gurev became Atyrau, Kirovo
became Zhanalyk, and so on. See GLEASON, supra note 461, at 88.
486. TISHKOV, supra note 126, at 128.
487. See Thoenes, Tough at Home, Tactful away, supra note 476, at 3 (quoting official
statistics). But see MELVIN, supra note 485, at 118 (stating that 200,000 Russians left in 1994);
TISHKOV, supra note 126, at 123 (stating that 400,000 left). According to some estimates, more
than one million Russians left Kazakhstan between 1991 and 1995. See Vladimir Yegorov, The
Russian Language as a Target of Persecution, CURRENT DIG. POST-SOVIET PRESS, Nov. 22,
1995, at 22.
Because of the size of the Russian population in Kazakhstan, a major Russian exodus is
unlikely. See TISHKOV, supra note 126, at 124. This is especially true in the northern oblasts, the
birthplace and homeland of a high proportion of Russians. CHINN & KAISER, supra note 127, at
190-91. The situation is different in other Central Asian republics, where Russians make up a
much smaller portion of the population. According to one survey, 44% and 35% of the Russians
in Tajikstan and Uzbekistan, respectively, believed in 1991 that "a massive Russian exodus from
the republic was very likely in the near future." Kaiser, Ethnic Demography, supra note 122, at
254. Most Russians have in fact left civil-war-torn Tajikstan. See TISHKOV, supra note 126, at
124.
488. Ethnic conflict in Tajikstan has climaxed "in a devastating civil war." TISHKOV, supra
note 126, at 128. In Kyrgyzstan, the ethnic riots that broke out in the Osh region in 1990 were
among "the most violent in the territory of the former USSR." Id. at 136.
489. The last episode of interethnic violence in Kazakhstan dates back to December 1986,
when Kazakh demonstrators in Almaty protested the replacement of Kunayev, a Kazakh who had
held the position of Communist Party First Secretary in Kazakhstan for the previous 25 years,
with Gennadii Kol'bin, a non-Kazakhstani Russian. The demonstrations turned into riots, which
were violently suppressed by Soviet troops. The Almaty riots are often cited as the first
manifestation of nationalism in Central Asia, although they "now seem minor in comparison to
the events in other republics." CHINN & KAISER, supra note 127, at 195-96; see GLEASON, supra
note 461, at 103.
490. See Thoenes, Tough at Home, Tactful away, supra note 476, at 3.
491. See Melvin, supra note 481, at 209. Many Russians returned to Kazakhstan "not simply
because they were not welcomed back in Russia-which has certainly often been the case-but
also because they found themselves living among Russians who were very different from
themselves." Id.
492. See GLEASON, supra note 461, at 85-87; Matt Bivens, Kazakhstan Leader Tightens Grip
on Reins of Power, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, at AS.
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2. Satisfaction of Model Conditions
Kazakhstan has a low per capita income, a low rate of labor
productivity, a high rate of fertility, and a high proportion of the population
engaged in agriculture.493  Thus, model condition one (economic
underdevelopment) appears for now to be satisfied, although education and
health levels are higher in Kazakhstan than in most Third World
countries.494 Condition two is also satisfied. As even the brief historical
sketch above makes clear, longstanding ethnic divisions exist between
Kazakhs and Russians.495 Whether condition three (the presence of a
market-dominant minority) is satisfied is more questionable. Russians in
Kazakhstan were clearly economically privileged at least until
independence, dominating key industrial and technical positions and
occupying the country's best housing.496 Whether Russians are market-
dominant, however, is a distinct and pivotal question, which will be
discussed in detail below. Finally, condition four is not squarely met either.
While Kazakhs are a relatively impoverished group with claims to being the
true indigenous owners of Kazakhstan,497 they are not a majority in
Kazakhstan. Kazakhs today constitute roughly forty-two percent of
Kazakhstan's population, Russians constitute thirty-eight percent, and a
493. See Mandelbaum, supra note 452, at 2. Per capita income estimates vary significantly.
Kazakhstan's State Statistics Committee estimated per capita income as of June 1996 at roughly
$35 a month. (The subsistence level set by the United Nations is $28 a month.) According to other
surveys, Kazakhstan's per capita income may be as high as $95 a month, but even this estimate
remains at developing country levels. See Kazakhstan's Mineral Wealth Makes a Good Base for
Middle Class Growth, supra note 475.
494. See Shafiqul Islam, Capitalism on the Silk Route?, in CENTRAL ASIA AND THE WORLD,
supra note 452, at 147, 153, 157.
495. Notwithstanding extensive interethnic contacts and linguistic Russification during the
Soviet era, throughout Central Asia "the Russians and the titular population kept a cultural
distance from one another. In effect, they were separate communities. ... Mixed marriages
between Russians and people of the local nationalities were and remain rare." TISHKOV, supra
note 126, at 126. Rates of interethnic marriage, however, have "increased with rising urbanization
and education rates." CHINN & KAISER, supra note 127, at 84.
496. See Graham E. Fuller, Russia and Central Asia: Federation or Fault Line?, in CENTRAL
ASIA AND THE WORLD, supra note 452, at 94, 109-10; Kaiser, Nationalizing the Work Force,
supra note 123, at 103 tbl.9 (showing underrepresentation of Kazakhs in industry, transport and
communications, construction, trade, services, and science). Russians are concentrated in the most
industrially developed parts of Kazakhstan, namely the capital city (Almaty) and the northeastern
oblasts. See TISHKOV, supra note 126, at 121; Fuller, supra, at 110.
497. Slogans such as "Drive the Russians out of Kazakhstan" and "Kazakhstan for
Kazakhs" have been around since early this century. OLCOTr, supra note 120, at 206. Such
sentiments, however, appear to be relatively rare today. See infra note 513 and accompanying
text. The suffix "stan" in Kazakhstan is a Persian word meaning "land of." See Richard
Boudreaux, Central Asia: The Long Road to Democracy, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1996, at Al. At
the same time, many Russians in Kazakhstan are descended from families who arrived in the
region before the Revolution and who think of Kazakhstan, "where they-and perhaps their
parents and even grandparents-were born, and many of their relatives are buried, as their 'little
homeland."' TISHKOv, supra note 126, at 126.
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variety of much smaller groups form the balance.49 This distinctive ethnic
demography has important policy implications, as we shall see below.
3. Analysis
The model provides a useful framework for understanding
Kazakhstan's achievement of combining significant marketizing success
with ethnic stability. This relative ethnic amicability may rest in part on
factors specific to Kazakh history and culture, such as the absence of a
strong current of Islamic fundamentalism and Russification of urban
Kazakhs.499 Without denying the salience of such factors, the model
suggests three other possible explanations of the current situation in
Kazakhstan.
a. Retreat from Democracy
First, Kazakhstan has already suffered a major retreat from democracy.
To be sure, in form, Kazakhstan has a tripartite government with
independent executive, legislative, and judicial branches."' Additionally,
opposition groups-including nationalist, socialist, and communist
parties-exist and operate in public."0  Nonetheless, the substance of the
Kazakhstan government for now is Nazarbayev, who was elected president
in an uncontested election,502 who presides over a largely impotent
Parliament,50 3 and who can make laws through unilateral decrees. 4 It is
therefore arguable that Kazakhstan already occupies a variant of model
outcome three: A retreat from democracy may have helped Kazakhstan
maintain both the market and its Russian minority.
498. See Kazakhstan: 1996, QUEST ECON. DATABASE: Bus. INTELLIGENCE REP. vORLD OF
INFORMATION, Oct. 1996, at 1 [hereinafter 1996 Kazakhstan Country Profile]. The demographics
of Kazakhstan have shifted dramatically over this century. In 1926, Kazakhs constituted
approximately 57% of the total population; by 1959, this figure had dropped to just 30%. See
Harris, supra note 124, at 5 tbl.1. According to the 1989 Soviet census, Kazakhs and Russians
represented 39.7% and 37.8%, respectively, of Kazakhstan's total population. See CHINN &
KAISER, supra note 127, at 189. After independence, many Russians left, resulting in the rough
proportions of Kazakhs and Russians noted in the text.
499. See Olcott, supra note 119, at 218; Melvin, supra note 481, at 209. Nazarbayev has
consistently "distanced himself from a religious identification. Alone among the Central Asian
republics, Kazakhstan recognizes no Muslim holidays, and does not mention Islam in its
constitution." Olcott, supra note 119, at 219.
500. See KONSuTsITI [Constitution] art. 3, § 4 (Kaz.).
501. See GLEASON, supra note 461, at 86, 88-89.
502. See Elliot, supra note 453, at 1246-47.
503. The country's legislature, twice dissolved by Nazarbayev, now functions as little more
than an advisory body. See GLEASON, supra note 461, at 86-87.
504. Under the so-called Nazarbayev Constitution, passed in 1995 with a 90% majority,
presidential decrees essentially have the force of law. See id. at 87.
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On this view, the argument would be that Nazarbayev has used his
autocratic power to check majoritarian anti-Russian sentiment. There is
some evidence of this. A career Communist Party member initially put into
power by Moscow, Nazarbayev has always been relatively solicitous of his
country's large Russian constituency: 5 In recent years, Nazarbayev has
repeatedly urged interethnic accord, both because of the importance of
Russian skills "to the economy and because of the necessity to maintain
good relations with Russia itself."5"6 Russian language newspapers,
including the flagship Kazakstanskaya Pravda, operate freely, often voicing
dissent."7 More crucially, under Nazarbayev's direction, Russian was made
an official language alongside Kazakh in 1997. In addition, Russian
language schools in Kazakhstan are now encouraged to stay open.0
Finally, while significant "Kazakhization" of the country's political
apparatus has clearly taken place-Kazakhs now dominate the leading
central ministries, the judiciary, and most spheres of public
administration509-Nazarbayev has also been careful to permit Russian
Kazakhs to occupy key, visible official positions." Indeed, many Russians
505. See Elliot, supra note 453, at 1245-47; Olcott, supra note 119, at 209, 225. But see
Yegorov, supra note 487 (suggesting that Nazarbayev has deliberately aroused anti-Russian
sentiments). Described by one commentator as "an Asian who thinks like a European,"
Nazarbayev was the only ethnic minority to be seriously considered as successor to Mikhail
Gorbachev. GLEASON, supra note 461, at 83. Early popularity polls showed that "ethnic Russians
approved of Nazarbayev's politics even more than did ethnic Kazaks." lId
506. Elliot, supra note 453, at 1245; see Chris Bird, Poverty Overshadows Kazakh
Independence, REUTERS WORLD SERV., Dec. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
REUWLD File.
507. See GLEASON, supra note 461, at 89-90, 132; Sander Thoenes, Kazakh Dissent Stilled
by Silence, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1996, at 6. Shortly after independence, Nazarbayev (who
according to Neil Melvin was "conducting extensive opinion-polling among Europeans") sought
to integrate influential Russians into "a pan-ethnic political organization, the Union of People's
Unity of Kazakhstan." Melvin, supra note 481, at 209.
508. The study of Kazakh, however, is still mandatory. See CHINN & KAISER, supra note
127, at 194.
509. See KULCHIK ET AL., supra note 125, at 36-37; MELVIN, supra note 485, at 109-10.
According to Chinn and Kaiser, the March 1994 parliamentary elections provide a stark example
of political Kazakhization:
Of the 177 parliamentary seats, 42 were filled by the president rather than by election.
Over 700 candidates competed for the remaining 135 seats, giving the appearance of a
democratic election. However, Kazakh electoral commissions struck 200 potential
candidates from local ballots. These candidates tended to represent Russian nationalist
positions. In addition, Cossack organizations were not allowed to field
candidates .... As a result of such preelection maneuvering, only 128 Russian
candidates appeared on the ballots, compared to 566 Kazakhs, even though voting-age
Russians outnumbered Kazakhs.
CHINN & KAISER, supra note 127, at 200 (footnote omitted). At the same time, from the
perspective of Kazakhs in the west, north, and east (the Small and Middle Hordes),
"Kazakhization" is in fact often "a cover for the advancement of the interests of the Great Horde
or southerners. Many of the Kazakhs appointed to high and middle-level [political] positions are
from the south." MELVIN, supra note 485, at 110; see infra text accompanying notes 526-527 &
535-537.
510. See MELVIN, supra note 485, at 116, 120.
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purportedly view Nazarbayev "as the only man who can slow down the
development of Kazakh domination of the country."511
While the model provides no grounds for assuming that an authoritarian
leader would choose to pursue ethnic accommodationism (rather than, say,
eliminationism), the model does predict that leaders who seek both to
marketize and to accommodate an economically dominant minority in the
face of a resentful, impoverished majority will find it easier to do so under
nondemocratic conditions. The problem, however, is that the Kazakhs are
not in fact a resentful, impoverished majority. In fact, taken together, the
Russian, Ukranian, and German Kazakhs-traditional political allies, often
misleadingly referred to as the "Russian-speaking" population-are very
nearly equivalent in number (approximately forty-seven percent of the
population) to the Kazakhs."'
Moreover, there is a danger of mistaking cause for effect in attributing
Kazakhstan's current ethnic stability to Nazarbayev, however shrewd or
powerful he may be. Many autocrats have unsuccessfully tried to "impose"
ethnic harmony (indeed, one of the model's corollaries is that leaders can
much more easily foment than control ethnonationalist movements). If
Nazarbayev were forcing ethnic accommodation upon a recalcitrant Kazakh
populace, one would expect to see many more eruptions of suppressed anti-
Russian resentment. But again, no significant outbreaks of anti-Russian
violence have occurred in postindependence Kazakhstan. Recent surveys
suggest that most Kazakhs wish to coexist peacefully with Russians and, to
a significant extent, with Russian culture.
5 13
b. Russians and Market Dominance
A second possible explanation is that the Russian Kazakhs are not a
market-dominant minority. If Russians are not market-dominant in
Kazakhstan, then marketization would not be expected under the model to
fuel ethnonationalist resentment and backlash among Kazakhs. This
possibility, together with Nazarbayev's accommodationist efforts, could
account in substantial part for Kazakhstan's success in combining
marketization with relative ethnic stability.
511. Elliot, supra note 453, at 1247.
512. See 1996 Kazakhstan Country Profile, supra note 498, at 1. Most Kazakhs also speak
Russian. See CHINN & KAISER, supra note 127, at 194.
513. According to one sociological survey taken in Kazakhstan in December 1994, both
Kazakhs and Russians "want to learn the language and culture of the other [group], and to live in
a cooperative, peaceful way." TIsHKov, supra note 126, at 127. The great majority (80.6%) of
surveyed Kazakhs endorsed the compulsory study of Russian in school. See id. Somewhat at odds
with the survey, however, Chinn and Kaiser observe that "Russians have for the most part resisted
learning Kazakh" on the grounds that "the utility of Kazakh -is limited outside Kazkahstan" or
even in the Russian-dominated northern oblasts. CI-INN & KAISER, supra note 127, at 194.
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Throughout the imperial period, Russians in Kazakhstan were
obviously economically dominant-and possibly even market-dominant, to
the extent it can be said that market conditions existed in tsarist-era
Kazakhstan. 14 Russians remained an economically hegemonic group during
the Soviet era.1 Kazakhs are still disproportionately rural and lag behind
their Russian counterparts in education, technical skills, and per capita
income.516 For this reason, some believe that Russians would outperform
Kazakhs under free-market conditions. 17 However, the extent to which
Kazakhstan's current ethnoeconomic disparities simply reflect
discriminatory Soviet-era biases, which the market should now correct, is
an open and pivotal question.
Kazakhs today are no longer nomadic,18 their literacy and secondary
education levels are impressively high (comparable to those in the East
Asian Tigers), 19 and there is no compelling evidence to suggest that they
are "intrinsically" or culturally less "entrepreneurial" than their Russian
counterparts. 20 Indeed, some evidence suggests that market policies are not
reinforcing the historical economic dominance of Russians over Kazakhs in
Kazakhstan but rather undercutting that dominance. For example, many
Russian Kazakhs occupied positions in the state-supported, "outdated
factories that are among the hardest hit by [market] reforms.""52 Similarly,
the recent shift away from the heavy industrial and military sectors to
"commercial, brokering, and financial activity" appears to have favored
Kazakhs systematically over Russians.5 22
Nevertheless, it is much too early to know whether marketization in
Kazakhstan will favor Kazakhs or Russians (or neither). Many of the
economic problems experienced by the Russian Kazakhs in the northern
514. In the late-19th and early-20th centuries, the sudden opening up of commerce and trade
in the steppe benefited Russian farmers and livestock breeders almost exclusively. The vast
majority of Kazakhs, whose farming remained extremely primitive, could not-or would not-
take advantage of the rapidly growing markets in the north. See OLCOTr, supra note 120, at 85,
98.
515. See Kaiser, Nationalizing the Work Force, supra note 123, at 96. Starting in the 1970s,
however, most of the Soviet republics embarked on "indigenization" movements. As a result,
even in the late Soviet era, Kazakhs came to dominate white collar management positions as well
as high-status professions such as teaching, literature, arts, and science. See id. at 91, 97-99, 100
tbl.6.
516. See KuLCHIK ET AL., supra note 125, at 38. Russians are still overrepresented in
Kazakhstan's industrial, transportation, communications, engineering, construction, science,
textiles, and electronics sectors. See Kaiser, Nationalizing the Work Force, supra note 123, at 94-
95; Olcott, supra note 119, at 213.
517. See KULCHIKErAL., supra note 125, at2l.
518. See OLCOr, supra note 120, at 253.
519. See Islam, supra note 494, at 153, 157.
520. In fact, some have argued that Russians-both in and outside of Russia-are culturally
not entrepreneurial. See, e.g., ALFRED J. RIEBER, MERCHANTS AND ENTREPRENEURS IN
IMPERiAL RussiA 21-24, 29-30 (1982).
521. See Thoenes, Tough at Home, Taciful away, supra note 476, at 3.
522. TISHKOV, supra note 126, at 122.
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oblasts may reflect temporary economic dislocations resulting from the
collapse of the former Soviet Union. 23 Moreover, as the next Section
elaborates, some recent Kazakh economic advances may not reflect market
forces at all but rather an ethnocratic bias in the country's recent
marketization initiatives.
c. Anti-Russian, Antimarket Backlash?
The possibility of a systematically pro-Kazakh bias in Nazarbayev's
marketization program suggests a third explanation of why marketization in
Kazakhstan has not led to anti-Russian animus. According to this view,
"[c]ontrary to all declarations about the republic's advance towards a free-
market economy," 524 the Nazarbayev government is in fact circumventing
market forces in order to protect "the interests of the ethnocratic state and
nascent national Kazakh elite."" Specifically, critics argue that the
government deliberately rigged Zhekeshelendiru-the voucher privatization
program through which many of the country's state-owned enterprises were
transformed into corporations with shares and shareholders 6-- to favor
Kazakhs in general and the elite clan of the Great Horde (from which
Nazarbayev hails) in particular.527 Similarly, privatization of land, which
almost certainly would have "favor[ed] the Slavs and Uzbeks both, because
they are able to do small-plot farming, unlike Kazakhs," 52 allegedly was
conducted in a way that left title of all agricultural land in state hands,
leading some to label the process "ethnoprivatization." 5 29 In addition, the
government has been accused of "blocking contacts between foreign
523. See Kaiser, Nationalizing the Work Force, supra note 123, at 105. Russians in
Kazakhstan tended to be concentrated in the "all-union" industries in northern Kazakhstan that
formerly
produced goods for the whole of the Soviet Union. Following independence, the
Russian Federation quickly closed its southern border, thereby denying these
enterprises access to their main markets. At the same time, the Russian
[government] ... slashed purchases of military equipment from Kazakhstan.... The
combined effect of these policies was to create severe economic difficulties among the
very populations Russia is so keen to "defend."
Melvin, supra note 481, at 209.
524. KULCHIK ET AL., supra note 125, at 24.
525. Id at 26.
526. See GLEASON, supra note 461, at 92-94.
527. See Melvin, supra note 481, at 209-10. Kazakhstan's privatization program drew upon
the so-called Czech model, under which Privatization Investment Coupons (PICs), or vouchers,
were initially distributed to the general population. The PICs were not freely tradable and could
only be invested in government Investment Privatization Funds. These Funds in turn acquired
shares in newly formed joint stock companies. See GLEASON, supra note 461, at 93. According to
critics, the government has blatantly favored funds representing certain Kazakh clans from
southern Kazakhstan. See KULCHK ET AL., supra note 125, at 24.
528. Olcott, supra note 119, at 225; cf. Belcuore, supra note 79, at 466 (noting that private
ownership of land long was anathema to the nomadic Kazakhs).
529. KULCHIK ET AL., supra note 125, at 23.
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investors and non-Kazakh market operators, which, they fear, might
stimulate the development of a Russian-speaking bourgeoisie."53 These
claims, if true, would support a theory that Kazakhstan currently falls into
model outcome one.53'
4. Directions
For purposes of the model, the two most salient facts about Kazakhstan
are the country's unusual demographic balance and the substantial
possibility that the Russian minority, although historically economically
dominant, will not prove to be market-dominant. Given Kazakhstan's
particular demographics, it cannot be assumed that democracy would lead
to an ethnocratic state or even to the election of predominantly ethnic
Kazakh leaders. As a result, while the model suggests that democratization
likely will lead to some explicit ethnopoliticking in Kazakhstan (as is often
the case in divided societies) 3 the model does not predict that democracy
in Kazakhstan will necessarily present a serious obstacle to marketization.
Even assuming that the Russian Kazakhs are market-dominant,
democratization is unlikely to produce irresistible majoritarian, antimarket
pressures-again for the simple reason that Kazakhs are not a majority in
Kazakhstan. And, as already discussed, it is not clear that the Russians are
in fact market-dominant.
Accordingly, the model suggests that Kazakhstan, to a greater degree
than most developing countries, may be a receptive candidate for the stable,
simultaneous, ethnically neutral pursuit of markets and democracy.
Nazarbayev's current autocracy-which, despite his assertion that
"democracy is knocking on the door," 533 shows no sign of abating-is
causing increasing concern, domestically and internationally.:" Moreover,
Nazarbayev's blatant pursuit of not just ethnomarketization (favoring
Kazakhs over the Russian-speaking population), but also clannism and
nepotism, is drawing intensifying criticism from Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs
alike. 35 As one observer has remarked: " [Nazarbayev's] rule has been
accompanied by clan appointments and favoritism that have pitted Kazakh
530. Id. at 26. "Those foreign investors who established direct contact with the [Kazakh]
ruling circles, such as Chevron and Samsung, have achieved the most spectacular results." Id at
25.
531. More precisely, on this theory, Russians are market-dominant, and the absence of a
significant anti-Russian backlash against Nazarbayev's marketization policies would be owing to
the fact that these policies already incorporate an effective anti-Russian component.
532. See sources cited supra note 211.
533. Douglas Busvine, Kazakh Polls Keep Nazarbayev in Control, REUTERS WORLD SERv.,
Dec. 10, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD File.
534. See id.; Thoenes, supra note 507, at 6.
535. See Melvin, supra note 481, at 210.
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against Kazakh. Thus, while for many in the European community the
policy of 'Kazakhization' represents an ethnic threat, in the Kazakh
community it is seen as the growing dominance of the Great Horde." 
536
Similarly, in a local critic's view, "[n]ot talent but connections determine
everything. It's the ability to give the right bribes, not the ability to run a
company. There are no equal opportunities here. If I were married to the
daughter of Nazarbayev I would be one of the country's wealthiest
businessmen." 
5 37
Some, perhaps even most, of Nazarbayev's pro-Kazakh market
interventions to date may be justifiable on grounds of corrective justice.
Moreover, these interventions, together with other Kazakhization policies,
may have played an important role in defusing anti-Russian animus during
the emotionally charged transition period following independence.538 In
light of the available evidence, however, persistence by the Nazarbayev
government in systematically favoring Kazakhs, particularly those who are
well positioned either by family or clan, may simply constitute illegitimate
ethnocracy, if not outright corruption. On balance, in the absence of
compelling evidence that Russians are market-dominant, a strong argument
can be made that marketization in Kazakhstan should be given a chance to
proceed in an ethnically neutral manner. Should Russian market dominance
begin to emerge after a period of time, it might then be appropriate to
consider which, if any, measures should be adopted to address that
contingency.
There is an additional reason for Nazarbayev to avoid favoring ethnic
Kazakhs. Russians in Kazakhstan are geographically concentrated in the
northern part of the republic, near the border of Russia. 39 Russians actually
constitute a majority of the population in three of Kazakhstan's northern
oblasts and a plurality in four others.54 Empirical evidence suggests that
when ethnic groups are geographically segregated, there is a much greater
likelihood of secessionist initiatives and the violence that often
accompanies them.541 Indeed, most political analysts agree that special
dangers attend Kazakhstan's northern oblasts, "where Russians have lived
for generations, remain in the majority, and have developed a strong sense
of homeland."542
536. IdL
537. Thoenes, supra note 507, at 6 (quoting Pyotr Svoik, a former minister turned opposition
leader in Kazakhstan).
538. See, e.g., Boudreaux, supra note 497, at Al (quoting Neil J. Melvin); Busvine, supra
note 533.
539. See CHINN & KAISER, supra note 127, at 185.
540. See id.
541. See Fearon & Laitin, supra note 165, at3, 12-13, 33.
542. CHINN & KAISER, supra note 127, at 190. On the other hand, it may be propitious for
Kazakhstan that within the northern oblasts Russians and Kazakhs generally live interspersed and
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In an attempt to forestall secessionism, and in what most Russians
resent as a deliberate effort to "Kazakhize" the population in the north, the
Nazarbayev government has encouraged Kazakhs returning from other
former Soviet republics and from foreign states to settle in northern
Kazakhstan.54 3 These efforts at "demographic indigenization" have
generally been successful: Notwithstanding significant Russian migration
from the Kazakh-dominated southern oblasts to the northern oblasts,
Kazakh population growth in the north has outpaced that of the Russians.'
Nevertheless, the transition period over the next several years could be
"potentially explosive."' As more and more Kazakhs move to the north,
the Russians in the region "will be tempted to opt for secession while they
still hold the majority rather than to wait for a time in which they will no
longer be able to prevail in an independence referendum. ' ' "4 Hence, if
Nazarbayev goes too far in "ethnocratizing" Kazakhstan's economy and
politics, he risks triggering an ethnonationalist backlash amohg the Russian
populace, with potentially catastrophic consequences, including armed
retaliation, intervention by Russia, or the forcible secession of the Russian-
dominated northern oblasts, which many Russian nationalists view as "an
integral part of Russia." 7
Finally, if and when democratization proceeds in Kazakhstan, it will be
essential to structure the electoral regime in a way that creates incentives
for interethnic political alliances. Indeed, the prospects for "constitutional
engineering" may be especially fruitful in a country with Kazakhstan's
ethnodemographic characteristics." Given the closely balanced numbers of
Kazakhs and Russians in the country, ethnically conscious tailoring of the
democratic process might prove particularly effective. For example,
electoral systems that require majority support (as opposed to proportional
representation) might be effective in discouraging the formation of divisive,
ethnocentric political parties in Kazakhstan.4 9
in fairly balanced numbers. According to one study, societies with high levels of ethnic dispersion
and intermixing in cities are associated with lower levels of ethnic violence. See Fearon & Laitin,
supra note 165, at 20-21.
543. Most of these Kazakhs have returned from Mongolia, where many Kazakhs fled in the
1930s to avoid Stalinist persecution. See CHINN & KAISER, supra note 127, at 191 (citing
COMMISSION ON SEC. & COOPERATION IN EUR. (CSCE), HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION 195-
96 (1993)). Repatriation has been fostered by financial subsidies and a 1991 citizenship law that
grants automatic citizenship (and permits dual citizenship, unlike for Russians) to Kazakhs from




547. Kaiser, Ethnic Demography, supra note 123, at 254.
548. HOROwrrz, supra note 322, at 163.
549. See generally id. at 163-203.
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C. Vietnam
1. Background
Vietnam's recorded history begins in 208 B.C., when a renegade
Chinese general conquered Au Lac, a domain in the northern mountains of
Vietnam populated by the Viet people, and declared himself emperor of
Nam Viet °50 A century later, the powerful Han dynasty incorporated Nam
Viet into the Chinese empire, and for the next thousand years, Vietnam was
ruled as a province of China.551 During this period of Chinese colonization,
and for many centuries afterwards, waves of Chinese immigrants-
bureaucrats, scholars, and merchants, as well as soldiers, fugitives, and
prisoners of war-settled in Vietnam.5 2 By the end of the seventeenth
century, a distinct Chinese community (known in Vietnam as the Hoa) had
formed within Vietnamese society:
Small Chinatowns sprouted in or close to almost every big city and
major trading centre.... [T]he increasing numbers [of Chinese]
allowed them to congregate according to dialect groups or kinship
or even the causes which led to their leaving China. Their growing
economic sophistication also meant the creation of institutions to
regulate business activities... 5
Resentment of growing Chinese success and affluence in Vietnam,
coupled with repeated attempts by China to conquer Vietnam, sparked
recurrent anti-Hoa reprisals. Most notably, the bloody Tay Son uprising,
which began in the 1760s and "took its roots from widespread peasant
discontent," specifically targeted the Chinese, "a distinctive urban 61ite." 554
Tay Son rebels took over the country in 1788. It was during the brief Tay
Son reign that the Chinese were massacred in Cholon.55
With the establishment of the Nguyen dynasty in 1802, Chinese
business activities in Vietnam again flourished. 6 The Nguyen emperors,
who embraced Confucianism and modeled their imperial court after
China's court, had a symbiotic relationship with the country's Chinese:
550. See STANLEY KARNOW, ViETNAM: A HISTORY 111 (rev. ed. 1991).
551. See GOLAY ET AL., supra note 95, at 392; KAIMm, supra note 144, at 73; KARNOV,
supra note 550, at 111.
552. See KHANH, supra note 104, at 14-16.
553. Id. at 16.
554. Id. at 18-19. The Chinese sided with the emperor against the Tay Son rebels. See AMiER,
supra note 296, at 9 n.20.
555. See KHANH, supra note 104, at 19.
556. See id. at 19-20.
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The Nguyen rulers used Chinese merchants in the collection of
taxes, encouraged them to set up shipyards to build boats and ships,
allowed them to buy houses, acquire land, and form their own
social and economic organizations. Historical records show that in
some economic sectors, the Chinese were even more favoured than
the Vietnamese.... In the first half of the nineteenth century, the
Nguyen court exempted new Chinese immigrants from all taxes
[for three years]. Such preferential treatment for the Chinese
community helped them to expand their economic power. 7
The increasing wealth of the Chinese community served the interests of
the ruling officials, who received financial kickbacks from lucrative
Chinese businesses.55 By the time the French arrived in the mid-eighteenth
century, the Chinese were firmly embedded in Vietnam's economy,
particularly in the commercial, trade, and mining sectors.559 Vietnam's gold
industry, in particular, was monopolized by Chinese merchants .
56
Although the French only grudgingly tolerated the Chinese, controlling
their immigration and prohibiting their involvement in the natural resources
sector, the Chinese in Vietnam thrived under colonial free-market
policies.56' Indeed, favorable economic conditions brought a rapid influx of
Chinese immigrants (almost all of whom settled in the south), which
continued until the middle of the twentieth century.562 By the 1930s, "the
interstices between the large-scale manufacturing, plantation, commercial,
and financial enterprises of the French were filled by the smaller enterprises
of the Chinese." 563 At the same time, the French policy of treating the
Chinese as an outsider community "enhanced the distinctiveness of this
minority and sustained latent Vietnamese hostility." 56 The magnitude of
the Chinese minority's economic power was astounding: Constituting just
one percent of Vietnam's population, the Chinese controlled an estimated
ninety percent of non-European private capital in the mid-1950s and
dominated Vietnam's retail trade, its financial, manufacturing, and
557. 1l
558. See id. at 20.
559. See GOLAY Er AL., supra note 95, at 395; K-ANH, supra note 104, at 20.
560. See KHANH, supra note 104, at 18.
561. See GOLAY E AL., supra note 95, at 396; KHANH, supra note 104, at 57. The French
took advantage of Chinese market expertise by entering into a number of cooperative commercial
ventures, including joint rice exporting efforts to Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Singapore. See
KHANH, supra note 104, at 57.
562. According to one estimate, 1.2 million Chinese arrived in Vietnam between 1923 and
1951. See KHANH, supra note 104, at 22.
563. GOLAY ET AL., supra note 95, at 396.
564. Il This was true even though the French banned many expressions of Chinese culture in
Vietnam-for example, by abolishing the Confucian examination system and the official use of
Chinese characters-as part of an effort to break Vietnam's links with China and thus "to isolate
Vietnam from its heritage and to neutralize the traditional elite." ANDERSON, supra note 150, at
126 n.23 (citations omitted).
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transportation sectors, and all aspects of the country's rice economy. 65
Although there were also numerous wealthy Vietnamese in the commercial
class, Chinese economic dominance produced (as it did throughout
Southeast Asia) a bitter outcry against "the Chinese stranglehold on
Indochina," "the Chinese cyst," and "the Chinese excrescence,"5 166 and
triggered recurrent state retaliation, whether in the form of coercive
assimilation policies567 or anti-Chinese commercial restrictions.
6 8
The French granted Vietnam independence in 1954. With the division
of the country into two halves, the south became the Republic of Vietnam
(ROV), and the north became the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.569
Roughly eighty-five percent of Vietnam's Chinese population lived in the
ROV,57 ° and despite an early, abortive "Vietnamization" drive,571 Chinese
economic dominance prevailed during the twenty years of the Saigon
regime--4hat is, from 1955 to 1975.72 Particularly during the Vietnam War
(which the Vietnamese call the American War), the wealth of the
"compradore bourgeoisie" 573 in the ROV rapidly intensified:
565. See GOLAY Er AL., supra note 95, at 395; KHANH, supra note 104, at 20-21, 41, 47;
Tsung-to Way, Overseas Chinese in Vietnam, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 2, 1958, at 20,20-22.
566. PURCELL, supra note 266, at 190 (citation omitted).
567. As early as the 15th century, the Vietnamese government required Chinese residents to
"conform with Vietnamese customs and traditions, even to the extent of dressing the Vietnamese
way." KHANH, supra note 104, at 17. Interestingly, when China's Han dynasty ruled Vietnam
centuries earlier, the Chinese similarly-and unsuccessfully-tried to assimilate the Vietnamese,
for example, by "establish[ing] schools to spread the Chinese language, which became the idiom
of learned Vietnamese...." KARNOW, supra note 550, at 111.
568. Between 1955 and 1957, the Republic of Vietnam's (ROV) "Vietnamization" drive
effectively forced the Chinese in Vietnam to choose between their Chinese identity and their
means of livelihood: Under a series of presidential decrees, members of Vietnam's Chinese
community who did not take on Vietnamese citizenship were prohibited from operating rice mills,
acting as commercial middlemen, transporting goods and passengers, and engaging in areas of
trade traditionally dominated by the Chinese. See AMER, supra note 296, at 19-20; KHANH, supra
note 104, at 53. Another law required the Vietnamese language be used in all Chinese high
schools and mandated that all principals appointed to Chinese schools be Vietnamese. AMIER,
supra note 296, at 20. The ROV's attempts to curtail the economic power of the Hoa failed. By
closing down business operations "and by withdrawing large amounts of money from the banks,
the Chinese virtually brought the [ROV's] economy to a standstill by the summer of 1957." Id at
21 (citation omitted). Shorty afterwards, ROV authorities effectively retracted the anti-Chinese
decrees. See id. at 21-22.
569. The United States replaced France as the primary supporter of anti-Communist South
Vietnam, ruled by Ngo Dinh Diem. See KAMM, supra note 144, at xiv; KHANH, supra note 104, at
22-23.
570. See KHANH, supra note 104, at 23. In northern Vietnam, the Chinese made up a very
small portion of the population and, in stark contrast to the Chinese in the south, were
predominantly rural-" mainly fishermen, foresters and craftsmen." AMER, supra note 296, at 12,
18.
571. See supra note 568.
572. See AMER, supra note 296, at 23.
573. "Compradore" bourgeoisie, from the Portugese word for "buyer," was the official
Communist term for local agents who had made money by acting on behalf of foreign capitalists.
See KHANH, supra note 104, at 79. In the Vietnamese context, the southern compradore
bourgeoisie included both Vietnamese and Chinese businessmen, who were decried as
"reactionary in politics" and "[in collusion] with imperialism and the Saigon regime." Id
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This was a time when opportunities for business came with the U.S.
need for a trade and service network to supply its troops fighting in
Vietnam. The post-1964 years also saw an ROV government
inclined to deregulate the economy and promote liberal market
practices. Local Chinese businessmen were quick to seize these
opportunities and expanded operations not just in their traditional
strongholds of trade and services, but also in finance and light
industries.... The political underside of such economic practice
was the inevitable corruption of the power 6lite. In order to
operate... [the disadvantaged local Chinese] had to cultivate the
politicians and military leaders of the ROV. At the simplest level it
was wining and dining them. But a more serious form involved the
useof huge monetary bribes or offers of shares in businesses. 74
Following the country's reunification in 1976, the revolutionary
Vietnamese government singled out the entrepreneurial Chinese of the
south as "bourgeois" and "an important part of world capitalism,""57
arresting and brutalizing thousands5 76 and confiscating their property, along
with that of their Vietnamese counterparts. 577 In March 1978, all private
trade was banned in Vietnam. A few months later, the government
introduced a new currency and rendered existing money holdings worthless,
thus completing its campaign to transform Vietnam into a socialist
society. 78 Vietnamese authorities claim that this "campaign was not
directed against any particular ethnic group."579  Nonetheless, a
disproportionate number of Vietnamese Chinese were affected. Many
former businessmen and traders were left "without any means of sustaining
themselves.""58 Others faced forcible relocation to "new economic
zones." 581 As a result, many thousands of Chinese from the former ROV
fled the country. 82
574. l at 80. During the Saigon regime, "[s]ome of the Chinese capitalists came to be called
Kings due to their dominant position in trade in different products.... [Hence] the Rice King and
the Petroleum King, only to mention a few." AMER, supra note 296, at 23 (footnote omitted).
575. Henry Kamm, Vietnam Describes Economic Setbacks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1980, at
A9 (citation omitted).
576. See KHANH, supra note 104, at 81 (footnote omitted).
577. See "AM.ER, supra note 296, at 35-36, 53-54; KHANH, supra note 104, at 81; see also
James N. Wallace, A Ray of Hope, U.S. Navs & WORLD REP., Aug. 6, 1979, at 50 ("Employing
the techniques Hitler used to inflame hatred against the Jews, Hanoi is blaming day-to-day
problems in Vietnam on resented Chinese control of commerce and the Mekong Delta rice
trade.").
578. See AMER, supra note 296, at 55.
579. Il
580. Id. at 56.
581. lad
582. See id. After April 1978, the number of people leaving southern Vietnam by boat to
other Southeast Asian countries rose to 5000 a month. See id. Around the same time, more than
160,000 Chinese left the former North Vietnam for China. See id. at 46-47; supra note 296. In
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In 1986,583 after years of economic disaster and famine, and in the face
of triple-digit inflation, unmanageable debt, and declining aid from Soviet-
bloc countries, the Vietnamese government launched a program of
economic liberalization, known as doi moi ("renovation"), designed to
move Vietnam away from centralized planning toward a market-based
economy. 84 The implementation of doi moi has been described as follows:
[S]ince 1988, Vietnam has given free priority to maintaining
macro-stability while concentrating its limited administrative
resources on strengthening the institutional base of its emerging
market economy in order to promote micro-stability. There has
been no rush to privatize SOEs [state-owned enterprises] ... as in
Eastern Europe. Instead, the promotion of micro-efficiency has
focused on price liberalisation, on creating space for the growth of
the private sector and, finally, on imposing market discipline on
SOEs both by removing the soft budget constraint and by exposure
to international competition."5
The effects of doi moi, in particular the inflow of foreign investment,
have been more pronounced in southern Vietnam than in northern Vietnam.
As of 1995, the Mekong Delta and Ho Chi Minh City had almost 30,000
private-owned enterprises, in contrast to roughly 3400 in Hanoi and
Halphong." 6 Following familiar development patterns, doi moi has also
1979, a high-ranking Vietnamese official who defected to Beijing described the egregious
mistreatment of the Chinese in Vietnam:
They have been expelled from places where they have lived for generations.... They
have been dispossessed virtually of all their possessions, their land, their houses and
other belongings.... They have been driven into what have been called new economic
zones.... They gradually die for a number of reasons, either from disease, suffering
from the hard life and so on.
Vietnamese Defector Assails Hanoi's Policy on China, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1979, at A23
(quoting Hoang Van Hoan, former Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Vietnamese
National Assembly) (quotation marks omitted).
583. Although Vietnam's shift to economic liberalization is widely dated to the landmark
Sixth Conference, Eighth Plenum of the Communist Party of Vietnam, which occurred between
June 10 and June 17 of 1986, a progressive loosening of Vietnam's centrally planned economy
has been taking place since 1979. See John Gillespie, Private Commercial Rights in Vietnam: A
Comparative Analysis, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 325, 325 n.1 (1994); Max Spoor, State Finance in the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam: The Difficult Transition from 'State Bureaucratic Finance' to
'Socialist Economic Accounting,' in POST-WAR VIETNAM: DILEMMAS IN SOCIALIST
DEVELOPMENT 111 (David G. Marr & Christine P. White eds., 1988).
584. See CHRISTOPHER ENGHOLM, DOING BuSINESS IN THE NEW VIETNAM 20 (1995);
James Taylor, Jr., Vietnam: The Current Legal Environment for U.S. Investors, 25 LAv & POL'Y
INT'LBUs. 469,469 (1994).
585. George Irvin, Vietnam: Assessing the Achievements of Doi Moi, 31 J. DEv. STUD. 725,
744 (1995).
586. See Hoang K. Giao & Hoang V. Cuong, Vietnam's Private Economy in the Process of
Renovation, in VIETNAM IN A CHANGING WORLD 151-52 (Irene Norlund et al. eds., 1995).
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benefited urban areas far more than rural areas, which by most accounts
have experienced minimal improvement from marketization 87
Economic liberalization in Vietnam has revived the entrepreneurial
presence of the predominantly urban Chinese minority."' 8 Today, the
Chinese in Vietnam cluster in Ho Chi Minh City (still Saigon to most
Vietnamese'8 g), where they constitute about twelve percent of the
population but control thirty to thirty-five percent of that city's commercial
activity.59 For the moment, the Vietnamese government is openly
encouraging the Chinese minority to play a substantial role in Vietnam's
economic development, for example by engaging in joint ventures with the
government and by bringing in foreign investment from their overseas
contacts.59'
2. Satisfaction of Model Conditions
With the overwhelming majority of its population rural,
undernourished, and chronically poor, Vietnam is a typical economically
underdeveloped country, 92  easily satisfying model condition one.
Condition two (severe ethnic divisions) is probably met as well. Even
assuming that the longstanding animosities between the northern
Vietnamese and the southern Vietnamese do not reflect an ethnic conflict,
deep divisions have long existed between the Vietnamese majority and the
country's Cham, Chinese, Khmer, and highlander ethnic minorities." 3
Moreover, consistent with condition four, the Vietnamese represent an
impoverished majority with claims to being Vietnam's true indigenous
"'owners."
Whether the Vietnamese Chinese-who today constitute roughly three
percent of the country's population 4 -represent a market-dominant
587. See, e.g., KAMM, supra note 144, at 264; Ari Kokko, Managing the Transition to Free
Trade: Vietnamese Trade Policy for the 21st Century 4 (May 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with The Yale Law Journal).
588. Even after the Communist takeover of the country and the mass departures after 1978,
a certain part of the business networks of the ethnic Chinese [in southern Vietnam] remained
intact.... Furthermore, the trade links between the ethnic Chinese [who remained] in Vietnam
and Chinese in Southeast Asia, especially Singapore, seem to have been functioning." AMER,
supra note 296, at 56.
589. See David Lamb, Saigon by Any Name Lives on, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1997, at Al.
590. See Gale Eisenstodt, Caged Tiger, FORBES, Mar. 25, 1996, at 64.
591. See Vietnam Seeks Ethnic Chinese Potential for Development, JAPAN ECON.
NEWsxviRE, Mar. 30, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
592. See KAMM, supra note 144, at 44, 228-29, 254-55, 268; Kokko, supra note 587, at 3.
Indeed, Vietnam "remains one of the world's poorest nations." KAMM, supra note 144, at 44.
593. See GERALD CANNON HICKEY, FREE IN THE FOREST: ETHNOHISTORY OF THE
VIETNAMESE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS 1954-1976, at 6, 60 (1982). This is true notwithstanding
repeated (and largely unsuccessful) efforts by Vietnam to assimilate these groups. See id.
594. See WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS, supra note 100, at 834.
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minority in Vietnam (model condition three) is a crucial question, which
will be discussed more fully below. For the moment, it will suffice to say
that in urban Vietnam, where the Chinese are concentrated-and,
significantly, where the vast part of Vietnam's recent growth has taken
placeg--the Chinese appear to be prospering disproportionately as a result
of economic liberalization vis-a-vis the Vietnamese majority. 96
3. Analysis
Assuming for the moment that Vietnam satisfies all of the model
conditions, one would not necessarily expect to see any of the model
outcomes occurring in Vietnam because the government, while clearly
marketizing under doi moi, has taken no steps toward democratization thus
far. On the contrary, the recent ascension of General Le Kha Phieu to
Vietnam's highest political post is widely viewed as a victory for old-guard
Communists "more interested in preserving political control than in
liberating economic energies." 597 And while there is precedent in Vietnam's
history for all three of the model outcomes,59 there are currently no signs of
significant anti-Chinese backlash. Nevertheless, the model raises a set of
previously unaddressed issues, with important policy implications for
Vietnam, both now and in the event that it someday chooses to democratize.
a. The Significance of the Vietnamese Chinese
Without exception, the recent and increasingly voluminous law and
development literature on Vietnam devotes little or no attention to the role
of the Chinese minority in Vietnam.599 The same is true of the economics
595. See KAMM, supra note 144, at 61-65; Ron Corben, Two Cities Hope Their Synergies
Will Propel Vietnam's Development, J. COM., Oct. 15, 1997, at 13C; Lamb, supra note 589, at
Al; Kokko, supra note 587, at 4.
596. See supra text accompanying notes 590-591; infra text accompanying notes 610-613.
597. An Untimely Retreat by Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1998, at A20; see David Lamb,
Vietnam: Willful Contrarian in Booming Asia? Rise of New Communist Leader Seen as Step back
for Already Lagging Nation, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1998, at A14. General Le Kha Phieu, who was
designated Communist Party Secretary General in January 1998, was one of several new top
officials recently named to replace the aging leadership of Do Muoi. The others are Prime
Minister Phan Van Khai, an economist generally associated with market reform, and President
Tran duc Luong, a mining engineer. See An Untimely Retreat by Vietnam, supra.
598. See supra text accompanying notes 554-555, 557-560 & 571.
599. The vast bulk of this literature has been practitioner-oriented and "almost entirely
descriptive." Sidel, supra note 57, at 713; see, e.g., ENGHOLM, supra note 584; ANNE C.MJ.
SCHOT, LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
(1996); VIETNAM: A LEGAL BRIEF (Frederick R. Burke & David Howell eds., 1992); F. Gayle
Connor, Vietnam: Trading With the Enemy or Investing in the Future?, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
BuS. 481 (1994); Thao Cung & Frank Meier, Overview of Recent Tax Reforms in Vietnam, 11
TAx NOTES INT'L 1207 (1995); Glenn P. Jenkins & Seth E. Terkper, Vietnam's Tax Reforms:
Policies in Transition Economies, 6 TAX NOTES INT'L 469 (1993); Rory J. Radding & H.T. Than,
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literature on Vietnam."' This lack of attention is, at the very least, striking
from an historical perspective. Even a cursory look at Vietnam's past
reveals the deep anti-Chinese roots of Vietnamese nationalism.60' Although
Vietnam's relation to China and the Hoa has always been complex,
rejection of Chinese domination lies at the heart of Vietnam's most famous
national legends and landmarks.' More to the point, the Chinese in
Vietnam, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, played a pivotal role in Vietnam's
economy for much of the country's recorded history.60 3
Nonetheless, the situation in Vietnam today is arguably different. As
noted above, after 1975 the revolutionary Vietnamese government began
confiscating Chinese wealth and subjecting the Chinese (along with their
wealthy Vietnamese counterparts) to persecutions and purges.6" Although
these actions were undertaken as part of a broader socialist upheaval in
Patent Protection in Vietnam: A Business Decision, 8 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 87 (1995); Taylor,
supra note 584, at 469; Sesto E. Vecchi, Operating in Unstructured Legal Environments: The
Vietnam Model, E. ASIAN EXEc. REP., July 1991, at 21; Paul B. Walsh, Vietnam's Labor Law:
Can Labor Peacefully Coexist with Foreign Investment, Economic Development, and Structural
Reform?, 8 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 125 (1995); Arno Wohlgemuth, The Law on Foreign Banking in
Vietnam, 7 J. INT'L BANKING L. 284 (1992); Note, A Would-Be Tiger: Assessing Vietnam's
Prospects for Gaining Most-Favored Nation Status from the United States, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1583 (1997); Note, Protection of Foreign Direct Investment in a New World Order:
Vietnam: A Case Study, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1995 (1994). For unusually thoughtful or
sophisticated treatments of Vietnam from a legal perspective, see NATALIE G. LICHTENSTEIN, A
SURVEY OF VIET NAM'S LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN TRANSITION (World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper No. 1291, 1994); Gillespie, supra note 583, at 325; Mark Sidel, The Re-emergence
of Legal Discourse in Vietnam, 43 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 163 (1994); Pham van Thuyet, Legal
Framework and Private Sector Development in Transitional Economies: The Case of Vietnam, 27
LAWv & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 541 (1996); and Mark Sidel, New Directions in the Study of Vietnamese
Law, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 705 (1996) (reviewing LICHTENSTEIN, supra). For human rights work
on Vietnam, see the sources cited in Sidel, The Re-emergence of Legal Discourse in Vietnam,
supra, at 164 n.5.
600. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, VIEr NAM FINANCIAL SECTOR REVIEV: AN AGENDA FOR
FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 81 (1995) (Rep. No. 13135-VN); Kokko, supra note 587.
601. The anti-Chinese heritage of Vietnamese nationalism is often overlooked by Westerners,
who perhaps tend to focus on the more recent events of the Vietnam War. See David K. Shipler,
Robert McNamara and the Ghosts of Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1997, § 6 (Magazine), at 80.
It is worth recalling that Vietnam was colonized by the Chinese for roughly a thousand years and
by the French for roughly a hundred.
602. Thus, every Vietnamese knows that in 40 A.D., the Trung sisters led a brilliant,
sweeping insurrection against China. Although the Han army eventually crushed the rebellion and
captured the sisters,
Vietnamese legend has it that the heroic pair chose death at their own hands. To this
day, the sisters who defied China remain the most honored national heroes or heroines.
Even during the war between north and south, when the two Vietnams agreed on
nothing, both Hanoi and Saigon, and all other towns on either side, named a principal
street Hai Ba Trung, "two Trung sisters."
KAbmM, supra note 144, at 73; see also KARNOW, supra note 550, at 112 (stating that the Trung
sisters, acclaimed by the Communists "as pioneer nationalists," are still venerated at temples
throughout Vietnam).
603. See, e.g., AMER, supra note 296, at 11, 23; GOLAY Fr AL., supra note 95, at 395-96;
KIANH, supra note 104, at 17-18, 44-53; GABRIEL KOLKO, VIETNAM: ANATOMY OF A PEACE 22
(1997); Wu & WU, supra note 296, at 83-86.
604. See AMER, supra note 296, at 35-36,53-56; KHANH, supra note 104, at 81-82.
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which the Chinese were by no means the only victims, the result was a
significant decline in the Vietnamese Chinese population. Between the
early 1970s and the commencement of doi moi, the Chinese population in
Vietnam fell by as much as half,"° and today there are virtually no Chinese
in Vietnam's rural areas, where eighty percent of the population lives. 6 A
preliminary question, then, is whether the Chinese in Vietnam today
represent a sufficient presence and are capable of exerting sufficient control
over the country's economy to trigger the kind of ethnonationalist dynamics
predicted by the model.
A negative answer cannot be inferred from the fact that the Chinese
constitute only three percent of Vietnam's population. First, in countries
like Indonesia and the Philippines (where the Chinese make up two to three
percent of the population), their small numbers have not prevented the
Chinese from being the repeated targets of resentment and state-directed
retaliation.60 Second, although doi moi was initiated nearly a decade ago,
the consensus is that Vietnam is still in the early stages of marketization;
with the exception of the agricultural sector,0 ' almost no privatization has
taken place in Vietnam, and the state continues to occupy a "'leading
position in the multi-sector economy.' 60 9 If the Vietnamese government
undertakes significant genuine market reforms, the economic role of the
Vietnamese Chinese-who in the last decade have regained their prior
prominence in Vietnam's light industry (and, to a lesser extent, banking and
import-export) sectors, 6' ° and who today include "a new breed of young
ethnic Chinese who have made it big" 6I-will almost certainly increase.
Already doi moi has brought an inflow of investments by Chinese from all
over Southeast Asia "through their family connections in Cholon, Saigon's
revitalized Chinatown.612 Moreover, increasing numbers of former Hoa-
605. See KHANH, supra note 104, at 23-25.
606. See Kokko, supra note 587, at 4.
607. See supra text accompanying notes 183-184, 265-266, 283, 301.
608. Collective agriculture was abolished in the late 1980s. The state share of agricultural
production has fallen to less than three percent and is principally limited to "industrial crops such
as coffee, tea and rubber." Kokko, supra note 587, at 4.
609. All Things Being Equal for the State, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 17, 1997, at 6
(quoting Nguyen Tam Chien, Vietnam's Deputy Foreign Minister); see also Kokko, supra note
587, at 7.
610. See KHANH, supra note 104, at 107. The Vietnamese Chinese have been particularly
successful in "plastics, textiles and garments, shoes, and foodstuff-processing." Id.
611. Harish Mehta, A New Phase for the Chinese Community, Bus. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1994, at
17.
612. KAMM, supra note 144, at 61; see also KHANH, supra note 104, at 98. In 1994, ethnic
Chinese from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, who reportedly had "maintained key
economic links with the Chinese community in Vietnam," accounted for roughly 40% of total
foreign investment in Vietnam. See Mehta, supra note 611, at 17.
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many of whom have prospered in their new countries-are returning to
Vietnam "to explore business opportunities." 
613
If the history of Southeast Asia is any guide, and if the great majority of
Vietnamese continue in the near to midtenn future to live in chronic
poverty (as will very likely be the case even under the best of scenarios),
then there is reason to worry that rising Chinese economic dominance will
provide grist for anti-Chinese demagoguery and resurgent Vietnamese
ethnonationalism. Recent journalistic accounts suggest that the revival of
Chinese economic control throughout urban Vietnam has already produced
"a simmering resentment among the Vietnamese," 614 although the extent of
such resentment is difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, as the next few
Sections will demonstrate, grounds for optimism may also exist.
b. Political Favoritism, Corruption, and the Question of Market
Dominance
The economic dominance of the Chinese in Southeast Asia has not
always stemmed purely from their market prowess. In Vietnam, as
elsewhere in the region, Chinese economic success often has reflected
superior political connections as much as superior entrepreneurialism.
615
This was certainly true during the Nguyen dynasty, when the Hoa enjoyed
preferential economic treatment from the state.616 More egregiously,
Chinese economic power during the Saigon regime clearly reflected in part
nonmarket factors. After Nguyen Van Thieu seized power in Saigon in
1966, "a small coterie of Chinese worked with him to play the leading role
in exploiting South Vietnam corruptly. ' 617 After Saigon fell, Thieu fled
Vietnam with millions of dollars in gold,618 while his Chinese cronies,
"who had been exporting large amounts of capital well before 1975," drew
on "their personal connections in Southeast Asia... to go into exile and
prosper elsewhere." 
619
Accordingly, while the Chinese in Vietnam often have been targets of
state discrimination, 6 ° an argument nevertheless can be made that their
historical economic dominance to some extent reflects political favoritism.
To be sure, such favoritism raises the further question of why those in
613. KHANH, supra note 104, at 98.
614. Mehta, supra note 611, at 17; see also Eisenstodt, supra note 590, at 64.
615. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. Although ethnic generalizations are always
potentially suspect, it is striking that the Vietnamese are themselves widely regarded as an
entrepreneurial people, culturally "industrious and inventive." KAMM, supra note 144, at 24.
616. See supra text accompanying notes 556-558.
617. KOLKo, supra note 603, at 22.
618. See KARNOW, supra note 550, at 456.
619. KOLKO, supra note 603, at 22.
620. See, e.g., AMiER, supra note 296, at 10, 19-20 (describing various anti-Chinese economic
restrictions).
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power chose to favor (and to "deal" with) the Chinese. Part of the answer
must be that the Cinese in Vietnam, as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, had
already established themselves as a successful, wealth-generating
"middleman" minority.621 Still, if part of the Hoa's historical economic
success owes not to market forces but to political favoritism, then genuine
marketization (at least in theory) might eliminate this favoritism and
ameliorate the historical ethnoeconomic imbalance.
c. The Possibility of Vietnamese Exceptionalism
Another possible ground for optimism lies in the fact that Vietnam is
considerably more Sinicized than other Southeast Asian nations. 6 2 For over
two millennia, Vietnam's history and culture have been closely intertwined
with those of its colonizer-neighbor.6' The results are visible throughout
Vietnamese society, from its embrace of Confucianism and Taoism to its
literature, art, and architecture-much more so than in Indonesia, Malaysia,
or the Philippines.624 Additionally, there has been considerable "blood
admixture" between the Vietnamese and the Chinese.6' As a result, at least
arguably, Vietnam may be less prone to anti-Chinese animus and
politicking.
In other words, the hope would be that Vietnam will prove exceptional
in Southeast Asia in its greater potential tolerance of Chinese economic
success. Unfortunately, this hope flies somewhat in the face of historical
fact.626 Moreover, even if relations between the Vietnamese and the Hoa are
relatively benign for the moment, ethnic relations are highly malleable, and,
621. See KHANH, supra note 104, at 57.
622. See AMER, supra note 296, at 7-8; KAMM, supra note 144, at 128.
623. See AMER, supra note 296, at 2, 7.
624. See id. at 7; KAMM, supra note 144, at 128-29; see also KEITH WELLER TAYLOR, THE
BIRTH OF ViETNAM 80-81, 281 (1983) (noting the Chinese roots of Buddhism, Buddhist
architecture, and Taoism in Vietnam). Prominent Vietnamese have described Vietnam as part of
the "chopstick civilization," referring to
the four nations that are linked by much deeper cultural ties than their use of Chinese
eating utensils-China itself, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. The motherland of Chinese
culture and its three offspring, with all their differences, form a cultural family quite
distinct from the rest of Asia. Vietnam is its southernmost member.
TAYLOR, supra, at 128. A central aspect of Vietnam's Chinese heritage is its adherence to the
strong Confucian culture that places the world "under an established order, with a revered godlike
figure at the top and center of a highly centralized... hierarchy devoted to its service." Id.
625. PURCELL, supra note 266, at 201; see also id. at 179, 200-02 (detailing the "inextricably
commingled" blood of the Chinese and the Annamites). Particularly in North Vietnam, the
Chinese were assimilated early on and regarded as Vietnamese nationals. See AMER, supra note
296, at 8. More generally, after 1829, children of mixed marriages between the Chinese and the
Vietnamese were considered Vietnamese. See id. at 8-9. In addition, during the Saigon regime,
many foreign born Chinese eventually became Vietnamese nationals for economic reasons. See id.
at 22, 24.
626. See, e.g., PURCELL, supra note 266, at 202-03 (detailing deep, historical anti-Chinese
animus in Indochina).
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as one observer of Vietnam's relation to China put it in 1965, it would be an
error to "attribute more than is justified to their common cultural
heritage." 627
4. Directions
Today's legal commentary on Vietnam is almost unanimous in
encouraging this potential "Asian Tiger" to privatize its debt-ridden state
sector and to normalize its trade and investment regime as quickly as
politically feasible.6' As usual, this largely practitioner-oriented literature
has very little to say about distributional problems, much less
ethnodistributional problems. By contrast, this Article has argued that, if
markets and eventually democracy are the ultimate goals in Vietnam, then
distributional issues must be addressed.
As a general matter, it will be important for Vietnam's policymakers to
try to find ways to spread the benefits of marketization beyond the
(Chinese-dominated) urban areas to the country's immiserated rural
areas.629 Along these lines, in the context of privatization, I have elsewhere
suggested strategies that marketizing governments might adopt to create
broader distribution of market-generated wealth.63 Although careful
tailoring to Vietnam's particular circumstances would be necessary, such
strategies might include ownership restrictions; rate, service, and product
regulations; and environmental quality regulations.631 In addition, state-
building initiatives, typically sponsored by international financial or
development organizations and directed at establishing "functioning and
accountable bureaucracies capable of enforcing the regulatory frameworks
essential to the distribution of [the market's] benefits,"632 will be essential
to Vietnam's development.
More specifically, marketization in Vietnam will have to deal with the
complex position occupied by the Hoa. Assuming that the Chinese prove to
be market-dominant in Vietnam (as they seem to be throughout Southeast
Asia), the crucial question is whether this market dominance will trigger the
kind of ethnonationalist dynamic predicted by the model.
On the exceptionalist view, it will not. If Vietnam's relation to its
Chinese minority really is an exception to the rule that has prevailed
627. Id. at 201.
628. See, e.g., Gillespie, supra note 583, at 373-77; Jenkins & Terkper, supra note 599, at
480; Taylor, supra note 584, at 470-78; Wohlgemuth, supra note 599, at 284, 290-91; Vecchi,
supra note 599, at 23; Kokko, supra note 587, at 53-58.
629. Cf. Kokko, supra note 587, at 4 (indicating that the market's benefits have been
unequally distributed in Vietnam).
630. See Chua, supra note 18, at 288-98.
631. See id.
632. IU. at 299-300.
19981
The Yale Law Journal
virtually everywhere else in Southeast Asia, then the pursuit of full-blown
marketization (coupled with after-market social welfare programs) could be
the best strategy for Vietnam. On this theory, the economic success of the
Vietnamese Chinese should be actively encouraged and their
entrepreneurial skills and experience harnessed to help fuel Vietnam's
development. Moreover, to the extent that Vietnam establishes itself as an
attractive investment site for global Chinese capital, the country stands to
gain enormously.
This strategy, however, raises certain risks, which will have to be
carefully monitored. To begin with, corruption in Vietnam today is chronic
and pervasive-Vietnam has been ranked "as one of Asia's three most
corrupt nations." 633 It is often hoped that marketization will ameliorate
corruption in developing countries: "In general, any reform that increases
the competitiveness of the economy will reduce incentives for corrupt
behavior." 634 Unfortunately, the last decade has taught us that one of the
most intractable problems of marketization in the developing world is
corruption within the marketization process itself.635 In Vietnam, this
danger could be particularly acute if the government pursues excessively
pro-Chinese policies under the guise of marketization. Parasitic self-dealing
arrangements between the Vietnamese ruling elite and Chinese business
interests have a long history636 -as do popular reactions against the
"greedy" and "unscrupulous" Chinese.637
Even if there is more tolerance of Chinese economic success in
Vietnam than there has been elsewhere in Southeast Asia, this tolerance
will not be unlimited. To the extent that Vietnam seeks to harness Chinese
economic energy and investment capital, every effort should be made to
ensure that wealthy Chinese, inside and outside of Vietnam, make
significant, visible contributions to local (and especially rural) Vietnamese
communities. Such contributions could take the form of infrastructural
improvements, housing, hospitals, schools, and so on.
More fundamentally, there is the risk that the exceptionalist view will
prove to be a mirage. As detailed above, there is not only historical
precedent for anti-Chinese movements in Vietnam but also some evidence
of current anti-Chinese ethnoeconomic resentment.63 Accordingly, there
remains a substantial possibility that markets and democracy in Vietnam,
633. KOLKO, supra note 603, at 76.
634. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Development, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK
CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1997, at 35, 46 (Boris Pleskovic & Joseph E.
Stiglitz eds., 1998); see also Domingo F. Cavallo, Lessons from Argentina's Privatization
Experience, 50 J. INT'L AFF. 459, 462,474 (1997).
635. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 634, at 46.
636. See supra text accompanying notes 557-558, 617-619.
637. PURCELL, supra note 266, at 203; supra text accompanying notes 554-555, 576-582.
638. See supra text accompanying notes 554-555 & 614.
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coupled with disproportionate Chinese economic success, will trigger the
destructive dynamic predicted by the model.
In these circumstances, the Vietnamese government should' be
discouraged from pursuing a Suharto-style strategy of preferential treatment
for the Hoa.639 On the contrary, market preferences favoring the ethnic
Vietnamese might be far more prudent. Along these lines, the Vietnamese
government already has in recent years taken steps favoring overseas
Vietnamese (as compared to other potential foreign investors), who are
increasingly returning to, and investing in, Vietnam."4 Although such
favoritism raises concerns of ethnic discrimination, especially from the
point of view of the developed world, it may be justified and sensible for a
country with Vietnam's history.
As recent events in Bosnia starkly illustrate, ethnic relations even
among relatively well-integrated groups are very unstable. In Vietnam, the
prospects for free-market democracy will turn on the choices of political
elites and on the tolerance of the Vietnamese for a resurgently successful
Hoa community. Vietnam's history offers precedents for the full range of
reactions, from accommodationism to eliminationism. Unfortunately, the
degree of ethnic intolerance in Vietnam is difficult-perhaps even
impossible-to determine in advance. Of all the mines still buried in
Vietnam, this one may pose the greatest threat to the nation's future
development.
VI. CONCLUSION
History never repeats itself exactly. Ethnic relations are volatile and
malleable-for better or worse-and there is certainly room to hope for
market miracles. Whether such a hope should form the basis of law and
development policymaking, however, is another matter. The work of
Western lawyers and legal academics in the developing world today-
profound and transformative though it has been-has proceeded in blissful
and almost willful ignorance of three crucial facts. The first concerns the
relationship between markets and ethnicity; the second, the relationship
between markets and democracy; and the third, the interplay among all
three of these forces.
639. See supra text accompanying notes 312-317.
640. See David Lamb, Viet Kieu: A Bridge Between Two Worlds, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1997,
at Al; Vietnam New Preferential Treatment for Viet Kieu Likely, SAIGON TIMES DAILY, Jan. 16,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, SGNDLY File; Vietnam Offers Visiting Overseas
Vietnamese Discounts, AGENcE FR.-PRESSE, Sept. 23, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
AFP File. Overseas Vietnamese have at their disposal an estimated $20 billion, roughly one-fourth
of Vietnam's gross domestic product. See CIA, THE WORLD FAcTBOOK 1995, at 454 (1995)
(listing Vietnam's 1994 gross domestic product as $83.5 billion); Lamb, supra, at Al.
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First, the idea that the invisible hand of the market will benefit some
people over others is hardly new. Proponents of laissez-faire capitalism
respect and relish the anonymous justice of the market insofar as it
promises to reward anyone who is sufficiently entrepreneurial,
hardworking, and lucky.64 In Part I, however, I demonstrated that markets
tend to benefit not just some people over others, but also some ethnic
groups over others in virtually every part of the world. In the developing
world, moreover, markets often favor certain ethnic minorities over the rest
of the population. This phenomenon in the developing world is potentially
very destabilizing, yet it is almost uniformly disregarded by lawyers and
scholars involved in marketization.
Second, in the developing world, the ethnic groups favored by the
market are frequently different from the ethnic groups favored by majority
rule. As a result, markets and democracy in the developing world are not
always mutually reinforcing. On the contrary, they are constantly colliding,
sometimes to good effect, but at other times, catalytically and
catastrophically. What this means for marketizing and democratizing
lawyers is that, like it or not, the work they do in the developing world-
whether it is privatization, project finance, or constitutional advising-has
implications for ethnic conflict. It also means that many Western policy
suggestions may be dangerously myopic.
The final misperception concerns the relationship among markets,
democracy, and ethnicity. Prevailing law and development orthodoxy
assumes that marketization and democratization-the current prescription
for economic and political underdevelopment-will cure ethnic conflict
too. By contrast, this Article insists that marketization and
democratization-to the extent that they are successful-may, in countries
such as South Africa, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam, and throughout the
developing world, catalyze ethnic tensions in a highly determinate and
predictable fashion. The market will not lift the great majority of citizens
out of poverty. Rather, it will aggravate, at least in appearance and probably
in reality, the existing ethnic maldistribution of wealth. Democracy will not
make all voters imagine themselves as coparticipants in a fraternal national
community. Rather, the competition for votes will more likely foster the
emergence of ethnic political entrepreneurs (particularly among the
impoverished majority) and active ethnonationalist movements. Markets
and democracy cannot be regarded unproblematically as solutions to the
dangers of ethnic strife in deeply divided societies. Particularly given the
unprecedented international influence of American lawyers today,
641. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 162-64 (1982); 2 F.A.
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 68-69 (1976);
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 228-29 (1974).
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marketizing and democratizing lawyers who continue to ignore the
developing world's historic distributional problems, especially its
ethnodistributional problems, are engaging in "romanticism or worse." 64
642. GEERT7, supra note 95, at 156 (referring to the blind faith in the ability of laissez-faire
to achieve sustainable growth in developing countries as "romanticism or worse").
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